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Foreword
Jon 0. Newmant
On November 11, 1944, a general court-martial of nine members im-
posed a sentence of death upon Private Eddie Slovik, the only Ameri-
can serviceman executed for desertion since 1864. That fateful judg-
ment was reviewed by numerous levels of military command that
were authorized to exercise clemency. None did. Long after Private
Slovik's death, the presiding officer of the original court-martial was
asked about the sentencing decision. His reply captured a horrifying
aspect that pervades sentencing in America: No member of the court-
martial believed the sentence would be carried out.*
Out of humanitarian concerns to provide ample opportunity to miti-
gate the harshness of the sentencing process have come administrative
mechanisms for clemency. Chief among these is parole. Until recently
scant attention has been paid to the operation of state and federal
parole systems, and virtually no thought has been given to the effect
of the parole system upon the sentencing decision. Many have decried
the fact that American judges impose average sentences higher than
those of any other Western country. Has anyone realized how often
the judge imposes a long sentence on the assumption that parole will
be accorded at the one-third point? Many have decried disparities
among sentences imposed on seemingly similar offenders for similar
offenses. Has anyone realized how frequently the different sentences
simply reflect the different expectations of the sentencing judges as
to what proportion of the sentence the offender will serve before
being paroled?
American sentencing is afflicted with the Slovik syndrome: the ex-
pectation that the sentence will not be fully carried out. Of course few
defendants will serve every day of the sentence imposed. Good time
credits usually provide some discount and parole at some point is
likely, at least for long sentences. But even as to long sentences judges
frequently underestimate the time served before parole, and with sen-
tences of less than three years, they would be surprised to learn how
often parole is denied entirely.
The Project that follows provides what is urgently needed by judges
j- United States District Judge and former United States Attorney, District of Connecti-
cut.
* W. Hum, THE EXECUTION OF PRIVATE SLOVIK 169 (1970).
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and the public-a fund of valuable information concerning the opera-
tion of the parole system administered by the United States Board of
Parole. Only by understanding in detail how the system works can
judges rationally determine appropriate sentence lengths. Their sen-
tencing decisions are difficult to make at best. When they act in ig-
norance of the standards and practices that determine the extent to
which their sentences will be carried out, they unwittingly fall victim
to the syndrome that condemned Private Slovik.
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Introduction
Sentencing and parole release decisions share responsibility for deter-
mining length of imprisonment.' A decision to parole results in condi-
tional release2 prior to the expiration of the maximum term; a denial
results in continued imprisonment. Although parole release decisions
have been regarded as virtually autonomous from sentencing per se, 3
parole is an integral part of the sentencing and correctional process.
The parole release decision is often more important than the sentence
in determining how long prisoners actually spend incarcerated. 4 In-
deed, "when minimum sentences are short or are not given (as is
presently the trend) parole selection is, in reality, more of a deferred
sentencing decision (a decision of when to release) than a parole/no
parole decision."5
Release on parole has come to be essential to the administration of
post-conviction justice.0 American prison sentences are, comparatively
1. Menechino v. Oswald, 430 F.2d 403, 414 (2d Cir. 1970) (Feinberg, J., dissenting),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1023 (1971); R. DAWSON, SENTENCING: THE DECISION AS TO TYPE,
LENGTH AND CONDITIONS OF SENTENCE 5 (1969) [hereinafter cited as DAWSON]; U.S. PRESI-
DENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE
REPORT: CORRECTIONS 85 (1967) [hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE REPORT: CORRECTIONS];
Kastenmeier & Eglit, Parole Release Decision-Making: Rehabilitation, Expertise, and the
Demise of Mythology, 22 AM. U.L. REV. 477, 481, 482 (1973). See R. GOLDFARB & L. SINGER,
AFTER CONVICTION 282 (1973); Hayner, Sentencing by an Administrative Board, 23 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROD. 477 (1958); Kadish, Legal Norm and Discretion in the Police and Sen-
tencing Processes, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 904, 920-26 (1962).
2. Comment, The Parole System, 120 U. PA. L. REv. 284, 285 (1971) [hereinafter cited
as The Parole System]. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 477 (1972); N.Y. State Div.
of Parole, Manual for Parole Officers, 1953, reprinted in SOURCEBOOK ON PROBATION,
PAROLE AND PARDONS 17-18 (3d ed. C. Newman 1968).
3. See, e.g., Menechino v. Oswald, 430 F.2d 403, 410 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 1023 (1971); pp. 854-58 infra.
4. FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS, 47 NAT'L STATISTICS: PRISONERS IN STATE AND FEDERAL
INSTITUTIONS FOR ADULT FELONS 22 (1972), in O'Leary, Issues and Trends in Parole Ad-
ministration in the United States, 11 Am. CRIM. L. REV. 97, 99 n.7 (1973). Over 60 percent
of the adult felons in state and federal institutions are released from incarceration prior
to the expiration of the maximum sentence imposed by the court. TASK FORCE REPORT:
CORECTmONS, supra note 1, at 60. In 1967, 30 percent of the total state and federal prison
population were released on parole. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF
THE UNITED STATES 157 (1970).
5. P. Hoffman & D. Gottfredson, Paroling Policy Guidelines: A Matter of Equity, June
1973, at 3 (NCCD Parole Decision-Making Project Supp. Rep. No. 9) [hereinafter cited as
NCCD Supp. Rep. 9]; Gottfredson, Hoffman, Sigler & Wilkins, Making Paroling Policy
Explicit, 21 CRIME . DELINQ. 34, 36 (1975).
6. In the federal system parole is the most common form of release from incarceration.
In fiscal year 1970, 40 percent of all first-releases of federal prisoners serving sentences
longer than six months were on parole. Hearings on Corrections, Federal and State Parole
Systems Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 2d
Sess., ser. 15, pt. 7-A, at 897 (Chart 6) (1972) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on Parole].
Prisoners may also be freed on supervision through "good time" or mandatory release.
This accounted for 23.6 percent of first releases. Id. Mandatory release is a matter of
statutory right for prisoners who, through observance of institutional rules and participa-
tion in special work projects, earn and retain good time. 18 U.S.C. § 4163 (1970). Although
persons mandatorily released are subject to supervision, conditions and revocation of their
814
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speaking, quite long 7 Increasingly indeterminate, they leave open a
wide range within which the inmate can be released.8 These factors,
combined with the limited resources devoted to building and staffing
prisons, require that pre-expiration release be institutionalized.
In the absence of clear legislative or judicial guides for parole re-
lease decisionmaking, vast responsibility has devolved upon parole
'boards. Parole decisions have been considered matters of special ex-
pertise, involving observation and treatment of an offender and release
under supervision at a time that maximizes both the protection of the
public and the individual's rehabilitation.9 This ideal correctional aim
of protecting society and rehabilitating the offender has served as a
justification for the broad discretion vested in parole authorities.10
Parole release decisionmaking has thus suffered, like other phases
of the post-conviction process, from judicial neglect and "hands-off-
ism."" Until recently, parole boards have been left free to operate
release, just as if released on parole, mandatory release differs from parole release in two
important respects. First, mandatory release involves no discretionary judgment on the
part of prison officials or the Board of Parole. Second, a mandatory release becomes
unconditional by operation of law 180 days before the expiration of the maximum term.
Id. § 4164. See Note, Mandatory Release in the Federal System, 20 KAN. L. REV. 512 (1972);
p. 818 infra. At the other extreme, 30 percent of first releases occurred at the expira-
tion of the sentence. Hearings on Parole, supra. Of this percentage, however, the Board
indicates that virtually all of them were persons with sentences of 18 months or less.
7. While the average sentence of the federal prison population on June 30, 1965, was
over five years and nine months, sentences in excess of five years are quite rare in most
European countries. ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELAT-
ING TO SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND PROCEDURES, Commentary to § 2.1(f), at 57-59 (App.
Draft 1971); E. JOHNSON, CRIME, CORRECTION AND SOCIETY 409 (1964); Mannheim, Com-
parative Sentencing Practice, 23 LAw & CONTEMI'. PROB. 557 (1958); Morris, Lessons From
the Adult Correctional System of Sweden, FED. PROBATION, Dec. 1966, at 4 n.9.
8. "[T]he introduction of an indeterminate sentencing scheme into a given jurisdiction
has been associated with the argument that the release decision should be in the hands
of correctional experts who should be unhampered by restrictive sentencing...." O'Leary
8- Nuffield, Parole Decision-Making Characteristics: Report of a National Survey, 8 CRIM.
L. BULL. 651, 660 (1972). See Newman, Court Intervention in the Parole Process, 36 ALB.
L. REV. 257 (1972); Note, Statutory Structures for Sentencing Felons to Prison, 60 COLUM.
L. REV. 1134, 1144-53 (1960).
9. The fact that we ... believe there is some element in every ... [offender] ... which
renders him redeemable gives rise to the need of a service like parole ....
Parole is the service that aids the released prisoner to bridge the gap between the
relatively abnormal environment of the prison and the enyironment of the com-
munity .... [But] parole [also] providies a period in the life of the offender when he
can be removed from society as soon as he shows indications of dangerous behavior
without waiting until he commits a new crime ....
G. GIARDINI, THE PAROLE PROCESS 18-19 (1959) [hereinafter cited as GIARDINI]. See Mor-
rissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 477 (1972); D. DRESSLER, P.ACTICE AND THEORY OF PROBATION
AND PAROLE 60-61 (1951) (dual objective of protecting society and providing continuing
treatment in community).
10. Kastenmeier 9- Eglit, supra note 1, at 503.
11. See generally Goldfarb & Singer, Redressing Prisoners' Grievances, 39 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 175 (1970); Kimball & Newman, Judicial Intervention in Correctional Decisions:
Threat and Response, 14 CRIME & DELINQ. 1 (1968); Newman, supra note 8, at 259; Note,
Decency and Fairness: An Emerging Judicial Role in Prison Reform, 57 VA. L. REV. 841
(1971); Note, Beyond the Ken of the Courts: A Critique of Judicial Refusal to Review the
Complaints of Convicts, 72 YALE L.J. 506 (1963).
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with unstructured discretion; even those minimal due process safe-
guards required when earned "good time" is forfeited in disciplinary
proceedings, 12 or when parole is revoked after the inmate has been
conditionally released, 13 have not been applied to the parole release
decision. The apparent arbitrariness of parole release decisionmaking
has been much criticized, 14 especially as the parole process has been
shown to be ineffective in rehabilitating inmates and reducing crime. 5
This unsupervised freedom and immunity from judicial or adminis-
trative review has also left parole boards free to develop innovative
techniques and standards for decisionmaking. Although few parole
boards have taken advantage of this opportunity,' 6 the United States
Board of Parole is now the exception to this general pattern. The
Board has implemented major changes in response to prior criticism
of their unstructured and unreviewable exercise of discretionary power.
Among these innovations are improvements in the parole release hear-
ing and the introduction of an explicit, detailed Guideline Table
that determines in most cases how long an inmate must serve prior
to release. Many state jurisdictions may soon follow the federal lead.' 7
This Project analyzes the innovations adopted by the Parole Board.' 8
Part I details the basic features of the federal parole system and
criticisms of past procedures. The actual operation of the Board's
recent reforms in the parole hearing is evaluated on the basis of em-
pirical observations. Part II considers the minimum constitutional and
statutory procedural requirements applicable to parole release hear-
ings, and then suggests those procedures that are best designed to in-
12. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974). See pp. 849-50, 853 infra.
13. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 US. 778 (1973); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
See pp. 849-50, 852 infra.
14. AM. FRIENDS SERVICE COMM., STRUGGLE FOR JUSTIcE 90-96 (1970); K.C. DAVIS, DIsCRE-
TIONARY JUsTICE 126-33 (1969); Kastenmeier & Eglit, supra note 1, at 483-99; Newman,
supra note 8, at 261-71, 298-304; Parsons-Lewis, Due Process in Parole Release Decisions,
60 CALIF. L. REV. 1518, 1521-30 (1972); The Parole System, supra note 2; Dawson, The
Decision to Grant or Deny Parole: A Study of Parole Criteria in Law and Practice, 1966
WASH. U.L.Q. 243, 244. See J. GOLDSTEIN, A. DERSHOWITZ & R. SCHWARTZ, CRIMINAL LAW:
THEORY AND PROCESS 187-211 (1974) (transcripts of hearings).
15. Compare Brancale,oDiagnostic Techniques in Aid of Sentencing, 23 LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROB. 442, 456-60 (1958); GIARDINI, supra note 9; and Hayner, supra note 1, at
493-94; with Kastenmeier & Eglit, supra note 1, at 494-510.
16. V. O'LEARY & J. NUFFIELD, THE ORGANIZATION OF PAROLE SYSTEMS IN THE UNITED
STATES (2d ed. 1972); O'Leary, supra note 4, at 107-14, 137.
17. Interview with P. Hoffman, Research Criminologist, U.S. Bd. of Parole, Nov. 11,
1974, in New Haven, Conn. An NCCD" "follow-up" project, directed by D. Gottfredson
and L. Wilkins and funded by the Justice Department's Law Enforcement Assistance
Administration, inquired, by letter, whether any state parole systems would be interested
in assistance in adopting criteria similar to the federal Guidelines. Over 30 parole systems
responded that they were definitely interested in adopting guidelines modeled on the
federal system. Id.
18. The empirical focus of this Project is on the federal system of parole and, where
relevant, sentencing. However, many of the implications, conclusions and recommenda-
tions may be useful for various state parole systems.
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sure fairness and accuracy in the parole decision. Part III examines
the legality of the Parole Guidelines' substantive criteria for decision-
making. Part IV discusses the implications of present parole release
decisionmaking for the sentencing process and for the larger criminal
justice system. In particular, judicial beliefs and attitudes about parole
and sentencing are explored on the basis of a questionnaire survey of
sentencing judges. Part V summarizes the Project's recommendations
and conclusions.
I. Parole Release Decisionmaking
A. The United States Board of Parole
The United States Board of Parole, an independent agency located
in the Department of Justice, is composed of eight members appoint-
ed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate.19 The
members, one of whom is designated as chairman by the Attorney
General, serve staggered terms of six years. 20 By statute, the Board
has the responsibility for making federal parole release decisions, 21 set-
ting the conditions of that release 2 2 issuing warrants for the arrest of
parolees who have allegedly violated the conditions of their release,23
and determining whether release conditions have in fact been vio-
lated and, if so, whether parole should be revoked, modified, or con-
tinued.2 4 The Board has jurisdiction over all eligible federal offend-
ers, 23 regardless of where the sentence is served.20 Individuals released
19. 18 US.C. § 4201 (1970); 28 C.F.R. § 0.128 (1974). For a statutory history of the
federal Parole Board, see Act of June 25, 11910, ch. 387, § 1, 36 Stat. 819; Act of May 13,
1930, ch. 225, § 1, 46 Stat. 272; Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, § 1, 62 Stat. 854; Act of Sept.
30, 1950, ch. 1115, §§ 1, 2, 64 Stat. 1085; Act of Aug. 25, 1958, Pub. L. 85-752, 72 Stat. 845.
Criticism has been leveled at the appointment process. No qualifications or standards are
provided or suggested nor are there any requirements of preliminary training. See Mc-
Selly, What's So Good About Parole?, FED. PROBATION, Dec. 1961, at 20. The appointment
process also leaves members open to political pressure; see, e.g., Note, The Federal Parole
System: A Constitutional Analysis, 17 HOWARD L.J. 894, 906 (1973).
20. 18 U.S.C. § 4201 (1970). For administrative purposes, all Board members also
serve in the Youth Division. 28 C.F.R. § 0.127 (1974); see 18 U.S.C. § 5005 (1970).
21. 18 U.S.C. § 4203 (1970), as amended, (Supp. II, 1972); 28 C.F.R. §§ 0.125(a), (e), 0.127
(b)(5), 2.18 (1974); see id. §§ 0.129-2, 2.23 (delegation of authority to hearing examiners).
22. 18 U.S.C. §§ 4203-04 (1970); 28 C.F.R. §§ 0.125(b), 0.127(b)(4), 2.33, 2.34, 2.36, 2.44-
2.46 (1974). Federal probation officers supervise released parolees. 18 U.S.C. § 3655 (1970);
28 C.F.R. §§ 0.126(b), 2.42 (1974).
23. 18 U.S.C. § 4205 (1970); 28 C.F.R. §§ 0.125(c), 0.127(b)(7) (1974); see id. §§ 2.49-2.53.
24. 18 U.S.C. § 4207 (1970); see 28 C.F.R. §§ 0.125(a), (d), 0.127(b)(8) (1974); see id. §§
2.54-2.56.
25. 18 U.S.C. § 4203 (1970), as amended, (Supp. II, 1972). Adult offenders serving sen-
tences of 180 days or less are excluded from parole eligibility. 18 U.S.C. § 4202 (1970); 28
C.F.R. § 2.2 (1974). Also excluded are those individuals who receive a "split sentence" of
up to 6 months of incarceration followed by a term of probation, under 18 U.S.C. § 3651
(1970); 28 C.F.R. § 2.8 (1974).
26. 18 U.S.C. § 4202 (1970). In 1948, this section was amended to include adult of-
fenders serving federal sentences but not incarcerated in a federal institution. Act of June
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on parole are subject to Board supervision 2 7 as are those individuals
"mandatorily released" as a result of accumulated "good time."2"
B. Parole Eligibility
Under the federal sentencing scheme, the judge chooses among
several types of sentences for adult offenders and thereby determines
parole eligibility. Under the statutory provisions of the "Regular
Adult" sentence, the most commonly used of these alternatives, an
inmate becomes eligible for parole only after serving one-third of his
or her full sentence. 29 Alternatively, the judge may impose an "(a)(2)"
sentence, in which case the prisoner becomes eligible for parole at
the Parole Board's discretion; 30 under present Board rules, such a
prisoner is immediately eligible for release without serving any man-
datory initial period.31 Finally, under the "(a)(l)" provision the judge
may set a minimum eligibility date at any point earlier than one-third
of the maximum imposed.32 Eligibility for parole consideration un-
der each alternative requires observance of institutional rules and
completion of any minimum incarceration period required by the
sentence.33
Federal judges may also commit eligible adult offenders pursuant
to the criminal provisions of the Narcotic Addict Rehabilitation Act
of 1966 (NARA),34 in which case the offenders are by statute auto-
25, 1948, ch. 645, § 1, 62 Stat. 854; see 28 C.F.R. § 2.16 (1974). The District of Columbia
has its own parole board for its own institutions, D.C. CODE ANN. § 24-201a (1973), but Dis-
trict of Columbia offenders committed to federal institutions (id. § 24-425) are within the
jurisdiction of the federal board. Id. § 24-209.
27. 18 U.S.C. §§ 4205, 4207 (1970); 28 C.F.R. § 2.49 (1974).
28. 18 U.S.C. § 4164 (1970) states that such persons shall "be deemed as if released on
parole." Their release is thus subject to revocation if its terms are violated. Accord, 28
C.F.R. § 2.39 (1974). See 18 U.S.C. §§ 4161-66 (1970); note 6 supra.
29. 18 U.S.C. § 4202 (1970); 28 C.F.R. § 2.2 (1974). Those people serving life terms or
terms longer than 45 years become eligible after having served 15 years. Id. Of all adult
offenders committed to federal institutions during fiscal year 1972, 68.7 percent received
Regular Adult sentences. [1970-1972] U.S. BD. OF PAROLE BIENNIAL REP. 14-15 [hereinafter
cited as [1970-72] BOARD REPORT].
30. 18 U.S.C. § 4208(a)(2) (1970); 28 C.F.R. § 2.3 (1974). Approximately 28.6 percent of
all adult offenders committed to federal institutions during fiscal year 1972 were sentenced
pursuant to this section. [1970-72] BOARD REPORT, supra note 29, at 14-15.
31. 28 C.F.R. § 2.3 (1974); U.S. BD. OF PAROLE, You AND THE PAROLE BOARD 1 (1971);
see Garafola v. Benson, 505 F.2d 1212, 1215 (7th Cir. 1974). Immediate eligibility for
parole also attaches to every sentence under the National Firearms Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)
(1970); 28 C.F.R. § 2.7 (1974).
32. 18 U.S.C. § 4208(a)(1) (1970); 28 C.F.R. § 2.3 (1974). Approximately 0.8 percent of
all adult offenders committed to federal institutions in fiscal year 1972 were sentenced
pursuant to § 4208(a)(1). [1970-72] BOARD REPORT, supra note 29, at 14-15.
33. 18 U.S.C. § 4202 (1970). See 28 C.F.R. § 2.18(b) (1974); cf. 28 C.F.R. § 2.29 (1974)
(effect of withheld or forfeited good time).
Eligibility alone does not entitle an inmate to parole. The Board must independently
find that there is a reasonable probability that the inmate will not violate the law, and
that his or her release is not "incompatible with the welfare of society." 18 U.S.C. § 4203
(1970).
34. Id. §§ 4251-54. Before committing an offender under the Narcotic Addict Rehabil-
itation Act (NARA) the court must find that he or she is an "eligible offender" as defined
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matically eligible for parole after six months of institutional treat-
ment.3G Certain younger offenders may be sentenced under special
statutes which provide for immediate parole eligibility.30
Prior to the date tentatively scheduled for the initial parole hear-
ing, an offender sentenced under the Regular Adult, (a)(1), or (a)(2)
provisions, must either apply for parole or waive the right to a hear-
ing.37 Inmates sentenced under the (a)(2) provision generally have
their initial hearing within the first four months of confinement,38
while inmates sentenced under (a)(1) or Regular Adult alternatives
have their initial hearing one or two months before their minimum
eligibility date.39 NARA-committed offenders are not required to ap-
ply for parole, and generally receive initial hearings after serving six
to seven months.40 Similarly, certain youth offenders need not request
parole consideration. 41
by . 4251 and, after a period of examination provided for by § 4252, is "likely to be
rehabilitated through treatment." See Marshall v. United States, 414 U.S. 417, 419-21 (1974);
United States v. Moore, 486 F.2d 1139, 1203-06 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc) (separate opinion of
Leventhal, J.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 980 (1973). Of all adult offenders committed to
federal institutions in fiscal year 1972, 1.6.percent were sentenced pursuant to § 4253.
[1970-72] BOARD REPORT, supra note 29, at 4-15.
35. 18 U.S.C. § 4254 (1970). In addition, before the Board can parole NARA-committed
offenders, the inmate must be "certified" by the Surgeon General, or his designated
representative, as having made sufficient progress to warrant release. Id. The Attorney
General, or his designated representative, may also report to the Board whether the in-
dividual should be released. See 28 C.F.R. § 2.6 (1974), as amended, 39 Fed. Reg. 45224
(1974).
Although an offender receives full credit for the examination period of § 4252, see note
34 supra, it does not count toward the six month minimum for parole eligibility.
36. Youth Corrections Act (YCA), 18 U.S.C. §§ 5005-26 (1970); Federal Juvenile Delin-
quency Act (FJDA), id. §§ 5031-37. See Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424 (1974); 28
C.F.R. § 2.4 (1974), as amended, 40 Fed. Reg. 5357 (1975); 28 C.F.R. § 2.5 (1974).
A youthful offender sentenced to a six year term under 18 U.S.C. § 5010(b) (1970) must
be conditionally released on or before the expiration of four years of his sentence, 28
C.F.R. § 2.40 (1974), and youthful offenders receiving terms of more than six years under§ 5010(c) must be conditionally released under supervision not later than two years be-
fore the expiration of the term imposed by the court. Id. A court may sentence any
offender younger than 26 under the YCA. 18 U.S.C. § 4209 (1970). See 28 C.F.R. § 2.11(c)
(1974), as amended, 40 Fed. Reg. 5357 (1975).
37. 28 C.F.R. § 2.11 (1974). See King v. United States, 492 F.2d 1337, 1344 (7th Cir.
1974), discussed in note 247 infra.
Inmates on occasion waive their scheduled parole hearing date in order to remain
eligible for parole and avoid any premature adverse judgment of their institutional
adjustment. They can then improve their institutional record and request a parole hearing
when they believe their chances of parole have increased.
38. See pp. 890-91 infra.
39. This uniform practice of the Board is not provided for by regulation.
40. Observation of parole hearings (II a-m), at Danbury FCI, Aug. 1974. For an ex-
planation of symbols used in connection with observations of parole hearings, see note 95
infra. NARA sentencees receive their initial hearings after the statutorily required period
of six months of treatment before release, 18 U.S.C. § 4254 (1970), and often not until they
have been "certified" for release by the NARA institutional staff. Telephone Interview
with P. Hoffman, Research Criminologist for the U.S. Bd. of Parole, Dec. 2, 1974. See 28
C.F.R. § 2.11(c) (1974), as amended, 40 Fed. Reg. 5357 (1975).
41. See 18 U.S.C. § 5010 (1970) (YCA); id. § 5037 (FJDA). See 28 C.F.R. § 2.11(c) (1974).
The failure to apply for parole may have consequences as to the applicability of § 6 of
the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 555(e) (1970); see pp. 858-59 infra.
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C. Previous Parole Decisionmaking
Prior to the implementation of the new procedures and policies
adopted by the United States Board of Parole, all parole release de-
cisions were made by members of the Board. Each hearing was con-
ducted by a Board member or authorized hearing examiner,42 with
the inmate and his or her institutional caseworker present.
Traditionally, the hearing stage of parole decisionmaking was
thought to provide decisionmakers with an opportunity to speak with
and observe the prospective parolee, to search for such intuitive signs
of rehabilitation as repentance, willingness to accept responsibility, and
self-understanding. 43 Parole decisions were not based on formally ar-
ticulated criteria or policies,44 but on the discretionary judgments of
individual decisionmakers. The courts, to the extent that they were
willing to review the parole decision at all,4 5 agreed with the Board
that any attempt to impose even minimal due process constraints on the
hearing or decisional process would unnecessarily interfere with fulfill-
ment of its duty to engage in psychological diagnoses and prognoses:
[T]he Board has an identity of interest with [the inmate] ....
[I]t is seeking to encourage and foster his rehabilitation and re-
adjustment to society . . . . In making this determination the
Board is not restricted by rules of evidence developed for the
purpose of determining legal or factual issues. It must consider
42. When hearing examiners were first used, they were empowered to conduct parole
hearings and prepare a summary of their findings which included a recommendation to
the Board relating to parole. They could not, however, "vote" on any case.
See [1968-1970] U.S. BD. OF PAROLE, BIENNIAL REP. [hereinafter cited as (1968-70]
BOARD REPORT]. See generally Johnson, Federal Parole Procedures, 25 AD. L. REV. 459
(1973) [hereinafter cited as Procedures]; Comment, Parole: A New Approach, 18 LOYOLA
N.O. L. REV. 87, 93-94 (1972); note 90 infra.
43. Dawson, supra note 14, at 250-53. In practice the dearth of criteria combined with
administrative limitations on available time works against any sort of careful decision-
making. Note, Judicial Application of Procedural Due Process in Parole Release and
Revocation, 11 Am. CRIM. L. REV. 1017, 1020-21 (1973).
44. In the past the United States Board of Parole has spoken with pride of the absence
of specific criteria for its own decisionmaking and its related inability to give reasons for
its decisions. Gaylin, No Exit, HARPER'S MA,., Nov. 1971, at 86, 88-89. However, the
Board, as well as other parole boards, has in fact relied upon certain specific policies
and criteria. For example, the United States Board of Parole at one time had a policy
of granting early paroles to draft resisters who were Jehovah's Witnesses. Parsons-Lewis,
supra note 14, at 1528. The California Adult Authority has issued a general statement of
policy priorities that rates, for example, the "protection of the public" as the first priority
and "rehabilitating the offender" as the fourth priority; this statement also declares that
"any doubts... are to be resolved by continued incarceration to protect the public." Cal.
Adult Authority, Policy Statement No. 24, Mar. 1973.
45. See, e.g., Tarlton v. Clark, 441 F.2d 384, 385 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 934
(1971) ("it is not the function of the courts to review the discretion of the Board in the
denial of application for parole"); Hyser v. Reed, 318 F.2d 225 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert.
denied, 375 U.S. 957 (1963); TAsK FORCE REPoRT: CORRECTIONS, supra note 1, at 85; pp.
842-44 infra.
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many factors of a non-legal nature [such as] medicine, psychiatry,
criminology . .. psychology and human relations.46
Thus, counsel or other personal representation for the inmate was not
permitted, information being considered was not revealed, and written
findings or reasons were not given.47 Hearings were commonly short
and incomprehensible to the prisoner.48
At the conclusion of the hearing the examiner or member prepared
a case summary to be mailed to the Board's offices in Washington,
D.C. The other Board members, without discussion, then reviewed
the summary and voted on the case. The Board's final order was based
on an agreement of two members out of a voting quorum of three.49
The Board did not give reasons for any of its decisions,50 and pris-
oners were "left in a total state of uncertainty."' 1 The inmate was
merely to appear, to be scrutinized, to answer the questions put and
ask no others, and to assume the attitude he or she believed best in-
dicated "readiness" for parole. 52 Under this procedure inmates usually
had to wait two to three months before learning the outcome of their
parole hearing, and they had no avenue of administrative appeal.53
These practices, similar to those of many state parole systems,54
46. Menechino v. Oswald, 430 F.2d 403, 407-08 (2d Cir. 1970) cert. denied, 400 U.S.
1023 (1971); Scarpa v. United States Bd. of Parole, 477 F.2d 278, 281 (5th Cir.) (en banc),
vacated as moot, 414 U.S. 809 (1973); Hyser v. Reed, 318 F.2d 225, 237, 242 (D.C. Cir.) (en
banc), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 957 (1963).
47. Note, supra note 43. See generally K.C. DAVIs, supra note 14, at 126-33.
48. In 1970, the Parole Board's eight members and eight hearing examiners conducted
over 12,000 release hearings, and reveiwed 5,000 progress reports on the record. Hearings
on Parole, supra note 6, at 378. Thus the 10 to 15 minute "hearings" conducted by the
Board were more aptly described as "interviews." Procedures, supra note 42, at 522. Ten-
minute parole hearings remain typical in California. Comment, The California Adult
Authority-Administrative Sentencing and the Parole Decision as a Problem in Administra-
tive Law, 5 U. CAL. D.L. REV. 360, 372 (1972).
49. In selected proceedings the Board could establish a voting quorum of a larger
number; US. BD. OF PAROLE, RULES 17 (1971).
50. Gaylin, supra note 44, at 88-89.
51. Hearings on Parole, supra note 6, at 597 (testimony of Sen. Goodell); Kastenmeier
& Eglit, supra note I, at 489. ("[P]arole epitomizes for most inmates a system of whim,
caprice and uncertainty .... ")
See Hearings on Parole, supra note 6, at 160; cf. Tromanhauser, Parole, in AN EvE FOR
AN EYE 207-71 (H.J. Griswold, M. Misenheimer, A. Powers & E. Tromanhauser eds. 1970).
52. See, e.g., Hearings on Parole, supra note 6, at 160-65; Gaylin, supra note 44. Accord,
CITIZEN'S INQUIRY ON PAROLE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE, INC., REPORT ON NEW YORK PAROLE
91-95 (1974).
53. These procedures are described in [1970-72] BOARD REPORT, supra note 29, at 9-11.
See US. BD. OF PAROLE, supra note 49.
54. Until very recently, the federal system in its secret procedures resembled the great
majority of state parole systems. According to a state-by-state survey of parole decision-
making completed in 1972, 40 parole boards did not record reasons for parole decisions; 31
did not make verbatim transcripts of their proceedings; 30 prohibited counsel at hearings,
and 34 forbade the inmate to present witnesses. O'Leary & Nuffield, A National Survey of
Parole Decision-making, 19 CRIME & DELINQ. 378, 386 (1973).
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came under increasingly heavy criticism on two levels. 5r The first con-
cerned the procedural inadequacies of the process, including the lack
of reasons, of speedy decisions, of representatives, and of an appellate
process. 0 Much of the confusion and frustration of the prospective
parolee, it was thought, could be overcome by adopting procedural
reforms. The second level of criticism was directed at the exercise of
discretion within the decisionmaking process itself.57 Critics called for
structuring discretion through articulated standards, or for eliminat-
ing discretion altogether.
D. The Present System
1. Substantive Criteria for Decisionmaking: The Guideline Table
The Board, first in an experimental "Pilot Project," and ultimately
in all five of its regions,5 s has responded to these substantive criticisms
by establishing "Guidelines for Decision-making" (the Guideline Table
and the rules governing its use).59 The purpose of the Guidelines 0
55. See K.C. DAvis, supra note 14, at 126-33; Gaylin, supra note 44; Administrative
Conference Recommendations 72-3: Procedures of the United States Board of Parole, 25
AD. L. REV. 531 (1973); Note, supra note 19.
56. Kastenmeier & Eglit, supra note 1, at 483; Newman, supra note 8, at 270; Note,
supra note 43, at 1021-32; Comment, Curbing Abuse in the Decision to Grant or Deny
Parole, 8 HARV. Civ. RIGHTS-CIV. LIB. L. REV. 419 (1973).
57. Note, supra note 43, at 1032-36; Comment, supra note 56, at 431.
58. In October 1972 the Board began a "Pilot Project" in its Northeast region to test
the feasibility of both the "regionalization" program, and the Guidelines for Decision-
making, see note 60 infra. See Bureau of Prisons Operations Memorandum 40100.14 (Nov.
19, 1972); NCCD Supp. Rep. 9, supra note 5, at 13.
The format of the Pilot Project hearing, after experimentation, was adopted nation-
wide. See 38 Fed. Reg. 26652-57 (Sept. 24, 1973); 38 Fed. Reg. 31942-45 (Nov. 19, 1973).
See generally Tennant, The U.S. Board of Parole Takes to the Field, 48 CONN. B.J. 161
(1974). On regionalization, see 38 Fed. Reg. 26652-57 (Sept. 24, 1973) (first public notice
of Parole Board's regional reorganization); N. Carlson, Regionalization, Dec. 5, 1973 (U.S.
Bur. of Prisons Memorandum).
59. The adult Guideline Table is reproduced in the Appendix to this Project.
The Guideline Table was first used in October 1972, in the Board's Northeast
region. NCCD Supp. Rep. 9, supra note 5; P. Hoffman, Paroling Policy Feedback, June
1973, at 3 (NCCD Parole Decision-Making Project Supp. Rep. 8); see [1968-70] BOARD
REPORT, supra note 42, at 7-8. The Guidelines and a rule governing their use were first
published a year later, 38 Fed. Reg. 31942-45 (1973).
On June 5, 1974, a minor revision of all the rules was published, 39 Fed. Reg. 20028
(1974); 28 C.F.R. §§ 2.1-2.57 (1974). Federal district judges were not directly notified of
the Board's new procedures until August 1974. Letter from Judge Wollenburg (N.D. Cal.),
Chairman of the Committee on the Administration of the Probation System, to' "All
federal district judges" (Aug. 1974) (a copy of the Board's June 1974 regulations with an
explanatory memorandum prepared by the Federal Judicial Center) (on file with the
Yale Law Journal). In a survey of federal district judges conducted between June and
September 1974 (see discussion in note 159 infra) 72 percent of those judges responding
had prior knowledge of the use of the Guideline Table. However, only 2 percent learned
of their use through the Federal Register and only 8 percent stated that they were
notified by the Parole Board. Nineteen percent of those responding had received notifica-
tion through the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts. The same percentage (19
percent) had already presided over proceedings in their courts through which they learned
of the use of the Guideline Table. Project Survey of Sentencing Judges, questions 3, 4.
60. The Guideline Table was developed through the research of the National Council
on Crime and Delinquency (NCCD) working in conjunction with the United States Board
of Parole. See Gottfredson, Hoffman, Sigler & Wilkins, supra note 5.
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is to provide a scientific and objective means of structuring and in-
stitutionalizing discretion in parole release decisionmaking. In so do-
ing, the Guidelines also attempt to minimize the effects of sentencing
disparity.
The Guideline Table consists of two basic indices on which in-
mates are scored: an "Offense Severity" index and a risk prediction
or "Salient Factor" index."' These two indices form the axes of a
matrix: on the vertical axis inmates are placed into one of six sever-
ity groups according to their "offense behavior,"0' 2 while along the
horizontal axis they are divided into four risk groups according to
their Salient Factor Score. 3 At the intersection of each severity and
risk category, a range of months is listed.64 This range represents the
amount of actual time to be served prior to the first release of an
inmate with those offense and risk characteristics. 3 By scoring and
rating an inmate on the two indices, the hearing examiners determine
the inmate's expected incarceration period. They will normally recom-
mend a decision-parole, a continuance to a later hearing or report
(a set-off), or imprisonment until the expiration of the sentence (con-
tinue to expiration, or CTE)0 0-such that the total time actually served
by the inmate at release will be within that expected range.
The Offense Severity Scale was derived by averaging the evaluations
of Parole Board members and examiners of the seriousness, on a scale
of one through six, of typical offense behaviors. 7 The Offense Severity
61. Offense severity and risk prediction were chosen because the NCCD study found
that Parole Board members' evaluations of those criteria had been most influential in
past decisions. Research indicated that the Board's past decisions could have been "pre-
dicted" on the basis of the decisionmakers' evaluations of offense severity and parole
prognosis, NCCD Supp. Rep. 9, supra note 5, at 5; P. Hoffman, supra note 59.
62. The six severity ratings are: Low, Low Moderate, Moderate, High, Very High, and
Greatest. 28 C.F.R. § 2.20, at 69-70 (1974). See Appendix on pp. 901-02 infra.
63. The four risk groups are: Very Good Parole Prognosis (Salient Factor Score of 9 to
11); Good (6 to 8); Fair (4 to 5); and Poor (0 to 3). 28 C.F.R. § 2.20, at 69 (1974). See
Appendix infra.
64. The Guideline Table is reproduced in the Appendix to this Project. The "adult"
Guidelines very closely resemble the Guideline Tables used for NARA and YCA sen-
tencees. See 28 C.F.R. § 2.20, at 70-72 (1974). In apparent deference to the rehabilitation-
treatment orientation of NARA and YCA, however, the time ranges to be served prior to
release are lower under those Guidelines than under the adult standard; cf. Snyder V.
United States Bd. of Parole, 383 F. Supp. 1153 (D. Colo. 1974); United States v. Norcome,
375 F. Supp. 270, 274-75 n.3 (D.D.C. 1974).
65. In calculating total time served for purposes of setting a release date, the Parole
Board includes "jail time" served prior to conviction and/or sentencing for which the
inmate would receive credit on his federal sentence, 28 C.F.R. § 2.20, at 69 (1974), even
if the time was served in a nonfederal jail or other facility. See 18 U.S.C. § 3568 (1970).
66. Continuance to expiration results in imprisonment until the mandatory release
date, see note 6 supra, unless the Board on its own motion modifies the order to allow
another hearing. See 28 C.F.R. § 2.28 (1974).
67. P. Hoffman, J. Beck &- L. DeGostin, The Practical Application of a Severity Scale,
June 1973 (NCCD Parole Decision-Making Project Supp. Rep. 13) [hereinafter cited as
NCCD Supp. Rep. 13]. The initial descriptions for the offense behaviors were developed
from offenses contained in the California penal code with which the research team was
more familiar, rather than the federal penal codes. NCCD Supp. Rep. 9, supra note 5, at
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Rating reflects the Parole Board's independent, subjective evaluation
of the gravity of the inmate's past criminal behavior. Classification on
the severity scale is not based on the legal "offense of commitment"
or on sentence length; rather, the Board makes its own determination
of the inmate's offense behavior, which it then rates relative to "of-
fense behaviors .. .commonly seen by the parole board."0 8
The Salient Factor Score is designed to predict 9 the likelihood that
an inmate will succeed70 on parole. This score is measured by an 11-
point Salient Factor Scale, which consists of nine weighted personal
characteristics that were statistically determined to have high predictive
power in discriminating between past groups of releasees who "succeed-
ed" and "failed" after their release.71 All but two of the nine items are
part of the inmate's past criminal record and behavior; they are "static"
and generally known to the judge at the time of sentencing.7 - The
items scored cannot reflect rehabilitative progress, because they bear
little or no relation to the commitment offense, the amount of time
the inmate has served, or the programs in which he or she has par-
ticipated at the institution. The Salient Factor Score's prediction of
17 n.13. Consequently, many federal crimes are still not listed anywhere on the offense
severity scale; ef. Battle v. Norton, 365 F. Supp. 925, 930 n.5 (D. Conn. 1973); see generally
NCCD Supp. Rep. 9, supra note 5, at 8-13.
68. NCCD Supp. Rep. 13, supra note 67, at 2-3.
69. No prediction device can make predictions about an individual inmate. Rather,
the Salient Factor Scale classifies individuals by certain characteristics into large groups
possessing similar characteristics, about which groups accurate predictions of the likely
rate of success or failure can be made. P. Hoffman .9 J. Beck, Parole Decision-Making: A
Salient Factor Score, Apr. 1974, at 13 (U.S. Bd. of Parole Res. Unit: Rep. 2) [hereinafter
cited as Salient Factor Report]. For example, inmates with a Salient Factor Score of 6 to
8 belong to a risk group whose expected range of favorable outcomes is between 72 and
79 percent. Id. at 9. The Salient Factor Score does not enable the scorer to determine
which individual inmates within a risk group will succeed, and which will be among
those who fail. However, use of the Salient Factor Score to "predict" which inmates will
succeed or fail will result in more "correct" predictions in the aggregate than would
non-statistical predictions by trained personnel. See note 86 infra.
70. See note 311 infra.
71. Salient Factor Report, supra note 69, at 9; see note 311 infra.
72. The Salient Factors are: number of prior convictions, number of prior incarcera-
tions, age at first commitment, whether the crime involved auto theft, prior negative
experience on parole or probation, history of drug abuse, high school degree or equiv-
alent, verified prior employment or full time school attendance for at least six months in
last two years in community, and release plan to live with spouse (legal or common law)
or children. Number of prior incarcerations and number of prior convictions may amount
to two points each on the score; all other items equal one point. 28 C.F.R. § 2.20, at 73
(1974). Present age of the prisoner is not a factor on the Salient Factor Scale, even though
it has been shown to be highly correlated with recidivism. See D. GLAsER, Tim EFncmsvE-
NESS OF A PRISON AND PAROLE SYSTEM 36-37 (1964) (persons released from prison over 40
have markedly lower recidivism rates than similarly situated but younger releasees). The
question whether the offender, if released, plans to live with his or her spouse or children
cannot be finally determined at the time of sentencing, for the offender could become
divorced or estranged, thereby losing one point, or could conceivably be married while
incarcerated, thereby gaining one point. Whether an offender has a high school or
general equivalency diploma (G.E.D.) can only be determined at sentencing if the answer
is yes, for inmates normally have the opportunity to earn a G.E.D. while incarcerated.
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success or failure is generally constant over time and usually does not
change during the entire period of incarceration.
Neither the Offense Severity nor the Salient Factor Scale measures
the inmate's rehabilitative progress or institutional adjustment. Nei-
ther alone nor together can these scales actually determine when to
release an inmate. To derive the Guideline time ranges the research
staff analyzed a retrospective sample of Parole Board decisions to de-
velop average ranges of time actually served before parole by offenders
with various combinations of severity and salient factor ratings. 73 The
Board then chose to base their future decisions on this table. 74
The Guideline Table now determines almost all first parole release
decisions. 75 There are, however, provisions for decisionmaking out-
side the Guideline time ranges.70 For instance, because Parole Board
members objected to the complete elimination of rehabilitative con-
siderations, the Guideline Table is said to be "predicated upon good
institutional conduct and program performance."' 7 Unusually good
or bad performance may "justify" a parole release decision earlier or
later than the Guideline time indicated.78 A range of discretionary fac-
0
73. Salient Factor Report, supra note 69, at 4.
74. The institutionalization of past Parole Board practices, reflected in the time
ranges on the Guideline Table, is subject to semi-annual revision by Parole Board mem-
bers on policy ground.
Originally, this range was developed by researchers who found the median number of
months actually served by a sample group of federal prisoners who had the respective
pair of offense and offender characteristics and were released between August 1970, and
June 1972. The Guideline range of months to be served was based on this median, but
Parole Board members can and have made changes in the range based on their own
beliefs that a given range was too short or too long, or based on feedback from hearing
examiners' decisions showing that the median range of time actually served was moving
higher or lower in the total range. D. Gottfredson, The Utilization of Experience in
Parole Decision-Making: A Progress Report, June 1973, at 32 (NCCD Parole Decision-
Making Project Summary); NCCD Supp. Rep. 9, supra note 5, at 17-18; cf. NCCD Supp.
Rep. 13, supra note 67, at 27-28; 28 C.F.R. § 2.20(f) (1974).
75. Between October 1973, and March 1974, 91.7 percent of all decisions at initial
parole hearings were within the Guidelines, while 4.5 percent were decisions above the
Guidelines and 3.8 percent were decisions below the Guidelines. P. Hoffman & L. De-
Gostin, Parole Decision-Making: Structuring Discretion, June 1974, at 10. (U.S. Bd. of
Parole Res. Unit: Rep. 5) [hereinafter cited as Structuring Discretion]. There is some
dispute as to the meaning of these figures. If all cases are excluded that involve either
minimum sentences greater than the Guideline range or maximum sentences or manda-
tory release dates below the Guideline range (cf. note 80 infra), then the percentage of
decisions at initial hearings within the Guidelines is 88.4 percent with 5.3 percent below
and 6.3 percent above. Id.
76. The Board has emphasized that the Guidelines arc only that, guidelines, and are
not rigid rules amounting to an administrative minimum sentencing scheme. Battle v.
Norton, 365 F. Supp. 925, 933 (D. Conn. 1973) (Affidavit of M. Sigler, Chairman, U.S. Bd.
of Parole). According to the Board the Guidelines are designed to "structure discretion
without removing it, and thus permit a more rational and consistent decisionmaking...
[the Guidelines] merely specify the parameters of decisionmaking outside of which fair-
ness demands specific justification." Structuring Discretion, supra note 75, at 6. See note
266 infra.
77. 28 C.F.R. § 2.20 n.5, at 70, 71, 73 (1974).
78. Id. § 2.20(c).
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tors, such as mitigating or aggravating circumstances of the offense,
may also justify decisions outside the Guidelines." Explicit decisions
outside the Guidelines must be accompanied by special justification
from the hearing panel that makes such a recommendation. 0
The Guideline Table thus represents two major departures in pre-
vious parole release decisionmaking. It establishes explicit criteria
which, in most cases, determine the parole release date. And in its
choice of criteria, it abandons any attempt to condition release upon
rehabilitative factors.
The Board has quite properly abandoned the search for the "magic
moment" for release based on rehabilitation that characterized pa-
role release decisionmaking for 20 years."' In so doing it has also im-
plicitly relinquished any claim of expertise in predicting or assessing
rehabilitation. Extensive social science research strongly suggests that
rehabilitation-defined as an increasing likelihood of successful ad-
justment upon release-cannot be observed, detected or measured.8 '
79. Other bases for decisions outside the Guidelines include a determination by the
hearing panel that their clinical judgment indicates a risk different from that indicated
by the Salient Factor Score; that the inmate has unusual health or emotional problems;
that the inmate needs to complete specific programs; or that he or she is being paroled
to deportation or to a state detainer to serve more time. Id. § 2.20(d), (e); Structuring
Discretion, supra note 75, at 11; see 28 C.F.R. §§ 2.33-2.34 (1974).
80. 28 C.F.R. § 2.23(c) (1974). If, however, the decision of the panel results in actual
time served above or below the Guidelines because of the sentence imposed by the court
(maximum sentence below Guideline range; minimum sentence above Guideline range),
the Board considers the decision to be within the Guidelines and does not require further
justification. See note 75 supra.
81. See Hearing on H.J. Res. 424, H.J. Res. 425, H.R. 8923 Before Subconm. No. 3 of
the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 14, at 6 (testimony of Rep.
Celler), 8-9 (Deputy Att'y Gen. Walsh) (1958). Accord, Hearings on Parole, supra note 6,
at 385 (testimony of George Reed, member and former chairman, U.S. Bd. of Parole: "I
believe that basic to every decision of the Parole Board is a philosophy of releasing in-
mates on parole at the psychologically 'right time' to best assure their eventual complete
rehabilitation"); see Alverez v. Turner, 442 F.2d 214, 217 (10th Cir. 1970).
82. D. GLASER, supra note 72, at 302-04; H. MANNHEIM & L. WILKINS, PREDIcTIONs
METHODS IN RELATION TO BORSTAL TRAINING 118-19 (1955) [hereinafter cited as MANNHEIM
& WILKINS]; Robison & Smith, The Effectiveness of Correctional Programs, 17 CRImE &
DELINQ. 67, 68-80 (1971); P. Hoffman, Parole Selection: A Balance of Two Types of Errors,
June 1973, at 6-8 (NCCD Parole Decision-Making Project Supp. Rep. No. 10) [herein-
after cited as Types of Error]; see Bixby, A New Role for Parole Boards, FED. PROBATION,
June 1970, at 24-28; Hearings on Parole, supra note 6, at 224 (testimony of D. Gottfredson,
criminological researcher):
[In general time served is unrelated to parole outcomnes .... There is little evidence
for the effectiveness of a myriad of prison programs thought to be rehabilitative ....
Most information predictive of parole outcomes is known at the time of reception in
prison .... To many informed persons, this suggests... that both the parole board
and parole supervision should be abolished.
This assumes, however, that we have adequate knowledge that nothing works, when
in fact our investment to discover what works and what does not work has been less
than minimal .... Less than 1 percent of funds for the criminal justice system have
[sic] been aimed at decreasing our ignorance in this field .... Our ignorance ... argues
less for ... abandonment than for a concerted, adequately funded effort to determine
what procedures work for what offenders.
But even if treatment or rehabilitation could be effectively achieved and measured, it
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When inmates with .similar backgrounds and past records are com-
pared, neither institutional program participation and achievement, 83
nor disciplinary record, nor the level and type of pre-incarceration or
post-release supervision programs, have any measurable impact on the
probability of successful rehabilitation, the rate of recidivism, or the
likelihood of later parole success. 84 Holding other factors constant,
time served in an institution appears to have, if anything, a slightly
negative effect on the inmate's chances for success once he or she is
released.a Nor do "expert" decisions by parole officers or psychol-
ogists appear any more accurate in discerning likely success than de-
cisions by lay people.80 There simply is no way to know when "re-
habilitation" has occurred in an individual. To conform to its statu-
tory directive to release an inmate only when there is a "reasonable
probability" that he or she will not violate the law,8 7 the Board quite
would still raise difficult issues; see Note, Conditioning and Other Technologies Used to
"Treat?" "Rehabilitate?" "Demolish?" Prisoners and Mental Patients, 45 S. CAL. L. REV.
616 (1972).
83. Bailey, Correctional Outcomes: An Evaluation of 100 Reports, 57 J. CRIm. L.C. &
P.S. 153 (1966); Robison & Smith, The Effectiveness of Correctional Programs, 17 CRIME &
DELINQ. 67 (1971).
84. See GLASER, supra note 72, at 302-04; I. KAUFMAN, PRisoNs: THE JUDGES' DILEMMA
(1973); MANNHEIM g. WILKINS, supra note 82; Types of Error, supra note 82, at 6-8; V.
O'Leary & J. Nuffield, The Organization of Parole Systems in the United States xxii-xxiii
(NCCD, 2d ed. 1972); Bailey, Correctional Outcomes: An Evaluation of 100 Reports, 57
J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 153 (1966); Bixby, supra note 82; Frankel, Lawlessness in Sentencing,
41 U. CIN. L. REV. 1 (1972); Kastenmeier & Eglit, supra note 1; Robison & Smith, supra
note 83; Hearings on Parole, supra note 6, at 224 (testimony of D. Gottfredson, crim-
inological researcher).
85. See note 82 supra.
86. In one study, 10 parole officers and 10 laypersons were presented with full case
files for 200 persons who had actually been released on parole, and of whom approx-
imately one-half had been returned for violations. They were asked to predict parole
success or failure, type of violation and timing of violation. Although parole officers did
slightly better than laypersons in correctly predicting nonviolators, laypersons excelled
in correctly predicting violators. The ability of both groups to predict nonviolators was
less than the number of successiul predictions that would be expected from random
guessing. Hakeem, Prediction of Parole Outcomes from Summaries of Case Histories, 52
J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 145, 150 (1961). However, the parole officers may have been less
accurate than usual because the "violation" or "failure" rate of 50 percent may have
been higher than that to which they were accustomed. Similar findings were reported by
researchers in the California Adult Authority system. Gottfredson, A Strategy for Study of
Social Agency Effectiveness, Social Agency Effectiveness Study, NIMH l'roject, discussed
in Grant, It's Time to Start Counting, 8 CRIME & DELINQ. 259, 262 (1962).
Surveys have indicated that in many areas of prediction-psychiatric prognoses, predic-
tion of academic success and parole prognoses-statistical devices for the prediction of risk
will make more correct predictions than those made by professionals in the field. P.
MEEHL, CLINICAL VERSUS STATISTICAL PREDICTION 90-98 (1954); 13. WOOTrON, SOCIAL SCIENCE
AND SOCIAL PATHOLOGY 184-86 (1959); D. Gottfredson, Assessment and Prediction Methods
in Crime and Delinquency, in U.S. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAw ENFORCEMENT - AD-
MINISTRATION OF JusTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH CRIME
171-82 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Assessment and Prediction Methods]; cf. Kastenmeier &
Eglit, supra note 1, at 505 (parole board's claims to expertise would be enhanced by
greater reliance on statistical data).
87. 18 U.S.C. § 4203 (1970).
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properly concerns itself primarily with the predictive, static factors of
the Salient Factor Scale.88
While the Guideline Table's method for reaching decisions is more
rational than the Board's previous practices, its abandonment of re-
habilitation as a primary goal of the parole system eliminates a major
justification for the existence of the parole system as a second stage
in the decision as to length of incarceration. In most cases, the Board's
opportunity to observe institutional progress and rehabilitation-the
only relevant information not available to the judge at sentencing-
does not affect the release decision.
2. Procedures and Hearings under the Guidelines
The Board has also responded to the criticisms of its prior pro-
cedures.8 9 Parole Board members now serve in supervisory, appellate,
and policy-setting roles, while panels of two hearing examiners con-
duct all parole hearings.90 Inmates appear before the panel and are
given an opportunity to present a statement.91 They may also bring
a representative into the hearing with them. The representative may
be anyone of their choosing, including a lawyer, but the representa-
tive is restricted to making a short oral presentation and responding
to questions, if any, from the hearing examiners. 92 Official notifica-
88. See Battle v. Norton, 365 F. Supp. 925, 933 (D. Conn. 1973) (affidavit of M. Sigler,
Chairman, U.S. Bd. of Parole); note 72 supra.
89. The procedural reforms were originally part of the Board's Pilot Project. See note
58 supra. Some of the Pilot Project's innovations were modified before being implemented
nationwide. Broad, general and vague reasons for denial of parole, see Fisher v. United
States, 382 F. Supp. 241 (D. Conn. 1974); Lupo v. Norton, 371 F. Supp. 156 (D. Conn.
1974); In re Wilkerson, 371 F. Supp. 123 (E.D.N.Y. 1973); Battle v. Norton, 365 F. Supp.
925 (D. Conn. 1973), were replaced by more detailed explanations; see 28 C.F.R. § 2.13(c)(1974); note 247 infra. Mandatory waiting periods of 30 and 90 days before filing Level I
and Level II administrative appeals, respectively, were replaced by 30 day time limitations
on filing each level appeal. Compare L. DeGostin & P. Hoffman, Administrative Review
of Parole Selection and Revocation Decisions, Jan. 1974, at 5-6 (U.S. Bd. of Parole Res.
Unit: Rep. 1), with 28 C.F.R. §§ 2.25-2.27 (1974).
90. 28 C.F.R. §§ 2.13, 2.14, 2.23 (1974). The gradual increase in the powers, responsi-
bilities and duties of hearing examiners is described in [1970-72] BOARD REt'ORT, supra
note 29, at 9; [1968-70] BOARD REPORT, supra note 42, at 15. See R. SINGa & W. STATSKR,
RIGHTS OF THE IMi'RISONED 1006-07 (1974). The U.S. Board has eight members and 28
hearing examiners to conduct some 13,000 hearings per year. (This figure includes revoca-
tion and rescission hearings which are also conducted by hearing examiners.) For the
development of the full Board's appellate role, see [1968-70] BOARD REPORT, supra, "at 17.
Certain "special" cases are heard under the "original jurisdiction" of the Board's regional
directors. These cases are those in which the regional director believes: (a) national
security is involved; (b) the offense behavior involved unusual sophistication or was part
of a "continuing criminal enterprise" (formerly called "organized crime"); (c) there is
national or other unusual interest in the offender or the victim; (d) major violence has
been perpetrated or there is evidence that it might occur; or (e) the sentence is 45 years
or longer. 28 C.F.R. § 2.17 (1974), as amended, 40 Fed. Reg. 5357-58 (1975). See Masiello
v. Norton, 364 F. Supp. 1133 (D. Conn. 1973); cf. Catalano v. United States, 383 F. Supp.
346 (D. Conn. 1974).
91. 28 C.F.R. § 2.13 (1974); U.S. BD. OF PAROLE, supra note 31.
92. 28 C.F.R. § 2.12 (1974).
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tion of denial of parole is accompanied by reasons for that decision,93
and inmates may contest the denial through an internal, administrative
appellate process.94
In order to determine how the Guidelines and other new procedures
were actually affecting the parole hearing itself, members of the
Project staff obtained permission from the United States Board of
Parole to observe parole hearings in various institutions in the Parole
Board's Northeast Region,9 5 the first area in which the Parole Board
introduced its innovations.9 6
With the implementation of the federal Parole Board's new Guide-
lines for Decisionmaking, it might have been expected that hearings
93. The inmate receives written notification within 15 working days. Id. § 2.13. Panel
decisions are subject to review by the appropriate regional director. Id. §§ 2.23(b), (c), 2.24;
see note 102 infra. For the history of the Board's decision to begin giving reasons, see
[1970-72] BOARD REPORT, supra note 29, at 9.
94. Within 30 days of the official entry of decision the inmate may file a Level I
appeal to the regional office. 28 C.F.R. § 2.25 (1974). If the first appeal is denied, a
Level II appeal may be filed with the appellate board in Washington within 30 days of
entry of the decision from the Level I appeal. Id. § 2.26. The appellate board consists of
the chairman, vice chairman and at least one member of the full Board. Id. § 2.1(b).
95. See note 58 supra. When the empirical research for this Project was conducted,
the U.S. Board of Parole was in the process of regionalizing and modifying parole release
decisionmaking across the country. It was felt that little real understanding of the impact
of the Guidelines would be derived from observing hearings in regions which were in a
transition phase, and thus the study was limited to the Northeast Region where the
Guidelines had been in use for over a year.
Hearings were observed at three of the five institutions in the Northeast Region: the
Federal Penitentiary, Lewisburg, Pennsylvania; the Federal Correctional Institution, Dan-
bury, Connecticut; and the Federal Reformatory for Women, Alderson, .West Virginia.
These institutions were chosen to reflect the three basic levels of security found in the
federal system: Danbury, a medium security institution for men; Lewisburg, a maximum
security institution for men; and Alderson, a minimum security institution for women.
Members of the Project viewed 109 parole hearings and one "review of the record."
Table I summarizes the institution and type of hearings observed:
Table I
Type of Hearing
Institution Initial Review Rescission* Revocation Total
Lewisburg 34 16 1 2 53
Danbury 23 11a  1 3 38
Aldersonb 12 3 1 2 18
Total 69 30C 3 7 109
* "Rescission" hearings are explained in note 137 infra.
* Includes two court-ordered hearings.
b One "review on the record"--conducted in the form of an institutional review hearing
at which the inmate's representative, but not the inmate, was present-was also observed.
Includes three hearings ordered by the U.S. Board of Parole.
Each inmate was asked at the beginning of each hearing if he or she objected to the
student observer's presence; no inmate did. In order to fulfill the observers' promise to
both the Board and the inmates that the anonymity of all participants would be main-
tained, this Project, in referring to specific observations, identifies only the institution
and month of each hearing; Project members are identified through assigned roman
numerals, and specific hearings are identified through assigned lower case letters.
96. NCCD Supp. Rep. 9, supra note 5, at 12.
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would become predictable, routine proceedings designed to explore
the information relevant to classification on the offense severity and
risk scales. But the Guideline Table's radical departure in the sub-
stantive basis of decisionmaking has not prompted a similarly marked
change in the hearing itself. Rather, the hearing under the Guide-
lines retains the broad scope and rehabilitative emphasis of earlier
parole hearings. Indeed, observation of the hearing itself provides
hardly a hint that the Guideline Table controls actual decisions.
This continuing emphasis on rehabilitative factors means that the
parole hearing is poorly suited to decisionmaking under the Guide-
lines. Hearings, still conducted basically as interviews, often focus on
factors rarely relevant to the ultimate decision under the Guideline
Table. As a result, the primary criteria of decisionmaking are con-
cealed, and substantial areas for discretionary judgment within the
Guidelines are hidden. In short, the procedural reforms implemented
by the Board are not as effective as they might be in protecting in-
mates' rights or promoting prompt, accurate and fair decisions by the
hearing examiners.
The hearing process begins before the inmate enters the hearing
room. At this time, the hearing examiner who will be conducting the
hearing (the "primary" examiner) reviews the more extensive of two
files on the inmate. If it is an initial hearing07 he generally prepares
97. The first hearing an inmate receives, referred to as the initial hearing, is used
primarily to determine his or her incarceration range under the Guideline Table by
calculating the Salient Factor Score and rating the severity of offense behavior. Record
at 27, Diaz v. Norton, 376 F. Supp. 112 (D. Conn. 1974) (testimony of P. Hoffman, Re-
search Criminologist, U.S. Board of Parole).
All hearings conducted at the institution subsequent to the initial hearing are referred
to as "Institutional Review Hearings." 28 C.F.R. § 2.14 (1974). Since the Guideline system
is new, some "review" hearings have been conducted as "Guideline" initial hearings, if
the inmate's initial hearing had been prior to the introduction of the Guidelines. Record
at 27, supra. An additional mechanism for setting a date is the progress report, by which
a hearing examiner panel, upon receipt from the institution of a report on the inmate's
conduct, reviews "on the record" an application for parole. 28 C.F.R. § 2.14 (1974), as
amended, 39 Fed. Reg. 45225 (1974). Reviews on the record, based on progress reports, are
made in the following situations:
a. Cases receiving continuances of six months or less;
b. YCA or FJDA sentencees who receive continuances of two years or more receive
progress reports and reviews on the record after completing 18 months of such set-
off; and
c. (a) (2) sentencees with maximum sentences of more than 18 months who are given
a continuance at an initial hearing to a date past one-third of their maximum sen-
tence at an initial hearing, receive a progress report and review on the record upon
completion of one-third of their sentence.
But see Garafola v. Benson, 505 F.2d 1212, 1219 (7th Cir. 1974); Grasso v. Norton, -376 F.
Supp. 116 (D. Conn. 1974); Diaz v. Norton, 376 F. Supp. 112 (D. Conn. 1974) (holding
progress reports in (a)(2) cases insufficient). See note 392 infra. In addition, during the
month preceding a regularly scheduled review hearing an examiner panel may review a
case on the record, and, if the decision is made to grant parole, no hearing is conducted.
28 C.F.R. § 2.14 (a) (1974), as amended, 39 Fed. Reg. 45225 (1974).
The practice of making Guideline ratings at the initial hearing means that the in-
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a tentative Salient Factor Score sheet, rates the offense severity, and
arrives at the probable Guideline range. At the same time the other
("secondary") examiner prepares a summary report for the Parole
Board in Washington on the hearing just concluded, in which he
served as the primary examiner. The secondary examiner's role is
generally limited to asking questions late in the hearing about items
not covered by the primary examiner.
While the primary hearing examiner is reading the master file, he
may consult with the caseworker, who is usually in the room, to fill
in gaps or correct inaccuracies in the file. 98 This consultation can
also serve other purposes, such as confirming information already be-
fore the hearing examiner or eliciting the caseworker's attitude on
the particular case. 9 Caseworkers, aware of this opportunity to con-
vey their feelings or express their opinion to the examiners, occasion-
ally volunteer comments.
When the hearing examiners are ready, the inmate and representa-
tive, if any, 00 are called into the hearing room. After asking if the
stitutional review hearing has become primarily a parole granting hearing that merely
confirms the incarceration range determined in the initial hearing. The examiners check
to see if the inmate has abided by the rules of the institution; if so (and often if he or
she has not complied, but did not thereby forfeit any "good time"), the inmate is usually
granted parole and exhorted to observe the conditions of parole. A typical institutional
review hearing was conducted as follows:
This was a review hearing for a white inmate with a five year sentence for counter-
feiting; hearing examiners told the observer before the hearing that the man and his
wife had owned a boutique, but that it had been destroyed by fire, and he had taken
to making counterfeit bills. Also, before the man came in, the caseworker said that
the inmate was doing well in the institution in terms of general discipline and
personality development.
The inmate then appeared. He was asked about what he'd done in the institution;
then about his release plan and whether he had a job lined up. His wife who was
there as his representative said she thought her husband had benefited from prison,
just like some people benefit from the service.
After the inmate left the room, it required little discussion to note that he had
"done his time" (they had rated his SFS as Very Good and his crime as High at their
first hearing) and to grant him parole.
Observation of parole hearing (Iic) at Danbury Federal Correctional Institution (FCI)
June 1974.
98. E.g., Observation of parole hearing (IIc) at Lewisburg Federal Penitentiary (FP),
Aug. 1974.
Occasionally, caseworkers also offer information in the absence of the inmate at the
conclusion of the hearing. See, e.g., Observation of parole hearing (lib) at Danbury FCI,
Aug. 1974.
99. Prior to the inmate's entrance in 14 observed cases there was substantial discussion
between the hearing examiners and the caseworker, concerning the inmate's offense
severity, his Salient Factor Score, his institutional adjustment or progress, or his situation
with respect to detainers or charges in other jurisdictions.
100. The inmate had a representative in 52 of 109 hearings observed. Family repre-
sentatives often did not appear on the correct day for the hearing; this is partially due
to the fact that hearing days are changed, depending on how slowly or quickly the panels
are moving through their caseload. Although inmates who requested representatives were
offered the opportunity to be heard with their representative either on another day or
at the next set of hearings, they usually decided to waive representation.
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inmate understands the parole hearing process, the examiner usually
explaing the hearing procedure and mentions (but does not explain)
the administrative appellate procedure.' 0' Examiners state that their
decision is only tentative and will be confirmed or changed by an
official decision from Washington within 15 working days.102
The substantive part of the hearing then begins. It can vary from
a short, relatively simple proceeding to an extended discussion. 10 3 At
no point do the hearing examiners state or imply that the Guideline
Table is in use or that some facts under discussion are more signifi-
cant than others. Rather, a generalized discussion of many aspects of
the inmate's past and present life ensues. 04 At initial parole hearings
101. In the report dictated at the end of each decision the hearing examiner always
recites that the inmate was informed of the hearing procedures. However, in 21 cases (20
percent of those observed) the hearing examiners did not in fact so advise the inmate.
102. All inmates were told that they will be officially notified of the final decision in
15 working days, or three weeks. Under the Board's regulations, all decisions by the hear-
ing examiner panel are final, except where:
1) there is a split voted between the hearing examiners, in which case the appropriate
Regional Administrative Hearing Examiner shall cast the deciding vote (or, if he
was on the panel, another hearing examiner). 28 C.F.R. § 2.23(b) (1974). (three split
votes were observed in 109 hearings);
2) the hearing panel proposes to make a decision outside the Guidelines, in which
event the proposed decision is always reviewed by the Regional Administrative Hear-
ing Examiner (or, if he was on the panel, by another hearing examiner). If the Ad-
ministrative Examiner does not concur, he may, with the concurrence of the Regional
Director, modify the parole date to the nearest limit of the Guideline. Id. § 2.23(c);
3) the Regional Director, on his own motion, reviews any decision and refers it,
with his recommendation, to a vote of the National Appellate Board, consisting of
the chairman, vice-chairman and one other Board member permanently stationed in
Washington, D.C. Id. §§ 2.24, 2.1.
103. Each panel commonly saw 12 to 16 inmates a day, conducting an average number
of 15 hearings per day. The average time devoted to each decision, from the primary
examiner's reading of the inmate's master file to the dictation of the final report, was
approximately 25 to 30 minutes. This observation agrees with the average time reported
by P. Hoffman, Research Criminologist, U.S. Bd. of Parole. Record at 21, Diaz v. Norton,
376 F. Snpp. 112 (D. Conn. 1974). Of this time, an average of 10 to 12 minutes was
devoted to discussion with the inmate. Of the hearings observed, 14 were especially short,
that is, about eight minutes spent with the inmate and less than 12 to 15 minutes for the
entire decision process. In 10 of these hearings a clear decision to grant parole had been
made before the inmate entered the room, while four involved inmates with short sen-
tences who were treated as if parole were unavailable because their mandatory release
dates came before the time specified in the Gtideline Table. Six release hearings were
unusually long, involving more than 15 minutes of discussion with the inmate. Most of
these resulted in decisions outside 'the Guidelines, or in extremely long set-offs. (See p.
823 for an explanation of "set-offs".) One such case, however, resulted in an immediate
parole grant to an inmate whom the hearing examiners disliked, mistrusted and thought
was irresponsible, but whose Guideline time had arrived. Observation of parole hearing
(Ii) at Lewisburg FP, Aug. 1974.
104. The discussion reflects the contents of an unweighted list of criteria which, under
regulations promulgated before the Guideline Table but still in effect, the Board may
consider at parole hearings. U.S. BD. OF PAROLE, supra note 49, at 14-16. The list was first
publicized in September 1973. 38 Fed. Reg. 26652, 26654 (1973). It has reappeared with
little change in 28 C.F.R. § 2.19 (1974). Among its approximately 30 factors are such
items as sentence data, changes in motivation and behavior, psychological tests and
evaluation, past record, personal and social history. It has been described as a "laundry
list" in recognition of the limited utility of such an inclusive and unweighted list in
structuring discretion and making decisions. NCCD Supp. Rep. 9, supra note 5, at iv
(preface, M. Sigler, Chairman, U.S. Bd. of Parole).
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the inmate's commitment offense and related behavior are always
discussed, while at review hearings the inmate's institutional conduct
is at least mentioned.
When a discussion with the inmate and representative is concluded,
both are asked to leave the room. The hearing examiners discuss
any differences in opinion as to either the ratings on the indices
or whether a decision outside the Guidelines is appropriate. They
then call back the inmate, alone, to give notice of the decision and
reiterate that it is only tentative. At this point, the inmate is often
told that the Guidelines dictated the decision. 1°5 There may be some
additional colloquy between the inmate and hearing examiners. After
the inmate leaves the room, the primary hearing examiner dictates
a summary report that will be forwarded to the Regional Director
for final confirmation, 1°6 while the secondary hearing examiner pre-
pares to conduct the next hearing.
3. Deficiencies in the Present Hearing
a. Accuracy of Salient Factor Score
Information necessary to classify inmates on the Salient Factor Scale
is often discussed in the course of parole hearings. In none of the
hearings observed, however, did the examiners explain, the Salient
Factors, or indicate their importance to a "score" that would de-
termine exactly how much time inmates would serve before being
released. Nor did they generally inform the inmate that the Guide-
line Table would be used in making the examiners' tentative decision.
Since much of the information needed to compute the Salient Factor
Score is traditionally contained in the presentence investigation report
(PSI) or elsewhere in the prison file, the hearing examiners often
"rate" an inmate's parole prognosis prior to his or her first entry into
the hearing room. When the examiners know they are confused or
lack necessary information, they seek clarification or elaboration from
the inmate. In several hearings, the examiners disregarded certain in-
105. Likewise, inmates are often told when a decision outside the Guidelines has been
made. In that case the examiners describe their decision as "tentative" and stress the
possibility that it will be reversed by the Regional Director.
106. The summary report followed a form evidently set forth in the hearing examiners'
instruction books provided by the Board. The report takes the form of brief paragraphs
dictated on each of the following topics: I. Advised of Hearing Procedure; II: Offense
and Sentence Structure; III. Prior Record (not always complete); IV. Social History (not
always completed); V. Work Assignment-Institutional & Vocational Progress; VI. Release
Plans; VII. Representative and Remarks; VIII. Evaluation and Justification; IX. Tentative
Decision.
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formation in the file in reliance on his or her word that it was
incorrect.' 0 7 But in very few hearings is every factor on the scale dis-
cussed or confirmed.'08 And even those factors that are discussed in
the hearing are not raised directly, so the prospective parolee often
does not have a fair opportunity to rebut or respond to information
derived from the PSI.109
107. For example, one inmate, then serving a five-year, (a)(2) sentence for distribution
of narcotics, responded in answer to a question that he had had two prior convictions; the
examiner straightforwardly commented, "But the record says you have three." The inmate
explained that one of those convictions was actually his brother's and that the court
records had gotten mixed up. The hearing examiners changed their scoring and gave him
credit for having only two previous convictions. Observation of parole hearing (Ilk) at
Lewisburg F11, Aug. 1974. In another hearing, the institutional progress report indicated
a previous conviction in the inmate's native Colombia. On his bare word during the
hearing that he had never before been arrested, the examiners adjusted their scoring
from an 8 to a 9, resulting in a 10-month reduction in their tentative set-off decision.
Observation of parole hearing (Ir) at Lewisburg FP, Aug. 1974.
108. Some factors were discussed at most hearings. In 70 of the 109 hearings observed,
the inmate's past record was clearly mentioned or discussed. Other factors received less
attention. In only 50 cases did the hearing examiners explicitly inquire whether the
inmate had had at least six months of employment or student status in his or her last two
years in the community. But at the two observed hearings in which translators were
required for inmates who could not speak English, virtually every Salient Factor was
covered.
109. One summary of a hearing observed during the course of this Project offers a
good example of how Salient Factor Score information is established in a parole hearing:
A black inmate serving a 10 year narcotic rehabilitation sentence had done 14 months
at the time of this initial hearing. The examiner first discussed the factual basis for
his conviction of burglary II and petit larceny; the prisoner had climbed onto the
roof of a store, opened a window, and grabbed some clothing which he intended to
sell to support his habit. The amount of the drug habit was established. The examiner
then asked, "Were you working at the time of your offense?" When the inmate
answered yes, the examiner stated that he had no record of it and asked whether all
the inmate's jobs had lasted for short periods. The inmate said yes.
The examiner then commented that there was no record of whether the inmate
had obtaiped his high school equivalency diploma; the inmate responded that he
was to take the test the following month. The examiner asked him Jiow many times
he had been convicted and incarcerated. The inmate answered that he had had four
convictions and three incarcerations. The examiner asked, "You're not married?" The
answer was "No." The hearing examiner then proceeded to inquire about what the
inmate had gotten out of the NARA program, his release plans (to live with a sister
and brother-in-law), his employment possibilities, and a physical handicap he had.
After the inmate left the room, the caseworker spoke in the inmate's behalf, but
the hearing examiner said, "He's rough. He's robbed people three times." They
decided to set an institutional review hearing in eight more months. When the inmate
returned to hear their decision, the examiner advised him of the result and told him
that the reason for the decision was that he needed further counseling and therapy.
,Observation of parole hearing (IIe) at Danbury FCI, Aug. 1974. While the hearing
examiners did discuss six of the nine items on the Salient Factor Scale in this unusually
thorough interview, they did not inquire about the inmate's age at first commitment,
whether he had ever had parole or probation revoked, or whether the offense involved
a stolen auto. Further, the inquiry into past employment did not appear to be sufficiently
complete to indicate whether he had held employment for at least six months in his past
two years in the community. The hearing examiners determined the inmate's Guideline
range to be 18 to 24 months and the set-off to 22 months would thus appear correct. But
unexplored Salient Factor points might have reduced the Guideline period to only 12 to
18 months, and his set-off to 22 months would then have called for additional justifica-
tion. 28 C.F.R. § 2.23(c) (1974). Although this result was "determined" by the Guidelines
on the basis of a low Salient Factor Score, it was explained to the inmate as if the reason
for the denial was his need for further counseling. Further counseling, of course, would
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When the questioning did touch on crucial Salient Factors, the
colloquy often revealed doubt or even inaccuracy. Dispositions of
prior criminal cases are very difficult to establish accurately; 110 his-
tory of drug dependence was another factor frequently disputed.''
Given the number of times such uncertainties arose incidentally dur-
ing the hearings, there can be no doubt that far more inaccuracies
go unchallenged and uncorrected. 1 12 Many of these informational
flaws must iignificantly alter the results of hearings.
b. Determination of Offense Severity Rating
Although the Offense Severity classification is a more subjective rat-
ing than the Salient Factor Score, the Board provides only two written
rules to structure this essentially discretionary decision: "If an of-
fense behavior can be classified under more than one category, the
most serious applicable category is to be used"; and "If an offense
behavior involved multiple separate offenses, the severity level may
be increased." 113 While in initial parole hearings an inmate's "of-
fense behavior" is invariably discussed, hearing examiners generally
obscure the discretionary nature of their evaluation by failing to in-
form the inmate of the significance of the offense behavior discussion
or that facts not previously adjudicated are commonly used to rate
offense severity.114
The Offense Severity Rating is generally determined on the basis of
information in the inmate's file, with little or no weight given to
contradictory accounts provided by the inmate in the hearing. Despite
the fact that official reports of offense behavior are at times incom-
not improve his score, and his "need" for it was not the reason he had been denied.
Moreover, his institutional counselor was supporting his application for parole, since he
had completed the entire available institutional program and been recommended for
community after-care in a halfway house.
110. J. Beck, S. Singer, W. Brown & G. Pasela, The Reliability of Information in the
Parole Decision-Making Study, June 1973, at 14-15 (NCCD Parole Decision-Making Project,
Supp. Rep. 12); S. Singer & D. Gottfredson, Development of a Data Base for Parole
Decision-Making Project, June 1973, at 4-5 (NCCD Parole Decision-Making Project, Supp.
Rep. 1).
111. This factor is of unusual importance because, of its ambiguous impact on the
ultimate Guideline outcome. See note 126 infra.
112. Inaccurate information may also have caused another problem. When the Guide-
line Table was first being used by the Board to assist in parole release decisionmaking,
inmates were neither informed of the Guidelines' existence nor of their classifications
on the table. See note 59 supra. In view of the highly predictive implications of each
item, this lack of notice may have resulted in substantial errors through inaccurate
placement.
113. 28 C.F.R. § 2.20 (1974).
114. In 20 of the observed hearings there was a substantial discussion or mention of
nonadjudicated facts pertaining to offense behaviors other than the conviction offense.
In at least six cases, such factors changed the Offense Severity Rating that would other-
wise have been chosen on the basis of the conviction offense.
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plete 1a and unreliable, 16 the examiners do not appear to use the
hearing as an opportunity to check accuracy or correct possible mis-
information relevant to rating an inmate's offense severity." 7 Often,
the examiners do not question the inmate about important aspects of
alleged offense behaviors which later are included in their reports
as justifications for a particular severity rating.118 Even when examin-
ers make a detailed inquiry into some of the circumstances surround-
ing what they believe to be the "offense behavior," the inmate's
denial of facts appears to have no effect. Inmates sometimes maintain
that they did not commit all of the offenses listed in an indictment
but not proven at trial or by plea."19 But in contrast to the credibility
accorded inmates' denials of apparently false information relevant to
the Salient Factor Score, 20 examiners are reluctant to believe inmate
accounts of offense behavior.' 21 When an inmate's version disagrees
115. Probation officers' practices in compiling information on the conviction offense
and related behavior vary among jurisdictions. In some districts the "official" description
may be based only on the allegations in the indictment. Interview with S. Gzregorek,
former U.S. Probation Officer for the Eastern District of Michigan, presently warden of
the Federal Correctional Institution, Tallahassee, Florida, and D. Chamlee, Ass't Chief,
Division of Probation, Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, at Parole and Sen-
tencing Workshop, New Haven, Conn., Jan. 20, 1975. See pp. 878-79 infra.
116. See, e.g., Kohlman v. Norton, 380 F. Supp. 1073 (D. Conn. 1974) (files mistakenly
indicated petitioner used gun during robbery).
117. At another hearing, the inmate was given a set-off beyond his Guideline time
because there were 60 charges of burglary unresolved against him in state court. How-
ever, these charges were never mentioned during the hearing. Observation of parole hear-
ing (Ij) at Lewisburg FP, Aug. 1974.
118. For example, in an initial hearing for an inmate serving a 25 year, (a)(2) sentence
for bank robbery, the hearing examiners asked the inmate, "Why did you get involved
in this bank robbery? Was your weapon loaded? Did you intend to fire it? And you did
knock the manager down? Why did you leave the bank so suddenly?" After he left the
room, the hearing examiners agreed, without discussion, that his offense severity would
be rated "greatest" and gave the man a three year set-off, the longest permissible. See 28
C.F.R. § 2.14(d) (1974). In their dictated report, however, they mentioned many facts
beyond those suggested by their questions: that the prisoner had threatened to kill the
bank manager, that he had knocked him down although he had complied with all orders,
that he had fired the gun several times (without, apparently, wounding anyone), and
that he had attempted to kidnap the manager by forcing him to drive the getaway car.
Observation of parole hearing (III) at Lewisburg FP, Aug. 1974. The examiners were
seeking to see if he would "tell the truth" and admit rather than explain or deny facts.
119. In an initial hearing of an inmate with a five year, regular adult sentence for
truck hijacking, the hearing examiners discussed, both before the inmate came into
the room and during the hearing, the fact that other members of the ring had com-
mitted a kidnapping, and that the inmate had pleaded guilty to one count in a 50-
count indictment. They asked him about the fact that he was named in all 50 counts,
and he responded that he had pleaded guilty only to one. Despite his consistent
denials, the hearing examiners rated him as a "greatest" severity offender.
Observation of parole hearing (IIIg) at Danbury FCI, June 1974.
120. See pp. 833-34 supra.
121. In Kohlman v. Norton, 380 F. Supp. 1073 (D. Conn. 1974), the inmate's offense
had been classified as "very high" severity based on the Board's mistaken belief that he
had used a weapon in committing his bank robbery. In fact, there had been no weapon
involved, and under the Board's Guidelines the offense should have been classified as
only "high." Although the error here was corrected through court action, in many cases
inmates may not discover the facts underlying their severity rating, since the basis for
the rating is not disclosed. See, L. Wilkins, D. Gottfredson, J. Robinson & C. Sadowsky,
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with the official version, examiners do not point out or explore the
discrepancy, "'2 2 but appear instead to evaluate the response for other
purposes, usually with an eye to discovering whether the inmate is
repentant or willing to accept responsibility for his actions. On the
other hand, admissions drawn out in the hearing are relied on. 12 3 For
example, after asking an inmate to describe the circumstances of a
narcotics sale which was the basis for his conviction, the examiner
inquired, "Well, what about the other sales?" The inmate responded,
"What other sales?" The examiner replied, "This couldn't have been
your first sale. How many other had you made?" Intimidated, the in-
mate answered that he had made two or three others. 24 In light of
these practices, it is clear that the parole hearing is not presently
used to maximize the accuracy of the Offense Severity Rating.
c. Discretion and Uncertainty in Classification
A primary purpose of instituting the Guidelines was to structure
discretion and thereby reduce inequality of treatment. 2 Yet the
Guidelines do not completely eliminate opportunities for unstruc-
tured discretionary judgments by hearing examiners. For example, ex-
aminers may treat "negative" factors favorably. A previous history of
drug abuse will cause an inmate to lose one point on the Salient Fac-
tor Scale, but may reduce the offense severity level on a drug-related
offense if the inmate can establish that he or she became involved
in the crime because of the drug dependence. 2 6 The Guidelines do not
focus or control discretion in such a case.
Classification on the Guideline scales can sometimes also be a way
of shielding a decision that would otherwise require additional justi-
fication as a decision outside the Guidelines. Examiners can use the
seeming objectivity of the Guidelines as a way of hiding the exercise
of discretion. Occasionally, examiners modify the Salient Factor Score
Information Selection and Use in Parole Decision-Making, June 1973, at 29 (NCCD
Parole Decision-Making Project, Supp. Rep. 5) (noting board staff's "overwhelming use"
of official description of offense "without corresponding examination of the inmate's
description").
122. See p. 838 infra.
123. Thus, if an inmate admits to unpro%en offenses, he or she may provide the
Board with a factual basis for classification at a higher offense severity (based on multi-
plicity), 28 C.F.R. § 2.20 n.3 (1974), or for making a decision outside the Guidelines be-
cause of "aggravating" circumstances.
124. Observation of parole hearing (IIb) at Danbury FCI, Aug. 1974.
125. NCCD Supp. Rep. 9, supra note 5, at vii-x (preface by M. Sigler, Chairman, U.S.
Bd. of Parole).
126. A history of drug dependence means a loss of one Salient Factor point. Guideline
Evaluation Worksheet, Item F, 28 C.F.R. § 2.20, at 73 (1974). If the offense was drug-
related, however, addiction is a mitigating factor which may improve an inmate's offense
severity rating from "very high" to "high" or even "moderate." See id. § 2.20.
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to achieve a desired result. In one case involving a young German
immigrant with a four-year firearms sentence the examiners agreed
that they wanted to grant parole, but the Guidelines indicated that
a minimum of another four months would be expected. Neither ex-
aminer could think of an articulable reason to go below the Guide-
lines. Then one suggested that they simply ignore the inmate's ju-
venile offenses; the result would be a significant improvement in two
Salient Factor items: age at first conviction and number of prior
convictions and commitments. This plan was agreed to, the score was
altered, and the prisoner called back to be informed that his parole
had been granted "within the Guidelines."1 27 But had the examiners
actually thought that their "clinical evaluation of risk" should "over-
ride [the] predictive aid [Salient Factor Scale],"' 28 they could have
used that justification to make a decision outside the Guidelines and
been subject to the more stringent internal review applied to such
decisions. 129
More commonly, Offense Severity Ratings rather than Salient Factor
Scores are manipulated to avoid explicit decisions outside the Guide-
lines. In one such case, an inmate serving a five-year sentence for
larceny was also serving shorter concurrent sentences for two lesser
offenses. His Salient Factor Score and an Offense Severity Rating based
on his conviction offenses would have yielded a Guideline range call-
ing for immediate parole. The hearing examiners felt this was in-
appropriate. The following discussion ensued:
Examiner (2): Is his total sentence just five years?
Examiner (1): Yes. Where should we rank his offense severity?
(2): Looks to me like it's a moderate, unless you want to increase
it because of multiples.
(1): I do. He's got a serious problem, and he thinks he has it
licked, but he doesn't.
(2): O.K., then, we'll up it on multiple offenses.' 30
Had the hearing examiners not relied on the two lesser offenses to
increase the severity rating, they would have had to justify their de-
cision with additional reasons on the record, subject to the approval
of a regional member of the Parole Board.131
127. Observation of parole hearing (Im) at Danbury FCI, Aug. 1974. In another hear-
ing the inmate made such a favorable impression on the examiners during the hearing
that they overtly manipulated both the Salient Factor Score and Offense Severity Rating in
order to render an otherwise unjustifiable parole "within the Guidelines." Observation of
parole hearing (Iv) at Lewisburg FP, Aug. 1974.
128. 28 C.F.R. § 2.20(e) (1974).
129. Id. § 2.23(c).
130. Observation of parole hearing (Ilb) at Lewisburg FP, Aug. 1974.
131. See 28 C.F.R. § 2.23(c) (1974).
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Even though decisions may be determined entirely by the Guide-
line Table, inmates are lectured to, counselled, and given reasons for
decisions that are at best misleading and at worst dishonest. For ex-
ample, one inmate had served 49 months; his Guideline range was
45 to 55 months. The hearing examiners dismissed the inmate and
rapidly reached a decision to grant parole within the Guidelines, with
the special condition that he abstain from alcoholic beverages. Rather
than relying on the Guideline Table as the basis for release, the ex-
aminer explained to the inmate:
We've read your record and it's real poor. What you did-you
say you did it for your family-but it was more for your own
purposes. We'll take a chance on you, though, but we'll throw
in a few extra conditions .... 132
Such spurious explanations conceal from the inmate the true basis
for the parole decision.
d. Effectiveness of Representatives
Just as reasons given in the hearing context do not always correspond
to the Guideline Table that is controlling decisions, so the role of
representatives, as structured by the hearing examiners, is not oriented
to decisionmaking under the Guidelines. While one might hypothe-
size that representatives would be encouraged to assist in accurate clas-
sification, they are instead urged to comment on factors which the
Guideline Table has rejected as bases for normal decisions, 33 and
which could only serve to justify a decision outside the Guidelines
or to influence the discretionary decision as to when during the Guide-
line range the inmate will be released.13 4
The only class of representatives given relatively negative treatment
132. Observation of parole hearing (Ilp) at Lewisburg FP, Aug. 1974. In this case the
hearing examiners appeared well-intentioned. After the inmate had left, one examiner
said to the other, that he had given the inmate "your psychology" in the hope of promot-
ing his chances for success upon release.
Another inmate was given a set-off to his Guideline range, but was told to participate
in a special drug program so that the "Board could consider granting parole next time."
Observation of parole hearing (IIi) at Lewisburg FP, Aug. 1974. In no observed hearing,
however, was an inmate continued beyond the Guideline range because of failure to
complete an institutional program.
133. Observation of parole hearing (Ic) at Lewisburg FP, Aug. 1974.
134. Wives are generally asked, when they do not volunteer, whether they have seen
any change in their husbands. E.g., observation of parole hearing (Ic) at Lewisburg FP,
Aug. 1974. One of the two wives who seemed to make a strong favorable impression
on the panel convinced them that her husband really was "rehabilitated." She an-
nounced that she could not understand how her husband had allowed himself to perform
a criminal act, that she could not "relate" to it, but that she believed he had learned his
lesson and would return to his job and law-abiding life. Observation of parole hearing
(Ilh) at Lewisburg FP, Aug. 1974, (IIIc) at Danbury FCI, June 1974.
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by the hearing examiners is lawyers and law students.135 Lawyers do
not usually appear as representatives at parole release hearings. At-
torneys served as representatives in only two observed hearings; they
were expressly told to speak for only five minutes, and one was cut
off in the middle of his presentation after that time.130 Attorneys and
law students are commonly told not to make legal arguments on be-
half of their clients.137
The treatment accorded lawyers is consistent with the observers'
finding, confirmed by the Parole Board, that institutional personnel
are the most effective representatives.138 As the Board itself has sug-
gested in explaining their greater effectiveness as representatives:
135. The original rules of the Parole Board's pilot project, experimentally implement-
ing the Guidelines and other new procedures, provided that anyone except lawyers and
law students could represent inmates at parole hearings. See Bureau of Prisons Opera-
tions Memorandum 40100.14, Experimental Parole Board Regionalization Project, Oct. 19,
1972, at 3 (on file with Yale Law Journal); Letter from J. Berry, Counsel to the U.S. Bd.
of Parole, to D. Curtis, Jerome N. Frank Legal Servs. Org., Yale Law School, May 1, 1973.
This regulation has been modified. See 28 C.F.R. § 2.12(a) (1974).
136. Observations of parole hearings (I1d) at Danbury FCI, June 1974, (Ills) at
Alderson FRW.
137. The transcript of a parole rescission hearing submitted in Williams v. United
States Bd. of Parole, 383 F. Snpp. 402 (D. Conn. 1974) as quoted in the court's opinion
showed that:
Williams' attorney was prevented from effectively defending his client. At the outset
of the hearing, the examiner expressed his opinion that "Its [sic] hard to keep a law-
yre's [sic] mouth shut" and therefore cautioned Williams' counsel "not to act in a
legal capacity" and further ruled that he would not "listen to any legal aspects of
the case."
Id. at 405 (first "[sic]" in original).
This hearing was held tinder the provisions of 28 C.F.R. § 2.30(a) (1974), providing for
a review hearing if a previously granted parole date is "retarded" for more than 60 days
on account of institutional misconduct after the date of the parole hearing. The purpose
of the hearing is to determine if the parole grant should be rescinded or a new parole
date established. The procedures followed in all such hearings are identical to those
followed in parole-release hearings, id. § 2.12. Compare Koptik v. Chappell, 321 F.2d 388
(D.C. Cir. 1963), and United States ex rel. Felder v. United States Bd. of Parole, 307 F.
Supp. 159 (D. Conn. 1969) (before Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972)), with Williams
v. United States Bd. of Parole, 383 F. Supp. 402 (D. Conn. 1974); Batchelder v. Kenton,
383 F. Supp. 299 (C.D. Cal. 1974); Means v. Wainwright, 299 So. 2d 577 (Fla. 1974); and
In re Prewitt, 8 Cal. 3d 470, 503 P.2d 1326, 105 Cal. Rptr. 318 (1972) (en banc) (post-
,Morrissey). See Jackson v. Wise, 43 U.S.L.W. 2272 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 10, 1974). But see
Sexton v. Wise, 494 F.2d 1176 (5th Cir. 1974), rev'g 352 F. Supp. 147 (W.D. Tex. 1973).
The Board's provisions have since been elaborated but not substantially changed. 28
-C.F.R. § 2.37, as amended, 40 Fed. Reg. 5361-62 (1975).
138. J. Beck, Effect of Representation at Parole Hearings, Apr. 1974, at 5 (U.S. Bd. of
Parole Res. Unit, Rep. 3) [hereinafter cited as Effect of Representation]. The effectiveness
of institutional representation was most clearly seen in the NARA hearings.at Danbury.
NARA sentencees and voluntary participants in the NARA program receive more in-
tensive "treatment," therapy and counselling than other inmates. NARA caseworkers have
a much smaller caseload than regular caseworkers, are more familiar with each inmate,
and often serve as representatives. Interview with regular caseworker, Lewisburg FP, Aug.
1974. In two observed NARA cases the advocacy of the caseworker influenced the decision
of the hearing examiners. Emphasizing the inmate's success in the program, his "readi-
ness" for release as contrasted with his "problem" at commitment, and the program's
lack of further utility, the caseworker persuaded the examiners to make a decision below
the Guidelines in one case and at the shorter end of the Guideline range in the other.
Observations of parole hearings (IIh, Ilk) at Danbury FCI, Aug. 1974.
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Institutional staff . . . primarily convey information concern-
ing prison adjustment, compliance with institutional goals, and the
degree to which the inmate appears to be rehabilitated .... Equal-
ly important may be the balanced information provided by institu-
tional staff not found with other types of information . ... 139
Although the hearing procedures are conscientiously explained to
them, noninstitutional representatives are not regarded as "experts"
on rehabilitation and hence are perceived by examiners as impedi-
ments to the efficient conduct of the hearing. 40 Despite the Guide-
line Table's explicit abandonment of any effort to measure rehabili-
tation or to base parole decisionmaking on it, the parole examiners'
belief in "rehabilitation" is reflected in the type of the representation
they find most persuasive.' 4 1
In sum, the revamped parole hearing proves useful only in the small
number of cases that present the hearing examiners with borderline
questions of whether to make decisions outside the Guidelines and
how to exercise their limited discretion as to when, during the Guide-
line range of several months, the inmates should be released. The
traditional rehabilitative concerns of adjustment and discipline,'4 2 no
longer reflected in the Guidelines, are still dominant in many hear-
ings, but they seem to affect decisionmaking only in extraordinary
cases.' 43 Thus, although the present parole hearing has fairer pro-
cedures than before, its actual functioning is virtually unrelated to
the basic substantive standards for decisionmaking.
II. Reform of the Hearing
The procedural reforms needed to remedy many of the problems
with parole hearings under the Guidelines could be achieved easily
and voluntarily by administrative action. With more effort, they could
be achieved through statutory amendment. If neither reform is forth-
coming, however, inmates denied parole under the Guidelines may
be expected to seek such changes by judicial action.
139. Effect of Representation, supra note 138, at 12.
140. Hearing examiners generally expressed relief when a case scheduled to be beard
with a representative decided to proceed without the representative. See note 100 supra.
141. While the effectiveness of a representative varies according to how convincing the
examiners find his or her description of the inmate's rehabilitative changes, the presence
of a representative is itself correlated with a small reduction in the time served before
release within the discretionary range permitted under the Guidelines. Effect of Rep-
resentation, supra note 138, at 5.
142. Dawson, supra note 14, at 275-85. Thomas, An Analysis of Parole Selection, 9
CRIME & DELINQ. 173, 175-79 (1963).
143. E.g., in one of the observed hearings an inmate was rewarded with a parole under
the Guidelines for "ratting" on the escape plans of other inmates. Observation of parole
hearing (li) at Danbury FCI, Aug. 1974.
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 84: 810, 1975
A. Reform through Judicial Action: Constitutional and Statutoly
Requirements for the Hearing
1. Traditional Judicial Approaches
One of the most striking aspects of the traditional parole release
process has been the virtual unreviewability of parole board deci-
sions affecting the substantial personal rights of prisoners. In recent
years courts have provided some procedural protections and articulated
criteria for review of the conditions which parole boards have set
upon parolees' conduct 1 44 and for the revocation of parole and return
to prison.145 But until very recently, federal and state courts almost
invariably rejected claims that the denial of parole was subject to re-
view because of procedural or substantive defects in the parole release
decision process.
The grant of parole has long been analogized by courts to the grant
of an executive pardon, essentially an "act of grace, ' 14 or the con-
ferring of a privilege,' 47 giving rise to no rights or expectations in
need of due process protection for the grantee or potential grantee. 1 4
144. Arciniega v. Freeman, 404 U.S. 4 (1971) (on-the-job contact with fellow ex-convict
employees is insufficient basis for parole revocation); McGregor v. Schmidt, 358 F. Supp.
1131 (W.D. Wis. 1973); Sobell v. Reed, 327 F. Supp. 1294 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (fundamental
rights of parolees may not be infringed without a compelling and reasonable justification).
But see Berrigan v. Sigler, 499 F.2d 514 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (Board may restrict parolees'
foreign travel, in interest of effective supervision).
145. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972)
(due process attaches to parole revocation hearing).
146. Richardson v. Rivers, 335 F.2d 996, 999 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Fleming v. Tate, 156
F.2d 848, 849 (D.C. Cir. 1946); Godoy v. United States Bd. of Parole, 345 F. Supp. 1292,
1295 (C.D. Cal. 1972); Berry v. United States Bd. of Parole, 266 F. Supp. 667, 668 (M.D.
Pa. 1967); United States v. Lewis, 274 F. Supp. 184, 189 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); cf. Escoe v. Zerbst,
295 U.S. 490, 492 (1935) (probation). For an excellent discussion of these theories in
greater detail, see The Parole System, supra note 2, at 286-97.
147. Hyser v. Reed, 318 F.2d 225, 237 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 957
(1963); Simon v. United States, 269 F. Supp. 738 (E.D. La. 1967), aff'd, 397 F.2d 813 (5th
Cir. 1968); People v. Ray, 181 Cal. App. 2d 64, 5 Cal. Rptr. 113 (1960), cert. denied, 366
U.S. 937 (1961); The Parole System, supra note 2, at 286-87.
148. It is not clear whether inmates even have a right to a parole hearing. French v.
Ciccone, 308 F. Supp. 256, 257 (W.D. Mo. 1969) (no federal right to a parole hearing); cf.
Ott v. Ciccone, 326 F. Supp. 609 (W.D. Mo. 1970) (no right to a hearing with a parole
board member rather than a hearing examiner). Moreover, courts have acquiesced in
legislative provisions (see, e.g., N.Y. CORREC. LAW § 212(10) (McKinney Supp. 1974)) pur-
porting to preclude judicial review of parole board actions. See, e.g., Briguglio v. State
Bd. of Parole, 24 N.Y.2d 21, 29, 246 N.E.2d 512, 517, 298 N.Y.S.2d 704 (1969); Hines v.
State Bd. of Parole, 293 N.Y. 254, 257, 56 N.E.2d 572, 573 (1944).
In addition to the "act of'grace" and "privilege" rationales, another theory for judicial
passivity in this area has been the argument that parole constituted a mere change in
the nature of custody, and that therefore the parole release decision lay in the area of
administrative prison decisionmaking. Anderson v. Corall, 263 U.S. 193, 196 (1923);
United States ex rel. Bey v. Connecticut State Bd. of Parole, 443 F.2d 1079, 1086 (2d Cir.),
vacated as moot, 404 U.S. 879 (1971); Jenkins v. Madigan, 211 F.2d 904, 906 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 348 U.S. 842 (1954); United States v. Lewis, 274 F. Supp. 184, 189 (S.D.N.Y.
1967); Poole v. Stevens, 190 F. Supp. 938, 941 (E.D. Mich. 1960); cf. Jones v. Cunningham,
371 U.S. 236 (1963). Courts abstained from interference, claiming a lack of knowledge of
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Another rationale used to justify the vast and unreviewable discretion
accorded parole boards is that they are acting as parens patriae with
respect to the inmates; as such, they are concerned only with promot-
ing the inmate's own rehabilitation through the exercise of their ex-
pert knowledge and judgment, which obviates any need for procedural
protections. 140 This rationale reflects the pervasive judicial view that
release decisions are part of a process of rehabilitation that promotes
the offender's reintegration into society. In support of this view, courts
emphasized that parole boards possess an administrative expertise in
evaluating "nonlegal" factors relevant to the release decision, such
as family history or physical and psychological conditions. 10 They
have acquiesced in the boards' assertion that the proper moment for
parole can be determined only after an inmate has been observed and
attempts made to treat him or her within the rehabilitative institu-
tional context.1 '
In Menechino v. Oswald,0 2 a prisoner argued that the state board's
denial of his application for parole was illegal because he had not
received notice of the information to be considered, a fair parole
hearing with a right to counsel, to cross-examination and to produce
favorable witnesses, or a specification of the grounds and underlying
facts upon which the denial was based. The court offered two reasons
in holding that these due process rights did not apply to parole re-
lease hearings. First, the inmate had no legally cognizable "interest"
in his parole grant, since he did not presently enjoy a status that was
being threatened or taken away. Second, the parole board's interest
the institutional exigencies requiring immediate discipline or other action. See The
Parole System, supra note 2, at 288.
However, the theories of "grace" or "privilege" are inconsistent with the view that
parole is a mere change in custody status, since the former theories recognize that the
substantial benefit of conditional freedom is being conferred. The "custody" theory
ignores the fact that a major purpose of parole is to provide a halfway point between
incarceration and total freedom in the community, in order to promote rehabilitation
while still protecting society. C. NEWMAN, SOURCEBOOK ON PROBATION, PAROLE AND
PAtDONs 206-07 (3d ed. 1968); GIARDINI, supra note 9, at 21; Kadish, The Advocate and
the Expert-Counsel in the Peno-Correctional Process, 45 MINN. L. REV. 803, 827 (1961);
Note, Parole Revocation Procedures, 64 HARV. L. REv. 309, 311 (1951); Note, Parole: A
Critique of its Legal Foundations and Conditions, 38 N.Y.U.L. REV. 702, 713-14 (1963).
149. Scarpa v. United States Bd. of Parole, 477 F.2d 278, 281 (5th Cir.), vaca'ed as
moot, 414 U.S. 809 (1973); Menechino v. Oswald, 430 F.2d 403, 407 (2d Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 1023 (1971); Briguglio v. State Bd. of Parole, 24 N.Y.2d 21, 246 N.E.2d
512, 298 N.Y.S.2d 704 (1969). See The Parole System, supra note 2, at 288-89.
150. Scarpa v. United States Bd. of Parole, 477 F.2d 278, 281 (5th Cir.), vacated as
moot, 414 U.S. 809 (1973).
151. Alverez v. Turner, 422 F.2d 214, 217 (10th Cir. 1970); United States v. Surgeon,
421 F.2d 119, 120 (8th Cir. 1970); Peterson v. Rivers, 350 F.2d 457, 458 (D.C. Cir. 1965);
United States v. Zacharias, 365 F. Supp. 256, 257 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). See Rice v. United
States, 420 F.2d 863, 867 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 910 (1970); Washington v.
Hagan, 287 F.2d 332, 334 (3d Cir. 1960).
152. 430 F.2d 403 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1023 (1971).
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in the proceedings was not adverse to that of the inmate's,153 because
"the Board . . . is seeking to encourage and foster his rehabilitation
and readjustment into society." 154
Expanding upon Menechino as to procedural rights, the Fifth Cir-
cuit ruled that it would not review the Parole Board's actions even
to determine whether it had acted in compliance with its own regu-
lations. 155 Although the regulations provided that all relevant factors
were to be considered, the court found that the Parole Board was
justified in considering only some (or one) factor, such as the in-
mate's past record. The court explained:
The decision to grant parole is a very complicated one. Many fac-
tors are necessarily involved in such determinations. The Board's
final determination may be based on any or all of [a list of factors].
The Board possesses the expertise and experience for ascertaining
which factors are determinative in the unique situation presented
by each applicant .... The weight to be given Scarpa's criminal
history is solely within the province of the Board's discretion in
determining parole eligibility. It is not the function of the court
to second guess the outcome of such proceedings nor what factors
went into their formulation. 56
This attitude still confronts those who attempt to obtain judicial re-
view of parole release decisions.' 57
Judicial attitudes and beliefs about the capacities of parole boards
are reflected not only in their decisions on prisoner petitions, but
also in their use of various sentencing mechanisms.' 58 However, un-
like the Parole Board, courts have not yet begun to issue position pa-
pers, rules or regulations concerning sentencing procedures and cri-
teria. Therefore, this Project undertook a Survey of Sentencing Judges
to explore judicial attitudes about sentencing and parole. 59 The re-
153. Id. at 407-08.
154. Id.
155. Scarpa v. United States Bd. of Parole, 477 F.2d 278 (5th Cir.) (en banc), re-
manded, 414 U.S. 809 (1973), vacated as moot, 501 F.2d 992 (5th Cir. 1973) (en banc). See
Ridley v. McCall, 496 F.2d 213 (5th Cir. 1974); 23 EMORY L. REv. 597 (1974).
156. 477 F.2d at 281.
157. See, e.g., Wiley v. United States Bd. of Parole, 380 F. Snpp. 1194, 1197-98 (M.D.
Pa. 1974).
158. See pp. 818-19 supra.
159. In June 1974, questionnaires with an accompanying letter of explanation were
mailed to the 162 district court judges (including senior judges) in the districts of D.C..
Conn., Del., Me., Md., Masi., N.H., N.J., N.Y., (Southern, Western, Eastern and Northern),
Pa. (Eastern, Middle, and Western), R.I., Vt., Va. (Eastern and Western). Persons sen-
tenced in these districts are most likely to be committed to institutions in the Board's
Northeast Region. See note 95 supra. In August, a followup letter was sent to those judges
who had not yet responded and to 12 judges in these jurisdictions who were not on the
original mailing list, enlarging the original sample to 174. Forty-two senior district judges
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sults of this Survey indicate a continuing judicial emphasis on the
rehabilitation of inmates and the expertise of the Parole Board. Those
judges who responded to the questionnaire clearly indicated that they
believed the major concern of the Board should be the inmate's re-
habilitative progress and institutional adjustment. In describing why
they choose the relatively indeterminate (a)(2) sentence, over 41 per-
cent of those responding answered that the primary reason was to en-
able the Parole Board to release an inmate at the time best suited to
promote his or her rehabilitation and reintegration into the com-
munity;1 10 the next largest group rated as foremost their desire to give
the inmate an incentive to good prison performance, that is, to foster
such conduct as would be encouraged by the knowledge that the
Parole Board had the power to release him or her at any time.10 Simi-
larly, with respect to both Regular Adult and (a)(2) sentences, judges
indicated that the primary concern of the Parole Board in determining
whether and when to release an inmate should be his or her insti-
tutional behavior and rehabilitation. 16 2
In addition to the unsuccessful efforts to bring Parole Board ac-
tions within the compass of judicial review by direct constitutional
were then excluded, as many of them had replied that they seldom sentenced any more,
reducing the total to 132. Five of the nonsenior judges had either died or resigned. Of
the remaining number (127) 59 did not respond, 4 indicated they did not wish to partici-
pate, and 64 (slightly over 50 percent) returned completed questionnaires; the last figure
thus provides the base for all calculations performed.
160. Project Survey of Sentencing Judges, question 9. Seventy percent ranked this
reason as among their primary reasons. Some eight percent of the judges responding cited
as their major reason for using the (a)(2) sentence a desire to indicate to the Board that
rehabilitation should be its first concern in this case; 34 percent thought it an im-
portant factor. Another eight percent use the (a)(2) sentence primarily to signal the
Board to give serious consideration before the expiration of one-third of the sentence; 27
percent listed this factor as important.
161. Fifty-two percent of the judges responding stated that they use (a)(2) sentences to
motivate good prison performance by holding out the possible reward of earlier parole.
Project Survey of Sentencing Judges, question 9.
162. Judges were asked to rank the order of importance in which they thought the
Parole Board, in determining a release date for an individual with a Regular Adult sen-
tence, should consider (a) offense severity, (b) rehabilitative progress and achievement of
institutional goals and (c) past record and personal history. Some 63 percent responded
that (b), rehabilitative progress and institutional achievement, should be of primary
importance, while 22 percent answered that (a), offense severity, should be paramount.
Only six percent felt (c), past record, should be most important. In making the same
determination for (a)(2) prisoners, 73 percent felt that (b) should be first, 14 percent
responded that (a) should be the principal consideration, and no judge responded that (c)
should be most significant. No judge stated that (b) should be of least importance.
Although rehabilitative progress and achievement of institutional goals was overwhelm-
ingly listed as being foremost in what the Parole Board should consider in administering
parole release for both Regular Adult and (a)(2) inmates, only 31 percent of the judges
felt that Regular Adult decisions were actually made primarily on the basis of an in-
mate's progress and conduct after commitment, while 50 percent thought that this was
not true (19 percent did not answer); only 33 percent felt this was true for (a)(2) inmates,
while 45 percent disagreed (22 percent did not answer). Project Survey of Sentencing
Judges, questions 13-14.
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theory, prisoners have long sought to obtain relief from adverse Board
decisions through reliance on the Administrative Procedure Act of
1946 (APA).' 63 The United States Board of Parole has never con-
sidered itself an "agency" within the meaning of the APA, and so has
never attempted to comply with its various provisions. 04 No reported
case indicates that any inmate attempted to apply any facet of the APA
to the parole release decision during the period prior to 1972.11" Be-
ginning shortly after passage of the APA, however, a number of re-
committed parole violators sought to challenge the revocation of their
paroles through declaratory judgment actions against the Board or its
chairman in the District of Columbia, alleging jurisdiction under the
APA.'00 Without having to so hold, the court of appeals consistently
assumed that the Board was an agency as defined in the APA. 1 7 How-
ever, its 1963 decision in Hyser v. Reed' 10 held that a revocation hear-
ing was not an "adjudication" within the meaning of § 5 of the Act 0 9
so as to require the notice and fair hearing there afforded. 70 After
Hyser, little effort was made for some ten years to use the APA to
obtain judicial review of Parole Board actions.
2. Legal and Empirical Criticisms of Traditional Approaches
The inadequacies of traditional justifications for judicial noninter-
vention, including their failure to conform to legal or social realities,
163. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59, 701-06, 1305, 3105, 3344, 5362, 7521 (1970, Supp. II, 1972),
formerly codified as 5 U.S.C. §§ 1001-09 (1964).
164. K.C. DAvIs, supra note 14, at 129; Procedures, supra note 42, at 479.
165. Cf. Hiatt v. Campagna, 178 F.2d 42, 44-45 (5th Cir. 1949) (dictum), aff'd by all
equally divided Court, 340 U.S. 880 (1950) (habeas corpus action involving parole revoca-
tion, in which the court opined that application of the APA to "the procedures of the
Parole Board in granting. paroles" would "render it practically impossible for the Board
to handle its business.").
166. See, e.g., Hurley v. Reed, 288 F.2d 844 (D.C. Cir. 1961); Robbins v. Reed, 269 F.2d
242 (D.C. Cir. 1959). jurisdiction under the APA is claimed by virtue of the language of
5 U.S.C. §§ 702-04 (1970). Whether these sections constitute a grant of jurisdiction to the
district court independent of the jurisdictional provisions of the Judicial Code is in
dispute among and within the circuits. See Pickus v. United States Bd. of Parole, 507
F.2d 1107,1109-10 & n.A (D.C. Cir. 1974).
Cf. Candarini v. Attorney General, 369 F. Supp. 1132, 1135 (E.D.N.Y. 1974) (jurisdiction
under the APA to consider prisoners' constitutional claims to due process in the parole
release hearing); Sobell v. Reed, 327 F. Supp. 1294, 1301-02 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (Frankel, J.)
(jurisdiction under the APA to review and reverse the imposition by the Parole ,Board
of an unconstitutional restriction on a parolee's freedom of expression).
167. "The Board is clearly an administrative agency in the Department of Justice,
carrying out a legislative enactment concerning parole." Hurley v. Reed, 288 F.2d 844,
846 (D.C. Cir. 1961); see Robbins v. Reed, 269 F.2d 242, 244 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
168. 318 F.2d 225 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 957 (1963).
169. 5 U.S.C. § 554(a), 551(7) (1970).
170. 318 F.2d at 236-37. Hyser further held that neither § 6(a) of the APA nor the
Constitution required the appointment of counsel for indigent accused parole violators.
318 F.2d at 237, 238; accord, Washington v. Hagan, 287 F.2d 332 (3d Cir. 1960). The
constitutional holding in Hyser seems plainly inconsistent with Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411
U.S. 778 (1973); see p. 852 infra; cf. Glenn v. Reed, 289 F.2d 462 (D.C. Cir. 1961)
(right to retained counsel).
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have been well demonstrated.17 ' Further, the right-privilege distinc-
tion has been rejected as the basis for constitutional analysis in many
other areas,17 2 and should also be rejected in the parole release con-
text. 7 3 The "act of grace" theory is inconsistent with the legislative
purpose of the parole statute, which was to establish an additional
mechanism in a unified correction system to promote its penological
and rehabilitative purposes.17 4 And regardless of whether parole was
originally intended to be administered solely to mitigate the harshness
of criminal sanctions, it has since come to serve the economic and
administrative needs of the courts and penal institutions.' 75
The "parens patriae" or "rehabilitative expertise" theory for per-
mitting parole boards to exercise unreviewable discretion is also sub-
ject to objections. Even though a parole board may conceive of itself
as assisting the inmate to achieve rehabilitation-as manifested in the
many instances of counselling and advising that occur in the hearing
context-its decision can have a substantial negative impact on per-
sonal freedom. A denial of parole, for whatever reason, results in con-
tinued incarceration. In other areas of the law involving restraints
on personal liberty, courts have come to recognize that the decision-
makers' presumed identity of interest with the subject of the decision
does not eliminate the need for procedural protections,'- 6 and this
learning should be applicable to the parole process.
In addition to the above criticisms, continuing judicial deference
to parole board expertise is mistaken for an even more fundamental
reason-it is based upon a misapprehension of the facts concerning a
parole board's exercise of its discretionary powers and upon an ig-
171. F. COHEN, THE LEGAL CHALLENGE TO CORREcTIONS (1969); R. GOLDFARB & L.
SINGER, supra note 1, at 284-87; Kastenmeier & Eglit, supra note 1; Newman, supra note
8; Parsons-Lewis, supra note 14, at 1530-46; Comment, supra note 56, at 433-39; The
Parole System, supra note 2, at 286-300; Note, Constitutional Law: Parole Status and the
Privilege Concept, 1969 DUKE L.J. 139; Note, Parole: A Critique, supra note 148.
172. Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 644 (1973); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593,
597 (1972); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571 n.9 (1972); Graham v. 'Richardson,
403 U.S. 365, 374 (1971); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397
U.S. 254, 262 (1970). See Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in
Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439 (1968); Note, Constitutional Law: Parole
Status and the Privilege Concept, 1969 DUKE L.J. 139.
173. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481-82 (1972).
174. "Preventing crime and rehabilitating prisoners are traditional governmental func-
tions, which the executive should effect with the best means available. If parole serves
these functions, can the parole system be properly labelled an act of grace?" The Parole
System, supra note 2, at 294. See 18 U.S.C. § 4203 (1970) (criteria and purposes of parole
release in federal system); cf. Biddle v. Perovich, 274 U.S. 480, 486 (1927).
175. "Economic factors belie the concept of grace. Given the high cost of confinement,
it is difficult to ascribe the state's action to clemency." The Parole System, supra note 2,
at 294. Institutionalization of one inmate costs about six times as much per year as his
maintenance under parole supervision. Task Force Report: Corrections, supra note 1, at
180, 189. See Kadish, supra note 148, at 826.
176. See, e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (doctrine of "parens patriae" is insufficient
to deny due process in quasi-criminal juvenile proceedings).
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norance of the best social scientific data on the achievement of re-
habilitative goals by penal and correctional institutions.
Confidence in the expertise of the parole board is profoundly mis-
placed. First, in deferring to the competence of parole boards, courts
have often overlooked the obvious fact that, with the exception of
institutional performance and evaluation, all of the information upon
which parole boards base their release decisions is also used by the
court in making a sentencing determination. 77 However, courts which
frequently sentence offenders and are thus experienced in the area
deny any comparable expertise or ability to oversee the substantive
criteria of parole boards.' 78 Moreover, most parole board members are
not trained in any of the correctional, sociological or criminological
sciences in which they are supposed to be "experts";' 0 few statutes,
including the federal, specify the qualifications of parole board mem-
bers, who are usually, like the judges themselves, political appointees.1'
But more disturbing than either of these facts is that even if parole
board members were all thoroughly trained in such relevant fields as
penology, criminology, psychology, and sociology, the present state of
the social sciences is not sufficiently advanced to permit precise de-
cisions as to the best time to release an incarcerated offender in
order to promote rehabilitation and reintegration into the communi-
ty.' For the vast majority of cases, a parole board's unique op-
portunity to assess an inmate's progress after incarceration will not
enable it to determine the appropriate time for release any better than
could have been determined when the prisoner was first committed.' 2
The Guidelines themselves represent an abandonment by the Parole
Board of its former pose of expertise in the area of rehabilitation'- 3
and the Board no longer claims to act on information not before the
court at sentencing. By placing primary reliance on the Guidelines in
its release decisions, the federal Board has shifted its orientation from
rehabilitation to achieving relatively longer incapacitation of likely
recidivists, and to furthering the "punitive" functions of deterrence,
retribution and denunciation.
177. See note 416 infra; Carter & Wilkins, Some Factors in Sentencing Policy, 58
J. CRli. L.C. & P.S. 503, 509 (1967) (Table VIII).
178. See, e.g., Scarpa v. United States Bd. of Parole, 477 F.2d 278, 281 (5th Cir.),
vacated as moot, 414 U.S. 809 (1973). Compare note 331 infra (contents of a typical PSI),
with 28 C.F.R. § 2.19 (1974) (factors the Parole Board says it may consider).
179. See V. O'L.ARY & J. NUFFIELD, sulira note 16, at xxn-xxin.
180. Id. at xxiv-xxviii.
181. See pp. 824-28 supra.
182. The factors that best predict ultimate success or failure upon release are static
and established before arrival at the institution. See note 72 supra; Kastenmeier &
Eglit, supra note 1, at 496-97 nn.71-72, 503-10; Frankel, supra note 84, at 34.
183. See pp. 826-28 supra.
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3. Three Models of Procedural Fairness
The traditional deference by courts to parole board expertise that
virtually precluded judicial review in the past cannot withstand legal
analysis. More significantly, such deference was premised upon certain
factual assumptions concerning rehabilitation which have proved to be
false. Moreover, the federal Parole Board has abandoned any pretext
of relying upon these assumptions in most decisions. Finally, observa-
tion of parole hearings raises questions about the effectiveness of the
hearing procedures to develop facts relevant to decisions under the
Guidelines. It is therefore necessary to examine the theories under
which appropriate procedural protections might be judicially extended
to parole release hearings. Three basic models are considered here:
minimum due process, sentencing due process, and the Administrative
Procedure Act.
a. Minimum Due Process
The minimum due process model is set forth by the Supreme Court
in Morrissey v. Brewer 84 (parole revocation) and Wolff v. McDon-
nelllsa (inmate disciplinary hearings). 8 6 Under these cases, a determi-
nation must first be made whether due process protections apply at
all in a particular governmental decision process.' 8 7 This determina-
tion is accomplished not simply by characterizing the governmental
benefit involved as a "right" or a "privilege," 8 8 but by examining
"the extent to which an individual will be condemned to suffer griev-
ous loss."'' 9 The Court in Morrissey concluded that the liberty of a
parolee, though conditional and indeterminate, "includes many of the
core values of unqualified liberty . . . and must be seen as within
the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment."' 90 Likewise, the Court
reasoned in McDonnell:
The State having created [a statutory] right to good time and it-
self recognizing that its deprivation is a sanction authorized for ma-
jor misconduct, the prisoner's interest has real substance and is
sufficiently embraced within Fourteenth Amendment "liberty" to
184. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
185. 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
186. Although Morrissey and McDonnell arose under the Fourteenth Amendment,
which is applicable only to the states, similar standards apply to the federal govern-
ment under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See note 314 infra.
187. 408 U.S. at 481.
188. See note 172 supra.
189. 408 U.S. at 481, quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S.
123, 168 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263 (1970).
190. 408 U.S. at 482.
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entitle him to those minimum procedures appropriate under the
circumstances and required by the Due Process Clause to insure
that the state-created right is not arbitrarily abrogated.' 9 '
Once it is determined that due process applies, the second step of the
minimum due process analysis examines "the question of what process
is due."'192 At this stage, state and individual interests are balanced to
arrive at the requisite procedural protections.
The state's interests in parole release decisionmaking are essentially
the same as those recognized in Morrissey. In both cases, the major
governmental interest is in the efficient administration of the parole
process. Society also has an interest in not revoking parole on the
basis of inaccurate information or the erroneous evaluation of in-
formation. It has an interest as well in the fair treatment of indi-
viduals so as to "enhance the chances of rehabilitation by avoiding
reactions to arbitrariness."' 193 As to the individual interests involved,
release, revocation, and disciplinary proceedings all vitally affect the
convict's liberty and freedom from incarceration, matters of obviously
great importance.1 94 The balance between these competing interests
determines the appropriate due process protections.
Three courts of appeals have applied this analysis to the parole
release decision.' 95 In United States ex rel. Johnson v. Chairman of
New York State Board of Parole'96 the Second Circuit reaffirmed its
earlier view in Menechino v. Oswald'97 of the rehabilitative function
of parole and the identity of interests between the parole board and
191. 418 U.S. at 557.
192. 408 U.S. at 483.
193. Id. at 484.
194. The Court recognized in McDonnell, however, that even the deprivation of "good
time" there involved did not result in an immediate "change in the conditions of [the
prisoner's] liberty." 418 U.S. at 561.
195. Childs v. United States Bd. of Parole, Nos. 74-1052 to 74-1142 (D.C. Cir., Dec. 19,
1974); Bradford v. Weinstein, No. 73-1751 (4th Cir., Nov. 22, 1974); United States ex rel.
Johnson v. Chairman, N.Y. State Bd. of Parole, 500 F.2d 925 (2d Cir.), vacated as moot,
95 S. Ct. 488 (1974), See King v. United States, 492 F.2d 1337, 1342-43 (7th Cir. 1974)
(dictuni); Cooley v. Sigler, 381 F. Supp. 441 (D. Minn. 1974); Craft v. Attorney General,
379 F. Stipp. 538 (M.D. Pa, 1974); Candarini v. Attorney General, 369 F. Supp. 1132
(E.D.N.Y. 1974); Masiello v. Norton, 364 F. Supp. 1133 (D. Conn. 1973); Johnson v.
Heggie, 362 F. Supp. 851 (D. Colo. 1973); United States ex rel. Harrison v. Pace, 357 F.
Supp. 354 (E.D. Ia. 1973); In re Sturm, 11 Cal. 3d 258, 521 P.2d 97, 113 Cal. Rptr. 361
(1974) (en banc); Monks v. New Jersey State Parole Bd., 58 N.J. 238, 277 A.2d 193 (1971);
cf. United States ex rel. Campbell v. Pate, 401 F.2d 55 (7th Cir. 1968); Sturm v. California
Adult Auth., 395 F.2d 446, 450 (9th Cir. 1967) (Browning, J., concurring in denial of
rehearing en banc, 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 947 (1969); Williams v. United States Bd.
of Parole, 383 F. Supp. 402 (D. Conn. 1974); Lupo v. Norton, 371 F. Supp. 156 (D. Conn.
1974); Freeman v. Schoen, 370 F. Supp. 1144 (D. Minn. 1974). See generally Comment,
Procedural Protection at Parole Release Hearings, 1974 DUKE L.J. 1119.
196. 500 F.2d 925 (2d Cir.), vacated as moot, 95 S. Ct. 488 (1974).
197. 430 F.2d 403 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1023 (1971), discussed at pp.
843-44 supra.
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prospective parolee. 19 8 But it rejected the second premise of Menechino
that the inmate lacks a sufficient "interest" in a parole grant to justify
constitutional protection. 190 "To hold otherwise would be to create
a distinction too gossaimer-thin to stand close analysis. Whether the
immediate issue be release or revocation, the stakes are the same: con-
ditional freedom versus incarceration." 200 The court then turned to
the specific issue of whether reasons must be given for a parole de-
nial..20 1 Although neither the New York parole statute nor the parole
board's rules and regulations had articulated criteria to guide the
exercise of the board's broad discretion, the court found that "a state-
ment of reasons will permit reviewing courts to determine whether
the Board has adopted and followed criteria that are appropriate, ra-
tional and consistent, and also protects the inmate against arbitrary
and capricious denials or actions based upon impermissible considera-
tions. 20 2 In addition, the court suggested that the board promulgate
release criteria and a list of factors to be considered in determining
whether the criteria have been met.20 3
In Bradford v. Weinstein,-2 0 4 the Fourth Circuit followed Johnson
in holding that a denial of parole without a statement of reasons would
be a denial of due process. The court further noted that "it would
be a grievous loss for a prisoner by reason of a completely ex parte
proceeding, and the resulting increased opportunity for committing
error, to be denied parole . . . because the attention of the parole
board was not called to data tending to indicate that parole should
be granted." 205 Similarly, in Childs v. United States Board of Parole,0°6
the District of Columbia Circuit agreed that reasons for a denial must
be stated. It also remanded the case for consideration whether pro-
spective parolees must be given access to adverse information in their
files prior to the parole hearing, in order to be able to respond to
any inaccuracies and contest any possible unfavorable inferences.
198. 500 F.2d at 927, citing 430 F.2d at 407.
199. 500 F.2d at 927.
200. Id. at 928. Accord, Menechino v. Oswald, 430 F.2d 403, 414 (2d Cir. 1970) (Fein-
berg, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1023 (1971); Childs v. United States Bd. of
Parole, 371 F. Supp. 1246, 1247 (D.D.C. 1973), aff'd, Nos. 74-1052 to 74-1142 (D.C. Cir.,
Dec. 19, 1974); Childs v. United States Bd. of Parole, Civil No. 1616-70 (D.D.C., Aug. 19,
1971), at 5, a f'd, Nos. 74-1052 to 74-1142 (D.C. Cir., Dec. 19, 1974), quoted in United
States ex rel. Harrison v. Pace, 357 F. Supp. 354, 356 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
201. 500 F.2d at 928-35.
202. 500 F.2d at 929, 931-33; see Childs v. United States Bd. of Parole, Nos. 74-1052
to 74-1142 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 19, 1974); Johnson v. Heggie, 362 F. Supp. 851, 857-58 (D. Colo.
1973); United States ex rel. Harrison v. Pace, 357 F. Supp. 354, 357 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Monks
v. New Jersey State Parole Bd., 58 N.J. 238, 277 A.2d 193, 197 (1971).
203. 500 F.2d at 930, 933, 934.
204. No. 73-1751 (4th Cir., Nov. 22, 1974).
205. Id. at 11.
206. Nos. 74-1052 to 74-1142 (D.C. Cir., Dec. 19, 1974).
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In addition to a statement of reasons for parole denial, the "mini-
mum due process" model would entitle the inmate to other pro-
cedural protections. Morrissey held that the parolee facing revocation
is entitled to a hearing20 7 attended with written notice of claimed
violations, disclosure of adverse evidence, opportunity to appear, be
heard, and present witness and documentary evidence, the right to
confrontation and cross-examination of adverse witnesses in most cases,
a "neutral" hearing body (such as a parole board), and a written state-
ment of the reasons and evidence relied upon for revocation.208 In
Gagnon v. Scarpelli,20 9 the Court further established a due process
right to the presence of retained counsel or to the appointment of
counsel at least when there is a colorable claim of innocence or when
"there are substantial reasons which justified or mitigated the viola-
tion and make revocation inappropriate, and .. . the reasons are com-
plex or otherwise difficult to develop or present." 210
Like a revocation or disciplinary hearing, the parole release hearing
involves two distinct stages: fact finding and disposition.21' The basic
facts relevant to the parole release decision are often as complex and
subject to dispute as those at issue in the other types of proceedings.
And in each type of hearing the ultimate disposition involves the
exercise of judgment and discretion: In a revocation or disciplinary
hearing the question is whether an offender found to have com-
mitted the violation charged should be subject to further punishment
and, if so, what kind, while in a release hearing the issue is whether
the examiners should take the action indicated by the Guidelines or
exercise special discretion. Moreover, the interest of the prospective
parolee in his or her hearing is similar to that of the, accused vio-
lator; indeed, Johnson, Bradford and Childs hold that the interest
in conditional freedom is the same.2 12 And the inmate has more at
stake in a parole release hearing than when facing institutional dis-
cipline; the prospective parolee stands to gain immediate conditional
release, while being "acquitted" in a good-time forfeiture hearing
means only that the inmate's tentative future release date will not
be postponed.
207. The Court held that an inmate was entitled to both a preliminary hearing near
the place and time of the alleged violation and a final revocation hearing. Morrissey v.
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972).
208. 408 U.S. at 489.
209. 411 U.S. 778, 783-91; see Wainwright v. Cottle, 414 U.S. 895 (1973) (Douglas &
Blackmun, JJ., dissenting).
210. 411 U.S. at 790.
211. See pp. 857-58 infra.
212. See note 200 supra.
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These similarities among the three types of hearings seem to indi-
cate that approximately the same due process requirements should
apply in all of them. In Wolff v. McDonnell,21 3 however, the Court
relied on two factors in holding that fewer protections adhere in good-
time forfeiture hearings: the absence of an immediate threat to the
prisoner's liberty 14 and the special tensions and dangers inherent
in confrontational proceedings within a prison. 215 In light of these
differences, the Court refused to order confrontation and cross-ex-
amination or to allow the assistance of retained or appointed coun-
sel.210 The Court held that the inmate "should be allowed to call
witnesses and present documentary evidence," but only when "per-
mitting him to do so will not be unduly hazardous to institutional
safety or correctional goals." 21 7 The Court did require advance written
notice of claimed violations, an opportunity to marshal facts and
prepare a defense, and a statement of evidence and reasons for any
forfeiture.218
The considerations in McDonnell that led to this lesser degree of
protection do not arise so markedly in the parole release hearing.
First, the prospective parolee stands to gain immediate conditional
release, so that the denial of parole does present an immediate threat
to the inmate's liberty. Moreover, under the federal Parole Board
Guidelines, sensitive institutional factors will seldom play a major part
in the outcome of the hearing.
At the same time, some factors involved in parole release hearings
differ from those considered in Morrissey. The difference between the
parolee's liberty and the prisoner's expectation, although certainly thin,
is not entirely insubstantial. More significant, however, is the fact that
the parole release hearing is not accusatorial; the inmate is not facing
"charges" that he or she must rebut. This factor reduces but does
not eliminate the need Morrissey recognized for direct confrontation.
Bearing in mind the enormous caseload of the Board and the con-
comitant demand for an efficient and orderly process, the analysis of
Morrissey, Scarpelli and McDonnell would allow those procedures
minimally necessary to assure accuracy in fact finding and fairness in
213. 418 US. 539 (1974).
214. The Court's analysis in this regard does not take account of the other and im-
mediate results of an inmate disciplinary hearing. In addition to the loss or suspension of
good time credits, the inmate may be placed in closer custody, including punitive
segregation, may lose any work or social privileges, and may be denied eligibility for
parole or furlough.
215. 418 U.S. at 561-63.
216. Id. at 567-70.
217. Id. at 566.
218. Id. at 563-65.
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 84: 810, 1975
dispositions under the Guidelines. These protections include advance
access to relevant data, analogous to notice of the "charges" in a
revocation or disciplinary hearing, and a fair opportunity during the
hearing to discuss and correct any errors through the presentation of
documentary evidence and, in extraordinary cases, favorable testi-
mony.210 Reasons would be required that give a full and fair ex-
planation of any denial, together with a brief, specific statement of
the evidentiary facts relied on in reaching that conclusion. However,
minimum due process does not seem to require counsel at all release
hearings, however useful and appropriate such a rule might be;
22 0
nonetheless, there may be some cases, such as those outlined in Scar-
pelli and McDonnell, where representation would be mandated.
22
'
b. Sentencing Due Process
A second analytical framework for considering due process at parole
release hearings is the sentencing model.2 -2 The sentencing and pa-
role release decisions are very similar:
219. See note 278 infra. Of course, it is not enough that the prisoner have notice and
an opportunity to contest adverse information. For such a right to be effective, the in-
mate must know the significance of the information. Moreover, the hearing examiners
must be willing to question the official records in an appropriate case and fairly con-
sider the conflicting evidence. See pp. 833-37 supra. For example, in Kohlman v. Norton,
380 F. Supp. 1073 (D. Conn. 1974), the severity of the inmate's offense was rated "very
high," rather than "high," on the basis that he had used a gun in committing a robbery.
In fact he had not, nor was there any evidence that he had, and Kohlman strenuously
denied it. Neither the examiners nor the Board's appellate structures would take his
word. The court ordered him released on habeas corpus unless the Board rescinded and
altered its previous classification, holding that pirole decisions without any evidentiary
basis violate due process; cf. Thompson v. City of Louisville, 362 U.S. 199 (1960) (due
process requires appellate reversal of criminal conviction unsupported by any evidence).
See Masiello v. Norton, 364 F. Supp. 1133 (D. Conn. 1973) (unsupported hearsay allegation
that petitioner's father was member of organized crime, and that petitioner would be-
come one if released, insufficient basis to deny parole); cf. United States ex rel. Campbell
v. Pate, 401 F.2d 55 (8th Cir. 1968) (claim for equitable relief stated where parole con-
sideration date was allegedly delayed on basis of prison officials' capricious and un-
reliable determination of a purported disciplinary infraction).
Kohlman's "no evidence" standard is not necessarily correct for reviewing agency action.
It has long been the law that "arbitrary" action is inconsistent with due process. ICC v.
Louisville & N.R.R., 227 U.S. 88 (1913); Scarpa v. United States Bd. of Parole, 477 F.2d
278, 283 (5th Cir.) (en banc), vacated on other grounds, 414 U.S. 809 (1973); Rudder v.
United States, 226 F.2d 51, 53 (D.C. Cir. 1955); Snyder v. United States Bd. of Parole, 383
F. Supp. 1153, 1155 (D. Colo. 1974); cf. APA, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1970). In administrative
law, agency actions may be reversed if not supported by "substantial evidence." See, e.g.,
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 414 (1971); Consolidated Edison
Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938); cf. APA, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (1970). A determina-
tion of the Selective Service System, on the other hand, may be overturned only if it has
"no basis in fact." Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114, 122 (1946).
220. See pp. 856-57 infra.
221. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 570 (1974); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S.
778, 790 (1973).
222. See Comment, Due Process: The Right to Counsel in Parole Release Hearings, 54
IowA L. REv. 497, 498 (1968); Comment, supra note 195, at 1149-50.
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Determining when during the offender's term he shall be released
approximates the judicial setting of a term of imprisonment. The
only difference is the time of the determination .... 223
Like the judge at sentencing who must determine within the statutory
range permitted for the conviction offense how much punishment the
particular offender merits, so the parole hearing examiners must de-
termine, within the range set by the judicial decision, how much time
the particular offender should serve prior to first release..2 24 Like the
defendant at sentencing, the inmate's goal is to avoid or minimize
time spent in prison.
Sentencing itself, however, currently suffers from many of the same
problems that have afflicted parole release decisions. Primary among
them is the absence of any requirement that sentencing be guided
by legislatively or judicially established criteria. 22 5 A related defect
is that courts are not required to state reasons or findings in support
of a sentence2 26 nor are "legal" sentences reviewable on appeal.22 7
The release of information in presentence reports or other ex parte
documents relied on by the judge is only discretionary. 228 Given the
enormous range of discretion afforded sentencing judges, the lack of
these safeguards results in arbitrary and inequitable sentencing de-
cisions which appear to violate fundamental notions of due process
of law.229
223. Kadish, supra note 148, at 812-13. See also Comment, supra note 222, at 500.
224. Types of Error, supra note 82, at 8.
225. There is no statutory guide to the imposition of sentence in the federal penal
system, except those provided under such treatment-oriented sentencing alternatives as
YCA or NARA. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 4209, 4252-53, 5010 (1970); cf. id. § 3651 (1970) (court
may suspend sentence and impose probation when it finds "that the ends of justice and
the best interest of the public as well as the defendant will be served thereby").
226. Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 431-32, 440-42 (1974). Dorszynski left
open the possibility that a constitutional due process claim, rather than the purely
statutory claim there presented, might require that judges provide reasons at sentencing.
Id. at 431 n.7. See generally M. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES (1973); Berkowitz, The
Constitutional Requirement for a Written Statement of Reasons and Facts in Support of
the Sentencing Decision: A Due Process Proposal, 60 Iow A L. REv. 205 (1974).
227. Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 431 (1974); Gore v. United States, 357
U.S. 387, 393 (1958); Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 305 (1932) (sentences
within statutory maximum not reviewable as to severity); DAwSON, supra note 1, at 385-
87; Hearings on S. 2722 to Provide for Appellate Review of Sentences Before the Sub-
comm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 89th
Cong., 2d Sess. 83-90 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on Appellate Review]; Com-
ment, Appellate Review of Sentences in Wisconsin, 1971 Wis. L. REV. 1190, 1191-93, 1207.
228. FED. R. CRI.t. P. 32(c)(1); note 259 infra. Some defendants spend ten years in
prison before discovering that the judge relied on false information at sentencing; others
never find out. See, e.g., Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736 (1948); M. FRANKEL, supra note
226, at 32-33.
229. See Frankel, supra note 84, at 2-16; Kutak & Gottschalk, In Search of a Rational
Sentence: A Return to the Concept of Appellate Review, 50 NEB. L. REv. 463, 499 (1974);
Motley, "Law and Order" and the Criminal Justice System, 64 J. CR1m. L. & CRIMIN. 259,
260, 265-66, 268-69 (1973); Singer, Sending Men to Prison: Constitutional Aspects of the
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Until the law of sentencing reaches minimum constitutional stand-
ards necessary to assure fairness and accuracy, it can hardly be pro-
pounded as a general model for the developing law of parole release
decisionmaking. 23° In one respect, however, the law of sentencing
has recognized an important procedural right not yet afforded at the
parole release hearing2 3 1 and not clearly required under the minimum
due process model: the right to be represented by counsel.2 32 Counsel
has been held to be required at sentencing for three purposes: 233 first,
to protect a defendant's rights that would otherwise be waived; second,
to assure the factual accuracy of the sentencing determination; 23 4 and
third, to present the case for minimal punishment appropriate in light
of the offense committed, the offender's personal characteristics, and
the available alternatives.
Although parole release decisionmaking does not involve the pos-
sibility of waiver of trial-level rights, it is otherwise parallel to the
sentencing decision. The Board passes on information similar or iden-
tical to that presented at sentencing; because of inadequate safeguards
to insure accuracy of information in the files, counsel must be available
Burden of Proof and the Doctrine of the Least Drastic Alternative as Applied to Sen-
tencing Determinations, 58 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1972); Zumwalt, The Anarchy of Sen-
tencing in the Federal Courts, 57 JUDICATURE 96, 97 (1973); Note, The Collective Sentencing
Decision in Judicial and Administrative Contexts: A Comparative Analysis of Two Ap-
proaches to Correctional Disparity, 11 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 695, 701 (1973) [hereinafter cited
as Note, The Collective Sentencing Decision]; Note, Equal Protection Applied to Sen-
tencing, 58 IowA L. REV. 596 (1973); Note, Criminal Procedure-Probable Cause and Due
Process at Sentencing, 50 N.C.L. REV. 925, 935 (1972); Note, Toward Lawfulness in Sen-
tencing: Thank You, Professor Dworkin, 5 RUTGERS-CAMDEN L.J. 80 (1973); Berkowitz,
supra note 226.
230. See Childs v. United States Bd. of Parole, Nos. 74-1052 to 74-1142 (D.C. Cir., Dec.
19, 1974), at 28 (distinguishing parole release decisions and sentencing to avoid holding
of Dorszynski); cf. id. at 3 n.5 (Leventhal, J., concurring); United States ex rel. Harrison
v. Pace, 380 F. Supp. 107, 111 n.4 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (parole board members' immunity from
damage action not dependent on their exercising quasi-judicial roles; crucial differences
exist); Lupo v. Norton, 371 F. Supp. 156, 160 (D. Conn. 1974) ("the use of alleged mis-
conduct in parole decisionmaking is ... more disquieting than in sentence proceedings");
Cruz v. Skelton, 502 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. 1974) (quasi-judicial function of parole board).
231. Although the mechanisms for assuring accurate decisionmaking are as yet un-
developed at sentencing, there is a relatively clear right not to be sentenced on the basis
of false information about one's past record. United States v. Powell, 487 F.2d 325 (4th
Cir. 1973); United States v. Malcolm, 432 F.2d 809, 816 (2d Cir. 1970); see United States
v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443 (1972). But see Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949). And
while the rules of evidence and standards of proof applicable at trial do not apply to
sentencing, defendants have a right not to be sentenced on the basis of nonadjudicated
allegations of criminal behavior unless the prosecution presents persuasive proof of such
allegations. United States v. Weston, 448 F.2d 626, 634 (9th Cir. 1971); cf. Shelton v.
United States, 497 F.2d 156 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Rosner, 485 F.2d 1213, 1229-31
(2d Cir. 1973); United States v. Espinoza, 481 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v.
Battaglia, 478 F.2d 854 (5th Cir. 1972) (opportunity to answer).
A similar trend has begun to develop regarding parole release decisions. See, e.g.,
Kohlman v. Norton, 380 F. Supp. 1073 (D. Conn. 1974); Masiello v. Norton, 364 F. Supp.
1133 (D. Conn. 1973).
232. Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967); Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736 (1948).
233. Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 135 (1967); cf. M. FRANKEL, supra note 226, at 37.
234. See notes 231-33 supra.
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at parole hearings to insure inaccurate information is not relied on.2 35
The Board's decision determines (within the parameters of the sen-
tence) the length of incarceration required, and counsel's arguments
in mitigation of extended incarceration are as important here as at
sentencing.
Courts have thus far rejected the argument that parole release de-
terminations should be held to the same constitutional standards for
counsel that apply at sentencing. Both Gagnon v. Scarpelli23 6 and
Menechino v. Oswald,2 3 ' in denying claims that counsel was required
at revocation or release determinations, suggested that the presence of
counsel at such determinations would interfere with the " 'predictive
and discretionary,' " i.e., dispositional, functions of such proceedings.2 38
But counsel is presently required at sentencing, which, like parole, is
essentially a dispositional rather than adjudicative proceeding.239 The
primary fact finding relevant to guilt or innocence has already been
made, or the defendant has admitted guilt, prior to the sentencing
stage.2 40 And like the judgments of parole boards, sentencing itself
is a complicated decision that involves balancing various policies and
factors, many of which are imprecise and nonlegal. The courts have
recognized the importance and relevance of lawyers' skills of investi-
gation, verification of evidence, and factual distinction in reaching
these decisions.2 41 There is thus little justification for judicial reason-
235. Thus the suggestion in Scarpelli that counsel should not be required at parole
revocation proceedings because "mitigating evidence... is often not susceptible of proof
or is so simple as not to require either investigation or expression by counsel," 411 U.S.
at 787, ignores counsel's function in assuring the accuracy of all the information-neutral,
aggravating or mitigating-upon which a decision depends. See notes 238-39 infra.
236. 411 U.S. 778, 786-90 (1973).
237. 430 F.2d 403 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1023 (1971).
238. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 787-88 (1973). In holding that Mempa v. Rhay,
389 U.S. 128 (1967), did not apply to parole release determinations, Menechino v. Oswald,
430 F.2d 403, 410 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1023 (1971), emphasized that a
lawyer would not be "required to perform functions of a legal nature... before the
Board of Parole ... [but would only provide] non-legal assistance in pleading for clemency"
(emphasis in original). See Childs v. United States Bd. of Parole, Nos. 74-1052 to 74-1142
(D.C. Cir., Dec. 19, 1974) at 28 (opinion of court), 3 n.5 (Leventhal, J., concurring).
239. See, e.g., Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949) ("A sentencing judge...
is not confined to the narrow issue of guilt.... Highly relevant-if not essential-to his
selection of an appropriate sentence is the possession of the fullest information possible
concerning the defendant's life and characteristics ... [also required by] modern concepts
individualizing punishment..."). See The Parole System, supra note 2, at 356-59; Hyser
v. Reed, 318 F.2d 225, 252-53 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc) (Bazelon, J., dissenting in part), cert.
denied, 375 U.S. 957 (1963); Dershowitz, The Law of Dangerousness: Some Fictions About
Predictions, 23 J. LECAL ED. 24, 44-49 (1973) (no true distinction between adjudication and
disposition; each is a kind of probabilistic determination).
240. See p. 880 infra. In the sentencing field, conviction does not end the need
for counsel, but merely serves to alter counsel's role in the decisional process; see Kadish,
supra note 148, at 828-29.
241. Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 135 (1967). In Mempa, the Court rejected the
argument that counsel's role would be minimal because the trial court had 'no discre-
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ing that currently affords counsel at sentencing but denies it at parole
hearings. 42
c. The Administrative Procedure Act
The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) 243 provides a third, statu-
tory model for parole hearing procedures. Due process aside, the APA
requires certain protections for persons affected by agency actions. 2 44
Jurisdiction under the APA to consider actions of the Parole Board
has long been allowed, although cases arising before 1972 uniformly
denied prisoners' or parolees' claims. 245 Because these claims were de-
nied on the merits, there was never a square holding that the federal
board was an "agency" under the Act. In King v. United States,240
however, the Seventh Circuit held that the Parole Board was within
the coverage of the APA and therefore had to provide "a brief state-
tion, after a probation revocation, not to impose the mandatory statutory maximum
sentence. The Court noted that the judge also had to make certain recommendations to
the paroling authorities who in effect performed administrative sentencing.
242. Just as the essential similarity of sentencing and parole should lead to the
extension of counsel to the parole hearing, so that same similarity should require at
sentencing those procedural protections available at the parole hearing, especially artic-
ulated criteria and the explanation of reasons for each decision. See pp. 850-51, notes
229-30 supra; Berkowitz, supra note 226.
243. See note 163 supra.
244. The APA requires that in every "adjudication required by statute" interested
parties be afforded timely notice of the "time, place, and nature of the hearing," and of
"the matters of fact and law asserted." 5 U.S.C. § 554(b) (1970). It also allows parties in
such adjudications to submit facts for consideration and to be protected from ex parte
consultation by hearing examiners with anyone "on a fact in issue, unless on notice and
opportunity ... to participate." Id. §§ 554(c), (d). The Act requires that persons "com-
pelled to appear" be permitted legal counsel "in any agency proceeding," and allows the
appearance of interested parties "in connection with an agency function," so far as "the
orderly conduct of public business permits." Id. § 555(b). Section 6 of thp Act also entitles
a "person compelled to submit data or evidence" to "procure a copy or transcript thereof,"
id. 555(c), and "any interested person" to receive a "brief statement of the grounds" for
denial of any written application. Id. § 555(e). In addition, § 10 of the APA grants a
statutory right of judicial review of agency actions under most circumstances; id. §§
701-06. Some courts have also interpreted this section as an independent grant of juris-
diction to the district courts. See note 166 supra.
The APA also establishes mandatory procedures for "rulemaking," including public
notice of proposed rules and an opportunity for interested persons to participate, with
narrow exceptions. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1970; Supp. II, 1972).
The Freedom of Information Act of 1966 (FOIA) is an amendment to the APA. 5
U.S.C. § 552 (1970; Supp. II, 1972), as amended, Act of Nov. 21, 1974, Pub. L. 93-502, 88
Stat. 1561. The FOIA requires publication of descriptions and rules of agency organiza-
tion and procedure. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1) (1970). Opinions and orders in cases are to be
available to the public, along with staff manuals and instructions. Id. § 552(a)(2)(A). The
individual votes of members "in every agency proceeding" must be recorded and "avail-
able for public inspection." Id. § 552(a)(4). Disclosure under the FOIA may be compelled
by a de novo action in the district court, with the burden of proof on the agency resisting
disclosure. Id. § 552(a)(3) (Supp. II, 1972), as amended, Act of Nov. 21, 1974, Pub. L. 93-
502, 88 Stat. 1561. All of these requirements are subject to enumerated exceptions. See
Privacy Act of Dec. 31, 1974, Pub. L. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896.
245. See p. 846 supra.
246. 492 F.2d 1337 (7th Cir. 1974); accord, Mower v. Britton, 504 F.2d 396 (10th Cir.
1974). See 27 VAND. L. REv. 1257 (1974).
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ment of the grounds" for the denial of any written application for
parole. 247 After reviewing both recent recommendations2 48 and con-
stitutional arguments240 that the Board should give such reasons, the
court proceeded to rest its decision solely on the plain language of
§ 6(d) of the Act. 250
In Pickus v. United States Board of Parole,251 the Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia reached a complementary result,
holding that the Parole Board was subject to the APA. The court
further held that § 4 of the Act 252 required notice of proposed rule-
making by prepublication in the Federal Register, allowing at least
30 days for public comment, of the parole Guidelines and most of
the accompanying procedural regulations..2 53 In applying the APA to
247. 5 U.S.C. § 555(e) (1970). The court reversed a dismissal of the action and
remanded the case solely for a finding of whether the application for a parole hearing
had in this case been written. Applications for initial hearings are filed in writing, but
written applications for subsequent review hearings are "not necessary." 28 C.F.R. §
2.11(a) (1974). The court in King did not consider whether denial of parole at a review
hearing (which, under § 2.11, the inmate "may not waive") would require written reasons
if only the initial hearing had been requested in writing. The Board now voluntarily
gives written reasons, consisting of the inmate's rating on the Guideline Table. Id. §§
2.13(c), (d), 2.14(d). A reason for parole denial merely reciting reliance on the Guidelines
was held insufficient under King and Mower in Snyder v. United States Bd. of Parole,
383 F. Supp. 1153 (D. Colo. 1974).
248. See Administrative Conference Recommendation, supra note 55, at 534; TASK
FORCE REPORT: CORRErONS, supra note 1, at 86.
249. See pp. 850-51 supra.
250. 5 U.S.C. § 555(e) (1970). Citing legislative history, King distinguished Hyser v.
Reed, 318 F.2d 225 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 957 (1963), on the basis
that the latter case involved a different and narrower provision of the APA. The provisions
involved in Hyser, §§ 554, 556 and 557, apply only to those agency adjudications "required
by statute to be determined on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing." Hyser
held that revocation hearings were not subject to those requirements, see p. 846
supra, but a court might now give a different construction to 18 U.S.C. § 4207 (1970),
which plainly does mandate a hearing before parole can be revoked. But see Procedures,
supra note 42, at 479-80. There is no comparable statutory requirement in the present
law for hearings before parole release, however, and it seems unlikely that the more ex-
tensive protections of those sections of the APA could be extended to the release stage.
See note 148 supra; deVyver v. Warden, 16 CRIM. L. Ri'rR. 2339 (M.D. Pa., Dec. 23, 1974).
251. 507 F.2d 1107 (D.C. Cir. 1974); accord, Blaricom v. Forscht, No. 72-1374 (5th Cir.
1974) (per curiam) (dictum) (published in temporary edition only at 488 F.2d 977); Wash-
ington v. Hagan, 287 F.2d 332, 334 (3d Cir. 1960) (Hastie, J., dissenting).
252. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1970).
253. Prior to the Pickus decision in the district court, Pickus v. United States Bd. of
Parole, Civil No. 112-73 (D.D.C., July 26, 1973) (Green, J.), the Board had published cer-
tain procedural regulations in the Code of Federal Regulations, but had never complied
with the prepublication and public comment requirements, see 28 C.F.R. §§ 2.1-2.49 (1973).
Substantive standards and considerations for granting or denying parole, however, did
not even appear in the Code, but only in the Board's own "Rules," which were last
published (n pamphlet form) in 1971. U.S. BD. OF PAROLE, supra note 49. After Pickus
the Board integrated the former C.F.R. regulations, most of the 1971 rules, and provisions
of the Pilot Project in a new set of regulations that were published at 38 Fed. Reg. 26652-
57 (Sept. 24, 1973). In its publication of the new regulations, the Board "expressly dis-
claimed]" any obligation to comply with the APA, and it repeated that disclaimer when
it first published the Guidelines. Id. at 26652, 31942. Ten weeks after Pickus was affirmed,
the Board complied and prepublished its rules in slightly amended form, declaring fort  interim period that they would serve as "emergency regulations." 39 Fed. Reg. 45223-
35, 45296 (Dec. 31, 1974). The Board continues to assert that it "does not acquiesce in
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the Guidelines themselves and finding that promulgation had vio-
lated the statutory requirements, however, the court did not express
an opinion as to whether adherence to the new rules might be incon-
sistent with the Act in any way.
In light of King and Pickus, attempts will certainly be made to
force the Parole Board to comply with other provisions of the APA.
For example, under the Act an inmate appearing at a parole release
hearing would be entitled to representation by counsel. 254 Moreover,
the assistance of counsel cannot be fully effective without access to
the record on which the hearing examiners will make their decision,
and such disclosure may therefore also be required by the Act.25 In
addition, the Freedom of Information Act would seem on its face to
require that parole release decisions be publicly available, along with
the votes of individual Board members. 256 Finally, the APA also per-
the decision." Id. at 45296. The Board amended several of its regulations again a month
later, 40 Fed. Reg. 5357-62 (Feb. 5, 1975), but did not comply with the APA requirements,
asserting that to do so would be "impractible." Id. at 5357. On the plaintiff's motion for
supplemental relief, the district court extended the time for public comment to May 4,
1975, and ordered that the new rules be properly prepublished. Pickus v. United States
Bd. of Parole, Civil No. 112-73 (D.D.C., Feb. 28, 1975).
254. There are two possible statutory supports for this right. First, § 6(a) of the Act,
5 U.S.C. § 555(b) (1970), affords a right to counsel to a "person compelled to appear in
person" before an agency or its representative, and a parole board regulation states that
"prisoners shall appear" for review hearings, 28 C.F.R. § 2.14 (1974); see Procedures, supra
note 42, at 481; K.C. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIvE LAw TREATISE § 8.10, at 376 (1970 Supp.). Sec-
ond, the same APA provision goes on to state that a "party is entitled to appear ... with
counsel.., in an agency proceeding," and King held that a parole hearing is "an agency
proceeding." 492 F.2d at 1344. Thus, even if an inmate were held not to be "compelled
to appear in person" at the parole hearing, he or she might still be entitled to the as-
sistance of counsel. Procedures, supra note 42, at 481. 28 C.F.R. § 2.12(a) (1974), which
allows an inmate to have a "representative" at a hearing but severely limits the rep-
resentative's role, may be incompatible with the APA and with the proper role of
counsel; cf. Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 135 (1967).
255. The primary hindrance to effective advocacy in the existing process is not that
counsel may not attend the hearing, but rather that he may not examine the entire
record, to correct prejudicial errors, omissions, and misplaced emphasis.
Procedures, supra note 42, at 482. The Freedom of Information Act generally favors dis-
closure of agency files. Files "the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwar-
ranted invasion of personal privacy" are exempted from public disclosure under the
FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (1970), but a prisoner might have the right to waive that
privacy in order to allow counsel access to prison records that the Board relies on. If
these files were "investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes," the Act
would allow their disclosure unless it would "interfere with enforcement proceedings" or
"disclose the identity of a confidential source and ... confidential information furnished
only by the confidential source." Id. § 552(b)(7), as amended, Act of Nov. 21, 1974, Pub. L.
93-502, 88 Stat. 1561. The applicability of this section to presentence reports is unclear.
See pp. 878-79 infra.
The Privacy Act of Dec. 31, 1974, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a (Supp. 1975), greatly facilitates
individual access to government files containing information about private persons, in-
cluding a right to review those records and request corrections or amendment. The
section, however, specifically allows the Board to exempt from these provisions "any
system of records ... maintained by... parole authorities and which consist of...reports
compiled at any stage of the process of enforcement of the criminal laws from arrest or
indictment through release from supervision." Id. § 552a(j)(2)(C); cf. Note, The Investiga-
tory Files Exemption to the FOIA: The D.C. Circuit Abandons Bristol-Myers, 42 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 869 (1974).
256. 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(a)(2)(A), (a)(4) (1970). Presently this information is expressly not
available. 28 C.F.R. § 2.57 (1974).
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mits persons "compelled to submit ... evidence," such as the inmate
at a hearing, to "procure a copy or transcript" of that testimony.257
B. The Necessary Procedural Protections
The above sections have explored the extent to which existing legal
standards require procedural protections in parole hearings under the
Guidelines. Neither of the two due process models, standing alone,
will necessarily assure adequate protections, for the Constitution im-
poses only minimum requirements. And neither the APA nor the con-
stitutional models necessarily provide optimal procedures, since each
must apply to a wide range of factual settings and legal problems. In
the specialized and critically important parole process, both the Board
and Congress should take steps to provide the fairest and most accurate
possible procedures.
At the hearing stage, at least those procedural requirements de-
signed to protect the inmate from Board reliance on faulty factual
assumptions should apply. Most basically, there should be open discus-
sion of the nine Salient Factor questions at the hearing. 25 8 Only by
discussion within the hearing itself can factual disputes be effectively
resolved. And as long as parole release decisions are based primarily
on the Guidelines, the hearing should, at least in part, be structured
to encourage such factual confrontation, rather than discourage it by
concentrating on rehabilitative factors having little bearing on the
ultimate outcome.
To facilitate this discussion at the hearing, there should be advance
notice of all these facts in the file upon which the Board's final Guide-
line rating will depend.259 The Guideline Table facilitates such ad-
257. 5 U.S.C. § 555(c) (1970). Such transcripts are presently available only upon court
subpoena. 28 C.F.R. § 2.12(b) (1974).
258. See ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE RECOMMENDATION, supra note 55, at 533; Note,
supra note 56, at 454-57.
In response to these and other similar recommendations, the Board has begun to en-
courage explicit discussion at the hearing of information relevant to the Salient Factor
Score. Interview with M. Sigler, Chairman, U.S. Bd. of Parole, Jan. 20, 1975.
259. Cf. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 486-87 (1972). Disclosure of evidence in
the PSI is discretionary with the judge in the federal system, and actual practices with
respect to disclosure vary widely in different jurisdictions. Barkin, Legal Problems in
Sentencing, 54 F.R.D. 289, 290-91 (1968); see United States v. Needles, 472 F.2d 652 (2d
Cir. 1973); United States v. Lloyd, 425 F.2d 711, 712 (5th Cir. 1970); United States v.
Solomon, 422 F.2d 1110, 1120 (7th Cir. 1970); FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(2). In the Second
Circuit, presentence reports are now presumptively available to defense counsel. Letter
from Judge M. Frankel, S.D.N.Y., to Project authors, Dec. 16, 1974 (on file with the Yale
Law Journal). Even a discretionary rule would be preferable to the Parole Board's present
practice of providing no disclosure of pertinent materials to the inmate or representative.
But cf. Fisher v. United States, 382 F. Supp. 241, 243-44 (D. Conn. 1974) (so long as PSI
not available of right at sentencing, there cannot be disclosure of right in parole hearing).
There is also an emerging right in the federal courts to disclosure of material adverse
information relied on in sentencing. Shelton v. United States, 497 F.2d 156, 159 (5th Cir.
The Yale Law Journal
vance disclosure, since it isolates those few criteria and factors which
are most relevant. As one judge has noted:
The entire thrust of the Board's commendable new approach is
to have objective facts such as a prisoner's offense and his offender
characteristics play a prominent part in parole decisionmaking.
[While] the Board makes known to prisoners both the guideline
table and the rating system used to score offender characteristics
[, it does not inform him] whether [it] is rating his offense
severity by his convicted offense or some other alleged offense ....
[W]hen an alleged offense may be considered by the examiners,
either to select an appropriate offense category or to continue con-
finement beyond a guideline period, it would be helpful to alert
the prisoner to this prospect during the parole hearing in order to
maximize his opportunity to challenge the allegations.20
There is no reason why an inmate should have to wait for an error
to be corrected through the administrative appellate process, 20' or even-
tually by the courts, when the likelihood of error is fostered by the
absence of safeguards and lack of fairness in the original determination.
Increased fairness and accuracy will also result from allowing a
greater role for counsel at the hearing. Instead of being prevented
from "acting like lawyers," counsel should be present - 2 to act as an
attorney whenever the inmate's version of the offense behavior dif-
fers from the one relied upon by the Parole Board.20 3 If, for example,
the Board is going to rate the inmate's offense severity at a higher
level on the basis of counts in an indictment of which the inmate was
not convicted, an attorney should be allowed to show that there is no
factual basis for including these other acts in the evaluation of "of-
fense severity." 204
There is also a role for counsel to present argument where facts are
not disputed. For example, the classification of ambiguous offense be-
havior may call for the exercise of judgment as to the relative crim-
inality of different acts. An attorney's skill and experience in analysis,
comparison and differentiation would be helpful in assuring the essen-
1974); United States v. Espinoza, 481 F.2d 553, 557-58 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v.
O'Shea, 479 F.2d 313, 314 (lst Cir. 1973); United States v. Battaglia, 478 F.2d 854 (5th
Cir. 1972); United States v. Steckham, 459 F.2d 297, 299 (10th Cir. 1972).
260. Lupo v. Norton, 371 F. Supp. 156, 162 (D. Conn. 1974).
261. See notes 271, 276 infra.
262. Administrative Conference Recommendation, supra note 55, at 534; Note, supra
note 56, at 449-54; Comment, supra note 222, at 502-05.
263. See pp. 836-37 supra.
264. Cf. Miller, The Lawyer's Hang-Up: Due Process versus the Real Issues, 11 AM.
CRIM. L. REv. 197, 208-09 (1973) (sentencing).
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tial fairness of such determinations.20 5 An attorney with experience
in allocution might also be valuable in explaining to the examiners
why they should consider the inmate a better "clinical risk" than in-
dicated by a Salient Factor Score.260
To further ensure the accuracy of the Salient Factor Score and Of-
fense Severity Rating, the reasons given for a parole denial should
include a statement of the evidence or facts underlying the rating.2 07
While it is now the practice of the Board to reveal the inmate's score
on each scale, this disclosure only identifies the severity rating20 8 and
component items of the Salient Factor Scale without indicating the
factual basis for lost points. None of the basic purposes for giving
reasons is thus fulfilled.269 The inmate does not receive an explana-
tion sufficient to make him or her feel that the decision is reasonable
and fair, and the administrative (or ultimately judicial) reviewing pa-
265. Id. But see M. FRANKEL, supra note 226, at 37 (most lawyers present boilerplate,
ineffective pleas for leniency at sentencing).
266. The Board's regulations allow the examiners' "clinical evaluation of risk" to
"override this predictive aid" (Salient Factor Score) "where circumstances warrant." 28
C.F.R. § 2.20(e) (1974). This opportunity may be constitutionally required. In the face of
mathenatical tables purporting to predict risk, the denial of any opportunity to demon-
strate that one is in fact a better risk might render the parole prognosis an "irrebuttable
presumption" of recidivism. Such an irrebuttable presumption would be an infringement
of due process. See Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973). See generally Note, Irrebuttable
Presumptions as an Alternative-to Strict Scrutiny: From Rodriguez to LaFleur, 62 GEo.
L.J. 1173 (1974); Note, The Irrebuttable Presumption Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 87
HARV. L. REV. 1534 (1974); Note, The Conclusive Presumption Doctrine: Equal Protection
or Due Process?, 72 MICH. L. REV. 800 (1974); Note, Irrebuttable Presumptions: An Illusory
Analysis, 27 STAN. L. REV. 449 (1975).
Even a rebuttable presumption may violate due process if the presumed facts do not
bear a sufficiently close relationship to the proved fact. It is unlikely that the risk predic-
tion generated by a Salient Factor Score would be held to a criminal presumption standard
of due process. See Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398, 416 (1970); Leary v. United
States, 395 U.S. 6, 36 (1969).
Since the Salient Factor Scale's predictions are more discriminating than chance and
even better than expert clinical judgment, there is at least "some rational connection,"
Mobile, J. 9: K.C. R.R. v. Turnipseed, 219 U.S. 35, 43 (1910), between an inmate's Salient
Factor Score and his or her risk of ultimate parole failure. Therefore, the scale does not
seem violative of due process as an impermissible rebuttable presumption; cI. pp. 875-76
infra.
267. See Administrative Conference Recommendation, supra note 55, at 534; Comment,
supra note 56, at 443-44; Monks v. New Jersey State Parole Bd., 58 N.J. 238, 277 A.2d 193
(1971).
268. One court has ruled that when the Board's determination of offense severity is
based on offenses other than the conviction offense, and parole is thereby denied, it must
specifically so inform the inmate, Lupo v. Norton, 371 F. Supp. 156, 161-62 (D. Conn. 1974);
cf. Billiteri v. United States Bd. of Parole, 385 F. Supp. 1217 (W.D.N.Y. 1974). See pp.
835, 838-39 supra. This holding should also apply where examiners use facts properly
the basis for decisions outside the Guidelines to raise an inmate's Salient Factor Score.
Adherence to this decision would at least prevent the hidden exercise of discretion.
269. Reasons serve both to ensure reviewability and to demonstrate fairness to the
subject of the decision. Monks v. New Jersey St. Parole Bd., 58 N.J. 238, 246, 277 A.2d 193,
199 (1971); United States ex rel. Johnson v. Chairman, 500 F.2d 925 (2d Cir.), vacated on
other grounds, 95 S. Ct. 488 (1974). Reasons for denial are also said to enable the inmate
to know how to direct his or her rehabilitation so as to improve his or her later chances
for parole. Bradford v. Weinstein, No. 73-1751 (4th Cir., Nov. 22, 1974), at 11.
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nels are not sufficiently notified of the factual basis of the decision to
discover whether the decision was within lawful bounds. A satisfactory
reason would have to identify with some precision any unfavorable
facts that caused a prisoner to lose Salient Factor points. For example,
this part of the decision might read:
You have a "good" parole prognosis, having scored 7 out of a pos-
sible 11. You lost points for your one 1963 New Hampshire con-
viction (one point lost); your 1965 parole revocation (one point);
your history of barbiturate dependence (one point); and your
lack of a high school diploma or equivalent (one point).270
Less informative reasons mean less satisfactory and useful reasons, both
to the inmate and to the Board.
The internal appellate process adopted by the Board271 cannot be
considered a remedy to the lack of fairness in Salient Factor scoring
and Offense Severity Rating. An inmate receives no notice of the fac-
tual basis for his Salient Factor Score or Offense Severity Rating.272 An
effective appeal by an inmate is thereby hampered, if not prevented,
especially in light of the low literacy level of many inmates and their
lack of access to supporting documents. 273
Taking greater care to expose crucial facts to confrontation and
discussion would be advantageous to the Parole Board as well as to
the prisoner. When the Board unwittingly relies on false data the
270. Compare Fisher v. United States, 382 F. Supp. 241 (D. Conn. 1974), and Beckworth
v. New Jersey St. Parole Bd., 62 N.J. 348, 301 A.2d 727 (1973) (adequate reasons given),
with Snyder v. United States Bd. of Parole, 383 F. Supp. 1153 (D. Colo. 1974) (inadequate
reasons given).
271. 28 C.F.R. §§ 2.24-2.27 (1974). During the first ten months of the Pilot Project(October 1972 to July 1973) 366 of 1,365 decisions not to parole were appealed to the
Regional Director (Level I). L. DeGostin & P. Hoffman, Administrative Review of Parole
Selection and Revocation Decisions, Jan. 1974 (U.S. Bd. of Parole Res. Unit: Rep. 1),
reprinted as Administrative Review of Parole Decisions, FED. PROBATION, June 1974, at 24.
See note 94 supra. Approximately 75 percent of these appeals led to an affirmance
of the earlier decision; 25 percent of the decisions were modified at the regional level and
led to results favorable to the inmate. However, the study did not report what percentage
of the modifications were based on Guideline misplacement, and what percentage were
based on discretionary considerations, such as the rating of an inmate's offense severity.
Finally, the study was conducted at a time when only approximately 63 percent of the
examiner panels' decisions were within the Guidelines, compared to the existing rate of
92 to 94 percent. See Battle v. Norton, 365 F. Supp. 925, 933 (D. Conn. 1973) (63 percent
of decisions within the Guidelines); Grasso v. Norton, 376 F. Supp. 116, 119 (D. Conn.
1974) (92 to 94 percent). During the ten month period of the study only 15 Level II appeals
were filed, about 12 percent of those eligible for Level II consideration. See note 89
supra. Fourteen were affirmed by the Board member designated to review the case, and
one was scheduled for a review on the record before the National Appellate Board, which
then affirmed the decision. DeGostin and Hoffman, supra, at 6.
272. U.S. Bd. of Parole, Notice of Action filed in Padron v. Norton, Civil No. B-74-389(D. Conn., Oct. 24, 1974) (on file with the Yale Law Journal). See 28 C.F.R. §§ 2.12(b),
2.13(c) (1974).
273. Cf. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 570 (1974); Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483,
487 (1969) (special needs of illiterate prisoners recognized).
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Salient Factor Score loses its predictive power.27 4 The inmate is then
improperly rated on the Guidelines and may be released at a time
inconsistent with the goals of the Guidelines. Moreover, disclosure
would also save time for the Board by avoiding unnecessary and time-
consuming appeals which often result in a second hearing 275 or at
times in a court challenge.276 Finally, inaccurate Guideline rating is
inconsistent with the Board's dedication to achieving "fairness" by
providing like treatment of similarly situated offenders.2 7 7 The use
of unchecked data from unreliable sources leads to results as capri-
cious and arbitrary as those intuitive decisions the Guidelines were
designed to curtail.
Such procedural reforms, with the possible exception of permitting
counsel to attend parole hearings, would impose a very limited burden
on the Parole Board.2 7 8 The files on which decisions depend are main-
tained not by the Board, but by the institution where the prisoner
is incarcerated. Before each hearing the institutional caseworker must
prepare a "progress report" for the examiners, which entails a review
of the inmate's file. Beginning in mid-1974 these reports were dis-
closed to inmates before their hearings. No special burden would at-
tach if the caseworker were required to reveal in that report, suffi-
ciently far in advance to allow a response to be prepared, those facts
in the PSI and other reports reasonably bearing upon Salient Factor
and Offense Severity determinations. If the inmate and casieworker did
not agree in advance of the hearing on the correct state of facts, the
274. Salient Factor Report, supra note 69, at 14.
275. See L. DeGostin g- P. Hoffman, supra note 271, at 9 (during first nine months of
allowing appeals, approximately ten percent led to new hearings).
For example, it took two appeals and ten months for the Board to finally reverse a
decision it had made to "continue for a one-year set-off," and to grant parole "below
the Guidelines." The inmate in question had been enrolled for 19 months after his
arraignment in a residential drug therapy program. He had done so well that he was
hired as a staff member, and had been accepted at the state university as a full time
student. Despite this, he received a three-year (a)(2) sentence when he pleaded guilty.
The caseworkers and other staff at the institution were unanimously of the opinion that
the inmate, whose conviction offense was sale of narcotics, should never have been in-
carcerated at all: his institutional adjustment was, they felt, outstanding. Case File YD
810-73, Jerome N. Frank Legal Servs. Org., New Haven, Conn.
276. In Kohlnan v. Norton, 380 F. Supp. 1073 (D. Conn. 1974), the Notice of Action
was entered by the Parole Board on February 1, 1974; the petitioner then exhausted his
administrative remedies by filing unsuccessful Level I and Level II appeals, contesting
the severity rating of his offense behavior. The district court entered judgment in his
favor on July 31, 1974, six months after the Board's action, finding that there was no
evidence to support the severity rating the Board gave him. See Jerome N. Frank Legal
Servs. Org., New Haven, Coni. Case File YD951-74; see note 219 supra.
277. NCCD Supp. Rep. 9, supra note 5, at xii.
278. In the interests of time and administrative convenience, permitting or requiring
witnesses to attend parole hearings should not generally be the rule. However, in extra-
ordinary cases where there is substantial disagreement between the inmate and the Board
over an evaluation of facts material to his parole outcome, the inmate should be able to
submit a request to present witnesses, detailing their testimony.
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inmate would have an adequate opportunity to prepare a presenta-
tion of alternative facts in the parole hearing. 279 The Board's concern
that arguments of counsel would consume too much time is reason-
able;2 8 0 but could be accommodated short of a ban on representatives'
"acting like lawyers." It would not be unfair to impose a reasonable,
pre-announced time limit, especially if the Board reveals in advance
the facts on which it will rely.
In sum, major revisions are needed in the parole release hearing
to ensure fair and accurate decisionmaking. Relevant factual issues
should be explicitly discussed during the hearing. To render this
discussion effective, there should be advance disclosure of those facts
in the inmate's file upon which the Guideline rating will be based.
In addition, counsel should have a more active role in the hearing.
Finally, reasons for denial of parole should be given, including a de-
tailed and meaningful statement of the underlying facts or evidence.
Such innovations, while offering significant benefits to both the in-
mate and the Parole Board, would not constitute an undue burden
on the Board.
The adoption of these reforms would substantially improve the
parole release process within the Board's present decisionmaking au-
thority. However, this discussion has not addressed the larger problem
of the appropriate role of the Parole Board in the post-conviction
process. The use of the Guidelines raises important questions about the
relationship between the Board and sentencing judges, an issue to be
considered later.28 1
III. Legality of the Guidelines
While the above procedural reforms will enhance the fairness and
accuracy of the parole release hearing, they will be of little importance
if the substantive criteria and purposes of the release decision are in-
279. In January 1975, the Parole Board arranged with the Bureau of Prisons for a
prisoner, during classification at an institution, to fill out a form (1-32), seeking to elicit
the information needed to compute the Salient Factor Score. Caseworkers attempt to
resolve any discrepancies with the prison file records. Interview with P. Hoffman, Re-
search Criminologist, U.S. Bd. of Parole, Jan. 20, 1975, at New Haven, Conn. The effect
of this new provision, however, may be minimal. First, a substantial period of time may
elapse before this form is used, since an inmate is classified upon entering an institu-
tion, 18 U.S.C. § 4081 (1970), but will normally receive a parole hearing only after serving
one third of the sentence. 18 U.S.C. § 4202 (1970). See p. 818 supra. More important, the
presentation of information in a written statement is not a satisfactory substitute for open
disclosure, confrontation and discussion of disputed information in the context of the
parole decision.
280. This concern, however, is not founded upon the Board's research. Its study of
the effect on hearings of various kinds of representation did not include any attorney
representatives. Effect of Representation, supra note 138, at 14.
281. See pp. 882-97 infra.
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valid.2 2 Such an inquiry has previously been inhibited by the secrecy
surrounding parole release decisionmaking; as a consequence, most
criticism has been focused on suggestions for procedural reform. Be-
cause the Parole Board's Guideline Table has so well articulated and
rationalized the criteria and goals of decisionmaking, it permits, and
indeed compels, this analysis.283 Therefore, the legality of the Guide-
lines will now be considered.
A. Fixed and Mechanical Decisionmaking
The Guideline Table's most fundamental innovation is its articula-
tion of two basic criteria that are applied to virtually all inmates to
determine how much time each must serve prior to release. Although
the Parole Board's previous emphasis was on individualizing the treat-
ment and consideration accorded each inmate,28 4 establishment of the
Guidelines reflects a change toward the goal of equality of treatment
under generalized rules. Individualization, 28 5 on the one hand, and
equality of treatment -8 6 on the other, are important goals of any
governmental decision process, especially the post-conviction process.
But while there is no irreconcilable conflict between the values of
individualization and the discretion needed to assure it, and of equality
of treatment based on systematic criteria or rules,2 8 7 the Board em-
phasizes:
By "fairness" we mean that similar persons are dealt with in similar
ways in similar situations . . . . [Fairness] cannot relate to the
282. "[WV]e should not spend more money on the Parole Board .... []t is a total fail-
ure. But like most situations where you have a total failure, reform comes along and
says, 'Spend more money. Put in more personnel.' [N]o matter how much money you
spend on the Parole Board and parole system, it is still going to be a failure, because it
attempts to do something which cannot be done." Hearings on Parole, supra note 6, at
597-98 (testimony of Sen. Goodell, Chairman, Comm. on the Study of Incarceration). See
id. at 94 (testimony of Prof. L. Orland).
283. See Kadish, supra note 1, at 921; Lederburg, The Freedoms and the Control of
Science: Notes from the Ivory Tower, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 596, 597 (1972); Note, Procedural
Due Process at Judicial Sentencing for Felony, 81 HARV. L. Ray. 821, 824 (1968); Note,
Freedom and Rehabilitation in Parole Revocation Hearings, 72 YALE L.J. 368, 379 (1962);
cf. TAsK FORCE REPORT: CORaEcrxONS, supra note 1, at 7-15 (while individualized treatment
is desirable "there is a danger of creating an illusion of scientific omniscience through
premature use of advanced methods for handling data." Id. at 15).
284. Hearings on Parole, supra note 6, at 91, 192-93; GIARDINI, supra note 9, at 145;
Comment, supra note 48.
285. Cohen, Moral Aspects of the Criminal Law, 49 YALE L.J. 987, 1024 (1940); Walker,
Aims of Punishment, in 2 CRIME AND JUsTIcE: THE CRIMINAL IN THE ARmS OF THE LAW
53 (L. Radzinowicz & M. Wolfgang eds. 1971).
286. U.S. Co~sT. amend. XIV; Hearings on Appellate Review, supra note 227, at 7
(legislative efforts to eliminate disparity in sentencing); M. FRANKEL, supra note 226, at 11;
Wyzanski, A Trial Judge's Freedom and Responsibility, 65 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1291 (1952).
287. Note, Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. REV. 1067, 1159-78
(1969) (see especially 1164). See Jackson v. Indiana, 406 US. 715 (1972).
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unique individual .... The question of justice is one of beliefs;
but we can, by the use of research methods .... address the ques-
tion of fairness. 288
The Guidelines generally seem to structure discretion quite well. 29
Their explicit criteria for determining release dates cause the hearing
panel to consider carefully why they think an inmate should be an
exception and to provide reasons for that decision.29 0 Decisions out-
288. NCCD Rep. 9, supra note 5, at xii-xv (Foreword by Leslie Wilkins).
289. See note 293 infra; but cf. pp. 833-39 supra.
290. For example, in one case involving a first offender, the hearing examiners dis-
cussed the background of the inmate's offense: he had been approached several times by
a narcotics agent and had agreed to ask his cousin where the agent could get some
heroin. His cousin had supplied the heroin and had paid him a small amount of the price
received from the agent. By the time of the hearing the inmate had served 11 months of
his one to nine year sentence. The institutional staff recommended his early release on
the grounds he was unlikely to commit future criminal acts, was thoroughly repentant,
and appeared to be on the verge of a nervous breakdown. In addition, the hearing
examiners were impressed by the inmate's wife who appeared as his representative. How-
ever, the examiners were in a quandary as to how to justify a decision outside the Guide-
lines. After the inmate left the hearing room the following discussion ensued:
Examiner (1): The impression I had was that he got pressured into it. He demonstrated
to me that this sentence had a serious impact on him. Besides, I'm afraid
to let him sit more.
Caseworker: Everyone says he's been very good here, that he should really be released.
Examiner (1): But I'm afraid that the Board won't buy it if we do give him a grant. I
don't-know how we can classify him-it can't be sale of narcotics for own
use, since there's absolutely no history of drug dependence-they put him
in the D.C. Treatment center, and dismissed him after 3 weeks-said he
had no need of it-so we have to classify the offense as sale of narcotics
for profit-hard drugs, sale for profits; it has to be classified for money,
not for personal use.
Caseworker: Of all the cases I've had, he's the best parole risk-It'll really hurt him
to stay here.
Examiner (1): But he has a Salient Factor Score of 10, so it's hard to use the "better
risk [than Salient Factor Score indicates] based on clinical evaluation"
reason.
Examiner (2): But couldn't you say-he appears to be a better risk than the Guidelines





Well, we'll do it and just caution him that it probably won't go through.
When it's outside the Guidelines so far, it has to go to [the Regional
Parole Board Member]-And if so, he may send it to the National Board
-and if he does that, we're dead.
Maybe we could talk to the chief hearing examiner?
This will give him 13 months, and 3 weeks.
I really think that if I were a judge and he appealed this, I'd give it to
him.
Observation of parole hearing (Ilh) at Lewisburg FP, Aug. 1974.
The examiners recommended release before the Guideline time. The justifications relied
on in their report were that further incarceration would serve no useful purpose and
would result in the deterioration and bitterness of the inmate; that he had an out-
standing institutional adjustment; and that the subject was an excellent risk.
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side the Guidelines are commonly based upon facts pertaining to the
offense severity,29 1 or to a list of criteria which the Board's regula-
tions specify may be considered in parole release decisionmaking. 29 2
However, the very effectiveness of the Guideline Table in struc-
turing discretion raises an important problem. Approximately 90 per-
cent of release decisions are within the Guidelines..2 93 Many release
dates are routinely determined prior to the hearing and then, after
a seemingly perfunctory proceeding, are affirmed with little discus-
sion beyond a statement of the Guideline range. 294 Moreover, hearing
examiners appear to believe that there is an informal quota on de-
cisions outside the Guidelines. 295 They also appear to feel constrained
291. In six hearings in which decisions outside the Guidelines were made, the primary
basis of the panel's evaluation was that the gravity of the inmate's behavior was either
more or less severe than the gravity of other, nominally similar, behaviors.
292. See note 101 supra. In six hearings in which decisions below the Guidelines
were made, facts not related to the offense severity were the apparent motivating force
(e.g., cooperation with government prosecution of others, serious illness, time served prior
to the sentence). One inmate with terminal cancer was given a decision below the Guide-
lines, observation of parole hearing (Ic) at Danbury FCI, and an addicted Vietnam War
veteran convicted of conspiracy to smuggle heroin was given a continuance to a release
date substantially earlier than that indicated by the Guidelines. Observation of parole
hearing (I) at Danbury FCI, Aug. 1974.
In one hearing, an inmate convicted of extortion accompanied by threats and physical
violence received a release date 20 months below his minimum Guideline time of 45
months, because he had cooperated in the prosecution of coconspirators. Observation of
parole hearing (Ild) at Lewisburg FP, Aug. 1974.
293. The Parole Board reported in March 1974 that close to 94 percent of all parole
board decisions are within the Guidelines. Structuring Discretion, supra note 75, at 10
(reports 91.7 percent within Guidelines); Testimony of P. Hoffman, Research Criminol-
ogist, U.S. Bd. of Parole, Record, at 83-84, Diaz v. Norton, 376 F. Supp. 112 (D. Conn.
1974) (92 to 95 percent within Guidelines). This figure also includes all those released
before their Guideline time because they have reached their mandatory release date, and
all the persons released after the Guideline time indicated, but only because the minimum
term on their sentence was higher than the Guideline time called for. Structuring Discre-
tion, supra, at 10. If those cases are not counted as decisions within the Guidelines, the
figure drops to 89 percent. Id.
The Board's most recent nationwide data tentatively indicate that decisions within the
Guidelines have dropped to between 81 and 89 percent. If all cases outside the Guidelines
by virtue of sentencing decisions are excluded from the figures, 77 to 85 percent of the
decisions were within the Guidelines range. The larger number of decisions within the
Guidelines as reported in the figures of March 1974 is attributed by the Board to the
hearing examiners' reluctance to rely on their own judgment when the unfamiliar Guide-
line Table first came into use, and, at the same time, hearing examiners were for the
first time delegated decisionmaking authority. Interview with P. Hoffman, Research
Criminologist, U.S. Bd. of Parole, Jan. 20, 1975, in New Haven, Conn.
Of 99 release hearings observed, 12 resulted in decisions outside the Guidelines. Of
these twelve, seven involved decisions below the 'Guideline time indicated, and five
decisions went beyond the Guideline time indicated. This does not correspond with
the Board's overall figures, which show more decisions to go above the Guidelines than
below them. Id.
More recent data indicate that a greater percentage of decisions nationwide are now
below, rather than above, the Guidelines. Interview with P. Hoffman, Research Crim-
inologist, U.S. Bd. of Parole, Jan. 20, 1975, in New Haven, Conn.
294. Project observers noted that this was the case in approximately 25 percefht of
the initial hearings observed.
295. Hearing examiners informally kept track of how many decisions outside the
Guidelines they were making each day (and throughout the course of their "visit" to an
institution); they discussed the number occasionally between hearings, and especially
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to give reasons from their formbook for such decisions, so that deci-
sions outside the Guidelines appear based on uncritical and repetitive
considerations.
In light of these observations the legal question arises whether
parole decisionmaking under the Guidelines meets the current legal
standards requiring judges to make individual sentencing decisions
and avoid a "fixed and mechanical" approach. Has the Parole Board,
in its attempts to achieve fairness in decisionmaking, imposed on itself
a tyranny of rules amounting to an abuse of discretion?
It is an abuse of judicial discretion to employ a "fixed and me-
chanical approach" in imposing sentences.2 96 The exercise of indi-
vidualized discretion is mandatory. The parole decision appears to be
sufficiently similar to sentencing that it would be subject to the same
requirement. The sentencing decision is often said to be a complex
determination, 0 7 and judges are "regarded as expert professional[s]
with talents to make crucial decisions where the law meets the limits
of its competence." 29 s Parole is also a complex decision, and parole
officials are considered to have a similar expertise. Moreover, one
court has expressly held that individualized discretion must be ex-
ercised in parole decisions. 299 Therefore, under present doctrine the
"fixed and mechanical" standard would be applicable to the parole
release decision.
Generally, the "fixed and mechanical" rule applies only where it
is clear that the judge had a policy of sentencing offenders convicted of
a given offense to the same term, 30 0 often the maximum permitted
by statute, or where a parole authority has a policy based solely on
the offense.301 If this is the extent of the doctrine, the Guidelines
when they were considering another decision outside the Guidelines. Observations (lib-
in), Danbury FCI, and (IIc-p), Lewisburg FP, Aug. 1974. The Board's official policy is
that panels should recommend decisions outside the Guidelines whenever in their judg-
ment it is warranted. 28 C.F.R. § 2.20(c) (1974).
296. United States v. Hartford, 489 F.2d 652 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Baker,
487 F.2d 360, 361 (2d Cir. 1973); Woosley v. United States, 478 F.2d 139, 143-45 (8th Cir.
1973) (en banc); United States v. Daniels, 446 F.2d 967 (6th Cir. 1971); cf. United States
v. McKinney, 466 F.2d 1403 (6th Cir. 1972) ("gross abuse of discretion"); United States v.
Thompson, 483 F.2d 527 (3d Cir. 1973), leave to file for prohibition and/or mandamus
denied, 415 U.S. 911 (1974); United States v. Townsend, 478 F.2d 1072 (3d Cir. 1973) (fixed
sentencing policy constitutes such "bias" as to require disqualification of judge); United
States v. Foss, 501 F.2d 522 (1st Cir. 1974) (not abuse of discretion to sentence solely for
general deterrent purposes). See generally Kutak & Gottschalk, supra note 229, at 471-81.
297. See Hearings on Appellate Review, supra note 227, at 109-13, 125.
298. Kadish, supra note 1, at 906.
299. In re Minnis, 7 Cal. 3d 639, 498 P.2d 997, 102 Cal. Rptr. 749 (1972) (en banc)
(California Adult Authority's policy that no narcotics offenders would be paroled held to
be an abuse of discretion; CAA required to make "individualized" determinations).
300. See note 296 supra. The cases overturning sentences on this ground do not require
the appellant to establish that every offender is sentenced on the basis of a fixed policy,
but only that such a policy exists and that the appellant was sentenced under that policy.
301. In re Minnis, 7 Cal. 3d 639, 498 P.2d 997, 102 Cal. Rptr. 749 (1972) (en banc).
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clearly are not "fixed and mechanical," for they include the other
factors contained in the Salient Factor Scale.30 2 At least one court,
however, has gone further. In United States v. Schwarz,3 03 the re-
fusal to sentence under the Youth Corrections Act a well-educated,
middle-class woman with a stable employment history who had sold
four ounces of cocaine, was held to be a "fixed and mechanical" ap-
proach amounting to an abuse of discretion. The court wrote that
the judge's reasons implied that a certain class of offenders-charac-
terized by their backgrounds-would not receive YGA sentences, and
that such a rule did not meet the requirements of a "careful ap-
praisal of the variable components relevant to the sentence upon an
individual basis .... "04 Under this latter approach, the Guidelines
might well amount to an unlawful "fixed and mechanical" scheme.3a
However, more careful consideration suggests the contrary conclu-
sion. The "fixed and mechanical" doctrine is based on the assump-
tion that justice and fairness require each decision to be individualized.
Under the Guidelines, however, the Parole Board has not abandoned
such individualized decisions. Rather, the Board identified certain per-
sonal and offense characteristics relevant to the goals it chose to im-
plement in the parole release decision; based on these characteristics,
the Board developed the two Guideline Table scales according to
which inmates are classified. Thus, for purposes of classification, each
individual's particular characteristics are given consideration.
302. The Guidelines clearly rely on at least two factors: offense severity and predic-
tion of risk. Because the prediction of risk is based on the nine items of the Salient
Factor Scale, the Guideline Table can be said to rely on 10 or 11 factors. Further, all
offenders convicted of the same offense are not treated alike under the Guidelines. It
could be argued that offenders with similar likelihoods of recidivism are held for pre-
determined periods of time solely on the basis of offense severity, amounting to a fixed
approach. However, the Board's failure to rely on the convicted offense may save it from
successful attack on this theory, since each inmate's offense is scored individually on the
severity scale.
303. 500 F.2d 1350 (2d Cir. 1974).
304. Id. at 1352. The dissent suggests that the court of appeals may have implicitly
established a substantive standard as to the relative weight which should be accorded
otherwise legitimate factors considered in sentencing. See McLeary v. State, 49 Wis. 2d
263, 182 N.W.2d 512 (1971).
305. See In re Minnis, 7 Cal. 3d 639, 498 P.2d 997, 102 Cal. Rptr. 749 (1972) (en banc).
Especially where an inmate has been sentenced under a rehabilitation-oriented program,
the Guideline Table may provide an inadequately individualized approach to parole
release decisionmaking. In Snyder v. United States Bd. of Parole, 383 F. Supp. 1153 (D.
Colo. 1974), the court held illegal the denial of parole to a YCA sentencee with the
highest possible Salient Factor Score, where the only reason given was that "after
consideration of all relevant factors and information presented, it was determined that -a
decision outside the Guidelines was not warranted...." Id. at 1156. Although the court
carefully noted that the "adoption of the Guidelines by the Board ... is not, in itself,
... arbitrary and capricious...," it concluded that with respect to YCA sentences, the
Board's "emphasis must be placed upon treatment and rehabilitation of the offender." Id.
at 1157, 1156. Thus, it held that reasons for parole denial must "at a minimum, relate to
the adjustment and rehabilitative efforts made... within the institution." Id. at 1157.
Accord, United States v. Norcome, 375 F. Supp. 270, 274-75 n.3 (D.D.C. 1974).
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However, if these groupings determined every release decision, the
Guidelines still might run afoul of the "fixed and mechanical" stand-
ard. 30 6 But the parole system explicitly provides the opportunity for
decisions outside the Guidelines, based on the judgment of the ex-
aminers in the individual case. Such opportunities are presently uti-
lized. Thus, the potential is present in every hearing for further in-
dividualization beyond that already introduced by the multiple factors
of the two Guideline scales.
In sum, the Guidelines, despite their often routine application, have
introduced a beneficial measure of certainty and equality to parole
release decisionmaking. 307 The "fixed and mechanical" doctrine should
not be applied in such a way as to inhibit the development or use of
flexible and articulated criteria such as those represented by the
Guideline Table.
B. The Problem of Prediction-Due Process and
Classification (Equal Protection)
The Parole Board's Salient Factor Scale is an experience table
"validated" for use as a predictive device.30 8 The Board's use of a Sa-
306. Schwarz suggests that any inmate denied parole in a decision within the Guide-
lines would have been treated in a "fixed and mechanical" manner. Under this interpreta-
tion the "fixed and mechanical" doctrine would invalidate any sentence based on factors
that are part of an articulated, consistent policy. To the extent that this interpretation is
correct, the doctrine interferes with the development of rational and articulated criteria
and their use to eliminate sentencing disparities, and should be abandoned. See M.
FRANKEL, supra note 226, at 41-42; United States v. Schwarz, 500 F.2d 1350, 1354 (2d Cir.
1974) (Moore, J., dissenting).
307. One of the major sources of unrest in prisons has been the enormous uncertainty
associated with the parole system. See p. 821 supra. The Guideline Table has now
enabled many inmates to "predict" their parole decision. In fact, to arrive at the basic
criteria of the Guidelines, NCCD researchers developed "experience" tables that enabled
them to "predict" parole decisionmakers' responses to various inmates appearing before
them. NCCD Supp. Rep. 9, supra note 5, at 5.
308. In developing the Salient Factor Scale, researchers sought to determine which
personal characteristics had the best predictive value in discriminating between groups
of releasees who did and did not "succeed" after their release. See note 311 infra (a dis-
cussion of the definition of "success"). The Factors found to be the best "predictors" of
"failure" were among those found by previous research efforts to be good "predictors" of
"'recidivism." See, e.g., D. GLASER, supra note 72, at 36-53; Glaser & O'Leary, Personal
Characteristics and Parole Outcomes, in SOURCEBOOK ON PROBATION, PAROLE AND PARDONS
412-33 (3d ed. C. Newman 1968); MANNHEIM & WILKINS, supra note 82, at 143.
Other criminologists have constructed experience tables largely based on factors much
more "subjective" than those on the Salient Factor Scale. A. BRUCE, E. BURGESS & A. HARNO,
THE WORKINGs OF THE INDETERMINATE-SENTENCE LAW AND THE PAROLE SYSTEM IN ILLINOIS
(1928); S. GLUECK & E. GLUECK, PREDICTING DELINQUENCY AND CRIME (1959); L. OHLIN,
SELECTION FOR PAROLE 124-29 (1951). Curiously, the use of such a scale was considered by
the U.S. Bd. of Parole in 1939 and rejected after an extensive study as unlikely to be
helpful. MANNHEIMI & WILKINS, supra, at 13-14. A good index of prediction requires that
different raters will evaluate the same material at the same score. MANNHEIM & WILKINS,
supra, at 140; Assessment and Prediction Methods, supra note 86, at 172-73. The NCCD
factors chosen for the Salient Factor Scale all showed a relatively high degree of reliability
in this sense. NCCD Supp. Rep. 12, supra note 110. See L. Wilkins, Inefficient Statistics,
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lient Factor Score as a key element in determining the length of in-
carceration for federal offenders raises important legal issues.30 9
As already described,310 the answers to nine weighted questions
about an inmate's history and status place him or her in one of
four "risk groups." These risk groups-ranked "very good," "good,"
"fair," or "poor"-solely determine, for offenders otherwise similarly
situated, the time at which each may expect release. Of the members
of each group, a predictable percentage will succeed on parole, and
a predictable percentage will fail.31 ' Because neither the length of
June 1973 (NCCD Parole Decision-Making Project Supp. Rep. 6). But see notes 109-12
supra.
An experience table only describes the characteristics of the group on which it was
based, but it does not necessarily apply to any other group, not even to a group similar
to the original in all respects but arising later in time. B. WOOTTrON, supra note 86, at 182.
A prediction table is "valid" only if it does in fact predict what it is supposed to predict
on new samples. MANNHEIM & WILKINS, supra, at 140; Assessment and Prediction Methods,
supra, at 171, 175.
The Salient Factor Scale was based on the actual records of 25 percent of those re-
leased from federal prisons during the first half of 1970. This table was then validated
against two other samples: another 25 percent of the same six months' releasees, and a
20 percent sample from the second half of the same year. Salient Factor Report, supra
note 69, at 10. Despite some shrinkage in "predictive" capacity, these validations compared
favorably with earlier parole table studies, which in turn had been shown to be better
predictors than clinical judgment; and "the predictive power of this measure was deemed
sufficient to recommend implementation." Id. at 13; see L. Wilkins, The Problem of
Overlap in Experience Table Construction, June 1973, at 12-14 (NCCD Parole Decision-
Making Project Supp. Rep. 3). The Salient Factor Scale thus has a legitimate claim to be
called a "prediction table" as well as an "experience" table.
Yet when a device is experientially "validated" as to a later group, the validation is
not prospective but only retrospective; its validity for other future groups is still un-
known. B. WoorroN, supra, at 183-84. in parole prediction all validation is inevitably
performed on those whom the board in fact decided to parole in a given year, plus those
who were mandatorily released during the same year, having been denied parole in the
past. This group is not necessarily comparable in relevant respects to the universe of
parole eligibles of a later year, on whom the table will be used.
309. While social scientists have produced a voluminous literature on prediction in
the past half-century, legal scholars have hardly considered the enormous potential impact
of these studies. What consideration there has been among those trained in law has focused
on predictions of juvenile delinquency and on preventive detention of suspects and the
mentally ill. See, e.g., B. Woo-rroN, supra note 86, at 173-99 (British magistrate criticizes
the Gluecks' delinquency prediction work); Dershowitz, supra note 239; Goldstein & Katz,
Dangerousness and Mental Illness: Some Observations on the Decision to Release Persons
Acquitted by Reason of Insanity, 70 YALE L.J. 225 (1960). Neither delinquents nor the
mentally ill are considered responsible for their antisocial behavior; adult criminals are.
The use of prediction devices to decide on extended incarceration of these persons, then,
may raise different legal and philosophical problems. But see Von Hirsch, Prediction of
Criminal Conduct and Preventive Confinement of Convicted Persons, 21 BUFF. L. REV. 717
(1972). This section of this Project focuses on the problems raised by the use of prediction
devices in the context of presumably responsible felons.
310. See p. 824 supra.
311. The measure of "success" and "failure" obviously depends on the definitions of
these terms. A lax definition of "success" means a lower perceived rate of "failure" and
vice versa. Various definitions of failure have been suggested: continued criminality, in-
.cluding those acts detected by official agents and those detected by researchers which
would be penal code violations, S. GLUECK & E. GLUECK, 500 CRIMINAL CAREERS (1930),
AFrER CoNDucr oF DISCHARGED OFFENDERS (1945); parole violation warrants; and technical
violations. "Success" may be defined in terms of such considerations as "total" adjust-
ment, avoiding major new convictions, avoiding subsequent incarceration. See generally
L. OHLIN, supra note 308, at 41-46; MANNHEIM & WILKINS, supra note 82, at 3.
For the parole board study, the following events were defined as "failures": a new
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incarceration prior to parole nor successful participation in a rehabili-
tative program increases the likelihood of success on parole, 31 2 neither
factor contributes to the "parole prognosis" or affects the "risk group"
to which an inmate is assigned. The inmate with a greater likelihood
of recidivism is confined longer solely for incapacitation, not because
such confinement will ultimately improve his or her chances of lead-
ing a law-abiding life upon release.
The use of the Salient Factor Scale raises the legal question of
whether the Due Process Clause is violated by basing differential
lengths of incarceration on the "risk categories" to which convicted
federal prisoners are assigned. If two inmates have the same offense
severity rating and the same length and type of sentence, but one has
a Salient Factor Score of five (a "fair" risk) and the other of six (a
"good" risk), then the "good" risk inmate is likely to be paroled some
six months earlier than the other.313 Is this classification into risk
groups and the resulting deprivation of liberty rationally related to
a legitimate governmental purpose, in light of the respective per-
sonal and public interests at stake?3 14
conviction resulting in a sentence of 60 days or more; a return to prison for parole viola-
tion; or an outstanding warrant. Salient Factor Report, supra note 69, at 2-3.
One aspect of the question of what should be predicted is the question of how long a time
period after release the researcher follows. If the criterion of success is total adjustment,
then presumably the follow-up period would be a lifetime. However, criminologists seem
to agree that most parole revocations occur during the first year after release. P. TAPPAN,
CRIME, JUSTICE AND CORRECTION 749 (1960). See W. HAMMOND & E. CHAYEN, PERSISTENT
CRIMINALS 89-90 (1963) (ultimate expected reconviction rate of releases in England of
80 percent; 73 percent reconviction rate within three years). But see G. VOLD, PREDICTION
METHODS AND PAROLE 52-54 (1931).
312. See pp. 826-28 supra; G. KASSEBAUM, D. WARD & D. WILNER, PRISON TREATMENT
AND PAROLE SURVIVAL (1971); D. GLASER, supra note 72, at 301-04; MANNHEIM & WILKINS,
supra note 82, at 119; G. VoLD, supra note 311, at 46-47; Robison & Smith, supra note 82;
Types of Error, supra note 82, at 7; Bixby, supra note 82, at 24-28.
313. The Guidelines are published as tables to 28 C.F.R. § 2.20 (1974). See also Ap-
pendix infra.
314. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies by its
terms only to the states. However, the same restrictions and standards are imposed upon
the federal government by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See, e.g.,
Schlesinger v. Ballard, 95 S. Ct. 572, 576-77 (1975); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677
(1973); Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163, 168 (1964); Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1934).
The Supreme Court has recently held that the "determination of an optimal time for
parole eligibility elicited multiple legislative classifications and groupings, which...re-
quire only some rational basis to sustain them." McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 270
(1973). Although the Guideline Table reflects not a legislative determination of parole
eligibility dates, but an administrative scheme for determining parole release dates, there
is no reason to believe the Court would require a higher standard of rationality to sustain
a classification contained in the Guidelines. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 487
(1970) (state welfare regulation upheld as "rational"); Marshall v. United States, 414 U.S.
417 (1974) (Court upheld as rational the exclusion from eligibility for rehabilitative drug
treatment sentencing anyone previously convicted of two or more felonies. The Court
emphasized its view that "in areas fraught with ... scientific uncertainties, legislative
options must be especially broad and courts should be cautious not to rewrite legislation
.414 U.S. at 427). See generally Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimi-
nation, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 723 (1974); Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a
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Of the risk group labelled "fair," 60.8 percent are expected to suc-
ceed on parole when released; of the "good" risks, some 77.4 percent
are expected to succeed.315 At some time during their sentences, mem-
bers of the "good" risk group will be released, while "fair" risks who
are otherwise similar to the "good" risk inmates will be imprisoned
an additional period of time. If there were 100 prisoners in each of
these two groups, the Parole Board would know that it was releasing,
among the "good" risks, approximately 77 future successes and 23
future failures, while holding incarcerated 61 likely successes and 39
likely failures in the "fair" risk group. 316 Of the total of 200 pris-
oners, about 37 percent of those who will fail on release gain im-
mediate freedom, while 44 percent of those who would succeed are
detained.
This seemingly high percentage of error, however, does not render
the use of the Table illegal. The governmental objective served by
the risk prediction-longer incapacitation of marginally greater risks
-is among the legitimate goals of sentencing. 31 7 The perceived gov-
ernmental interest in a marginally reduced crime rate is obviously
enormous,318 and every delay in the release of recidivists causes a real
albeit minor reduction in crime. More important, neither social science
nor clinical expertise can identify the misclassified individuals in the
released and detained risk groups.310 These classifications result in
the most accurate predictions that modem criminology can presently
achieve. 32 0 The relative deprivation of liberty thus seems not only ra-
Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 17-18 (1972);
Tussinan & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 341 (1949);
Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065 (1969); Note, Mental
Illness: A Suspect Classification?, 83 YALE L.J. 1237, 1239-41 (1974).
315. Salient Factor Report, supra note 69.
316. The "good" and "fair" risk groups are about the same size. (In the sample used
to construct the original scale, of 902 releasees classified, 268 scored "good" and 266
scored "fair." There were somewhat fewer "poor" risks (253) and many fewer "very good"
risks (115). Id.)
317. United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 458 (1965); see 4 IV. BLACKSTONE, COM-
MENrARIES* 251-52; M. FRANKEL, supra note 226, at 106; O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW
43 (1881); note 373 infra. But ef. Williamson v. United States, 184 F.2d 280, 282-83
(Jackson, Circuit Justice, 1950).
318. See U.S. NAT'L COMM'N ON LAw ENFORCEMENT 9- TiE ADMINISTIRAIION o JUxilcE,
REPORT (1967); N. MORRIS & G. HAWKINs, The HONEST 'OLiICIAN'S GUIDE TO CRIME CON-
TROL (1970); J. SCHEUER, To WALK THE STREETS SAFELY (1969); Singer, supra note 229.
319. All errors of classification in either group could be eliminated. Releasing all
prisoners immediately would ensure that no one remained in prison who would be a safe
risk if free; holding all prisoners indefinitely would eliminate recidivism. Neither ap-
proach wotld be legally or politically possible. An acceptable balance of the two types of
error may be called the goal of any reasonable parole policy. Types of Error, supra note 82.
320. Studies indicate that predictions based on actuarial risk categories conectly
identify more successes and failures than expert, clinical estimates. But within a given
risk group, no statistical device now known can predict whether a given individual will
succeed or fail on parole, nor is there any evidence that expert clinical judgment can do
so. Salient Factor Report, supra note 69, at 13; see L. WILKINS, EVALUATION OF PENAL
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tional but also necessary if the legitimate goal of incremental in-
capacitation is to be achieved. Therefore, the Guidelines will not be
invalidated through an equal protection challenge directed at the risk
classifications.
C. The Problem of Status-Due Process and
Cruel and Unusual Punishment
It is also possible to argue that risk prediction violates constitu-
tional standards by serving to punish those who share the "status"
of being a "bad risk." In Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville,32x a
unanimous Supreme Court struck down a municipal vagrancy ordi-
nance as too vague to satisfy due process.3 -2 Beyond vagueness, however,
the ordinance purported to punish the status of being a particular type
of person.323 Similarly, Robinson v. California324 held that any punish-
ment imposed for the "crime" of being a narcotics addict would be
cruel and unusual and thus barred by the Eighth Amendment. The
Salient Factor Score is merely a composite of nine status classifications,
each no more susceptible of separate criminalization than addiction.325
Robinson and Papachristou would clearly prohibit the detention of
a free citizen simply because of his or her Salient Factor Score. 326 But
MEASURES 128-29 (1969); Glaser, Prediction Tables as Accounting Devices for Judges and
Parole Boards, 8 CRIME & DELINQ. 239, 247-48 (1962). Invariably, any group of parolees will
include many recidivists; conversely, many of those denied parole would not have "failed"
if they had been free during that same period.
321. 405 U.S. 156 (1972).
322. Id. at 162.
323. That ordinance purported to punish, among others:
vagabonds ... common gamblers, persons who use juggling .... common night
walkers ... lewd, wanton and lascivious persons,... common railers and brawlers,...
habitual loafers .... [and] persons able to work but habitually living upon the earn-
ings of their wives or minor children.
JACKSONVILLE ORDINANCE CODE § 26-57, quoted in 405 U.S. at 156 n.l. The Court added:
Future criminality, however, is the common justification for the presence of vagrancy
statutes .... A vagrancy prosecution may be merely the cloak for a conviction which
could not be obtained on the real but undisclosed grounds for the arrest.
Id. at 169; see Note, Use of Vagmancy-Type Laws for Arrest and Detention of Suspicious
Persons, 59 YALE L.J. 1351 (1950); cf. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 678-79 (1962)(Harlan, J., concurring) (due process forbids punishment for addiction alone, because
addiction is nothing more than "a compelling propensity" or "bare desire to commit a
criminal act" of possession, not the commission of any act).
324. 370 U.S. 660 (1962); cf. Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968) (alcoholic found
drunk may be punished); United States v. Moore, 486 F.2d 1139 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 980 (1973) (addict may be punished for possession of drug). See
generally Fingarette, Addiction and Criminal Responsibility, 84 YALE L.J. 413 (1975).325. See note 72 supra. It is difficult to distinguish the status classification in Robinson
from a risk prediction. Each is based on the presently unavoidable consequences of past
social conditions and voluntary decisions. Indeed, it may be easier to shake a narcotics
habit than to improve one's Salient Factor Score.
326. See Ricks v. District of Columbia, 414 F.2d 1097, 1110 (D.C. Cir. 1968) ("Statistical
likelihood that a particular societal segment will engage in criminality is not permissible
as an all-out substitute for proof of individual guilt"); Von Hirsch, supra note 309.
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the Court's criticism of status crimes cannot be applied to a parole
denial based on a relatively poor risk prediction. The standards for
each risk category are not vague; specific, objective factors are spelled
out.3 27 More important, the government is not criminalizing a status,
since the "bad risk" label is not applied to an "innocent" suspect,
but only to certain persons who have already been properly convicted.
If attended with reasonable procedural protections, 328 the assignment
of a prospective parolee to a certain risk category is clearly more ac-
ceptable than the arrest of a vagrant or addict. 329 Thus, neither a
Fifth nor an Eighth Amendment attack on the use of status classifica-
tions would invalidate the parole Guidelines' differential treatment
of risk groups. 330
However, concluding that the Guideline Table meets minimum
legal standards is only the first step in the analysis. The Guidelines
have significant implications for the practices and goals of other ele-
ments of the criminal justice system, and these implications must now
be considered.
IV. Implications of the Guidelines for the Criminal Justice System
The process of parole release decisionmaking has been described and
criticized above. Although the hearing has been shown to be inade-
quate on constitutional, statutory and policy grounds, the Guideline
327. On the possibility of erroneous classification, see pp. 833-35 supra. On the op-
portunities for manipulation of the Salient Factor Score, see pp. 837-38 sufn'a.
328. See pp. 861-66 supra.
329. A different status argument would attempt to show that the Salient Factor Score is
highly correlated with an inmate's race and thus amounts to a disguised denial of parole
on forbidden racial grounds. Indeed, many of the unfavorable Salient Factors do relate to
personal attributes possessed disproportionately by black Americans: prior convictions,
prior incarcerations, young age at first commitment, history of drug dependence, lack of
high school diploma or equivalent, unemployment, single marital status. See U.S. BUREAU
OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSRrAcr OF THE UNITED STATES 38-39, 83, 115, 151, 154, 162,
225-26 (1973). This argument is specious. First, a statistical correlation is not necessarily
legally stfficient to establish a violation of equal protection. See Jefferson v. Hackney,
406 U.S. 535, 547-49 (1972). More importantly, while the correlation is true of the gen-
eral population it is apparently not true as to the federal prison population. In that
universe there are somewhat more blacks proportionately in the middle two risk groups
and somewhat more whites among the best and worst risks. Interview with P. Hoffman,
Research Criminologist, United States Board of Parole, Nov. 11, 1974, in New Haven,
Conn. Indeed, while being black was found to be among those factors most highly cor-
related with parole failure, its overlap with the other Salient Factors mentioned above
was so substantial that it was eliminated early in the experiments on purely mathematical
(as well as "ethical") grounds. Id. See Salient Factor Report, supra note 69, at 4.
330. Gross disproportionality of sentence to offense also offends the Eighth Amend-
ment. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910); see Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238,
273 (Brennan, J.), 325 (Marshall, J.) (1972). Thus, if the increment in increased detention
were grossly disproportionate or excessive in relation to the difference in predicted risk,
the assignment of federal offenders to "risk categories" might be unconstitutional. How-
ever, since the terms of confinement set by the parole Guidelines are relatively short in
comparison with lawfully imposable sentences, such a theory would not succeed as a
challenge to the risk increment; cf. Von Hirsch, supra note 309, at 750-53.
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Table appears to meet minimum constitutional standards. This section
examines the implications of the Guidelines-including the abandon-
ment of rehabilitation and the choice of other goals-for the larger
criminal justice system. The fundamental question to be considered
is the proper allocation of governmental authority and responsibility
in the post-conviction process of sentencing and parole.
A. The Presentence Investigation Report
With the implementation of the Guideline Table, the accuracy of
the presentence investigation report (PSI) 33 1 becomes critically im-
portant, since it is the primary source both for answering the nine
questions which determine the inmate's Salient Factor Score and for
obtaining the "official version" of the inmate's offense used to deter-
mine offense severity.3 32 The large number of errors that appear in
PSI's has been well documented. 33 Since an inmate's parole release
date may often be adversely affected by such inaccuracies, some way
must be found to insure the reliability of the PSI.
One obvious method to improve the accuracy of the Salient Factor
Score is to have the probation officers seek to answer each of the
nine questions in preparing the report.3 34 Focusing probation officers'
attention on the Salient Factors should result in some improvements
in accuracy and would enable the probation officers to indicate any
problems or questions encountered in documenting any of the Salient
331. The presentence report is prepared by the Probation Office and is first used by
the judge in sentencing. See M.A. Sullivan, The Use of the Presentence Investigation
Report in the Federal System, 1974 (unpublished paper on file with the Jerome N. Frank
Legal Servs. Org. of Yale Law School). The preparation of presentence investigation reports
is governed by FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(1). The subjects to be covered by the PSI include:
(a) Offense-official version, (b) Offense-defendant's version (sometimes an informant's
version is also included), (c) Prior criminal record, (d) Family history, (e) Siblings,
(f) Marital history, (g) Religion, (h) Education.... () Leisure-time activities, (k)
Health, (1) Military service, (in) Employment, (n) Financial condition, (o) Evaluation.
Procedures, supra note 42, at 510.
332. Procedures, supra note 42, at 510.
333. Lehrich, The Use and Disclosure of Presentence Reports in the United States, 47
F.R.D. 225, 240-45 (1969); S. Singer 8& D. Gottfredson, Development of a Data Base for
Parole Decisionmaking, June 1973, at 2 (NCCD Parole Decisionmaking Project Supp. Rep.
1); TASK FORCE REPORT: CORRECTIONS, supra note I, at 18-19. Some major sources of in-
accuracy in preparing the PSI are: 1) unknown dispositions and 2) multiple listings of
the same offense. (Interview with S. Gzregorek, Warden, Tallahassee Federal Correctional
Center, formerly U.S. Probation Officer for the District of Detroit, at Parole and Sen-
tencing Workshop, New Haven, Conn., Jan. 20, 1975.) An additional problem in calculat-
ing a prisoner's Salient Factor Score from the PSI is that some districts do not allow
inclusion of juvenile records, thereby potentially affecting at least 6 of the 11 points of
the Salient Factor Score. See 28 C.F.R. § 2.20 (1970). Interview with S. Gzregorek, supra.
334. The judges of the Southern District of New York have directed their Probation
Office to include in presentence reports an estimate of both the Salient Factor Score and
the time of release if the Guidelines are followed. Letter to Project authors from Judge
Frankel, S.D.N.Y., Dec. 16, 1974 (on file with the Yale Law Journal).
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Factors. This proposal falls short of being a final answer, however,
because the officers' sources of information and time for further in-
vestigation would remain limited, and there would still be the pos-
sibility of human error.33 5
A similar procedure would sensibly apply to the Offense Severity Rat-
ing. The presentence report, which is the basis for the parole exam-
iner's severity rating,330 normally contains an "official" description of
the offense and a "defendant's version" of the offense. The "official
version" is obtained primarily from the United States Attorney 37 or
the indictment, but occasionally is supplemented with additional facts
provided by the defendant. 338 Sometimes, PSI's note other existing
versions as well as aggravating or extenuating circumstances concern-
ing the offense.330 However, tests done in conjunction with an NCCD
study agree with this Project's observations that hearing examiners
and board members overwhelmingly rely on the official description
of the offense without considering the inmate's description. 40 In ef-
fect, the Offense Severity Rating may be based on unsubstantiated al-
legations of the United States Attorney or unproven charges in the
indictment, regardless of the conviction offense. Rather than relying
solely on the counts of the indictment or the word of the United
States Attorney, the Probation Officer should provide a more complete
and impartial account by including attributed accounts of the offense
from as many sources as may be available. Scrupulous presentation of
mitigating and aggravating circumstances may assist the hearing ex-
aminers in reaching a fairer and more accurate determination of of-
fense severity.341
335. During 1970, 614 federal probation officers completed 21,509 full presentence in-
vestigation reports, 2,259 limited presentence investigation reports, and 5,529 prerelease
investigations for the Board of Parole. Various other types of reports totaling 23,768 were
prepared by probation officers for the Board of Parole, the Bureau of Prisons, the U.S.
Disciplinary Barracks and U.S. Attorneys. Probation officers also supervised 38,409 re-
leased persons. Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Annual Report of the Director,
1970, at 178-82.
The nature of the information contained in the presentence report requires that proba-
tion officers often must rely upon community sources. However, probation officers are
instructed to distinguish clearly between fact and inference, to label any unverified in-
formation as such, and to reinterview a subject who provides information substantially
different from that provided by other sources. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS,
DIVISION OF PROBATION, THE PRESENTENCE INvEsTIGATION REPORT (Pub. No. 103, 1965). See
Note, The Presentence Report: An Empirical Study of Its Use in the Federal Criminal
Process, 58 GEo. L.J. 451 (1970).
336. NCCD Supp. Rep. i3, supra note 67; see pp. 835-36 supra.
337. THE PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT, supra note 335, at 10.
338. Interview with Stephen Gzregorek, supra note 333.
339. Procedures, supra note 42, at 510.
340. NCCD Supp. Rep. 5, supra note 121.
341. The judge's evaluation of offense severity should also be clearly stated in the
PSI. But cf. note 345 infra.
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B. The Guilty Plea
In the contemporary criminal justice system the vast majority of
convictions are achieved through pleas of guilty.342 Agreements on
plea bargains may arrive at an acceptable consensus as to the sentence
to be imposed on an "offender." The plea focuses principally on the
sentence imposed or imposable by the court. 343 Since the parole re-
lease decision is the primary determinant of when an offender will
be released from incarceration, 344 and since that decision has become
almost mechanically predictable under the Guidelines, it may well be
that the judge who accepts the guilty plea will be required to inform
the defendant of the Parole Board's use of the Guidelines. 345
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that
a court shall not accept a guilty plea "without first addressing the de-
fendant personally and determining that the plea is made voluntarily
with understanding of the nature of the charge and the consequences
of the plea. '340 Because the unavailability of parole "directly affects
the length of time an accused will have to serve in prison," courts
have recognized that ineligibility may "have great importance to an
accused in considering whether to plead guilty."3 4 7 Thus, it has been
held that ineligibility for parole3 48 is a consequence of the plea within
342. In some jurisdictions up to 90 percent of convictions result from guilty pleas.
U.S. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK
FORCE REi'nOr: THE CouRTs 9 (1967). In the federal courts in fiscal year 1969, 86 percent
of the convicted defendants pleaded guilty or nolo contendere; over two-thirds of all
defendants-whether dismissed, nolled, acquitted, or convicted-ultimately entered pleas
of guilty or nolo contendere. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTs, ANNUAL REPORT: 1969,
at 273; see DAWSON, suna note 1, at 179.
343. J.H. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL 175 (1966) (noting presumed impact of
pleading to fewer counts on parole board determinations as well). See DAWSON, supra
note I, at 179; D. NEWMAN, CONVICTION 79, 96, 98 (1966); Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S.
257 (1971); Note, The Unconstitutionality of the Plea Bargain, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1387,
1389-90, 1397 (1970).
344. See notes 1-6 supra.
345. Thirty-four percent of federal district judges surveyed thought a defendant
should be informed of the Parole Board's Guidelines before pleading guilty, while 61
percent responded negatively. Three percent had other responses and two percent did
not answer. Project Survey of Sentencing Judges, question 18. It would be in the interest
of the fair administration of criminal justice for the court to calculate and inform the
defendant of his likely Guideline rating. This practice, however, could raise as many
problems as it cures; prisoners might challenge either their plea or the Board's determina-
tion of the Guideline range if a court and the Board reached different results under the
Guidelines. This difficulty could be reduced by binding the Board to the court's evalua-
tion of offense severity. See pp. 887-89, 895 infra.
346. See p. 882 infra. The fact that a judge will probably not know what sentence
he might impose when he first accepts the plea or the defendant's Guideline range would
not bar the judge from informing the defendant at that time of their use. Before sen-
tencing the defendant, when judges normally provide an opportunity to withdraw the
plea of guilty, they could advise the defendant of the expected Guideline range and
its possible effects upon the probable sentence. See note 345 supra.
347. Bye v. United States, 435 F.2d 177, 180 (2d Cir. 1970).
348. Narcotic offenders were previously ineligible for parole. 26 U.S.C. § 7237(d)(1970). That section has since been superseded by the Comprehensive Drug Abuse and
Control Act, 21 U.S.C. § 841 (1970) (effective May 1, 1971). See Warden v. Marrero, 417
U.S. 653 (1974); Bradley v. United States, 410 U.S. 605 (1973).
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the meaning of Rule 11 and therefore must be made known to the
defendant before accepting his or her plea of guilty.349
Because parole is assumed to be available by the average defendant,
it is imperative that he or she be informed of the terms and conditions
of eligibility and any limitations thereon.35° This explanation should
include warnings that severity levels are independently determined by
the Board, and that decisions outside the Guidelines are possible. This
advice should at least be required when the Guidelines call for a period
of incarceration beyond the mandatory release date of the sentence to
be imposed. 351 For example, as part of the Offense Severity Rating, the
Guidelines contemplate consideration of offenses which are either
charged in counts dropped as part of the plea agreement or alleged but
not officially charged by the U.S. Attorney. 352 This knowledge might
have a significant effect upon a defendant's decision to plead guilty.
Defendants who believe they are "getting a break" by pleading guilty
to a conspiracy charge with a five year maximum that is lower than
the maximum for the substantive offense may revise that opinion upon
learning they might not be paroled because the Board may rate the
349. See, e.g., Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969); McCarthy v. United States, 394
U.S. 459 (1969). The fact that a "special parole term" is required to be imposed in ad-
dition to the regular sentence has been held to be within the scope of Rule 11. Michel v.
United States, 507 F.2d 461, 463-64 (2d Cir. 1974); Roberts v. United States, 491 F.2d
1236 (3d Cir. 1974); United States v. Richardson, 483 F.2d 516 (8th Cir. 1973). "Special
parole" is a novel provision of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control
Act, 21 U.S.C. § 841 (1970) (effective May 1, 1971). It is separate from and begins after
the regular sentence has been served, including any other parole and is required to be
imposed under § 841 for offenders convicted under that section. Subsection (c)(2) of the
proposed revision of Rule 11 requires that the judge advise a defendant of "the manda-
tory minimum penalty provided by law, if any, and the maximum possible penalty
provided by law for the offense to which the plea is offered," 62 F.R.D. 271, 275. Argu-
ably this would require the court to inform a defendant of the Guideline range. The
effective date of the proposed amendments has been postponed for one year to August 1,
1975, Act of July 30, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-361, 88 Stat. 397, in order to allow further
study.
350. Bye v. United States, 435 F.2d 177 (2d Cir. 1970); Harris v. United States, 426 F.2d
99 (6th Cir. 1970); Jenkins v. United States, 420 F.2d 433 (10th Cir. 1970); Durant v.
United States, 410 F.2d 689 (1st Cir. 1969); Berry v. United States, 412 F.2d 189 (3d Cir.
1969); Munich v. United States, 337 F.2d 356 (9th Cir. 1964). Contra, Trujillo v..United
States, 377 F.2d 266 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 899 (1967); Smith v. United States,
324 F.2d 436 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 957 (1964). But see Sanchez v. United
States, 417 F.2d 494, 496 (5th Cir. 1969) (Trujillo questioned); Spradley v. United States,
421 F.2d 1043 (5th Cir. 1970) (Trujillo confined to its facts). By Act of Oct. 26, 1974, Pub.
L. 93-481, § 2, 88 Stat. 1455, these offenders were made eligible retroactively. See Herrera
v. United States, 507 F.2d 143 (5th Cir. 1975).
351. See Bye v. United States, 435 F.2d 177, 180-81 (2d Cir. 1970).
352. The Parole Board makes its Offense Severity Rating on the basis of the "offense
behavior" of the defendant rather than on the offenses which he or she is convicted of or
pleads guilty to. P. Hoffman, J. Beck & L. DeGostin, The Practical Application of a
Severity Scale, June 1973 (NCCD Parole Decisionmaking Project Supp. Rep. 13); NCCD
Supp. Rep. 5, supra note 121. Parole Board members and examiners rely on the U.S. At-
torney's description of the offense without corresponding reliance on the defendant's
version. See J. SKOLNICK, supra note 343, at 175.
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offense severity as if they had committed the underlying substantive
offense. 353 Such knowledge is a minimal requisite for a knowing waiver
of rights.
C. Sentencing and the Post-conviction Process
1. Impact of the Guidelines on Sentencing Practices
Judges may well begin to consider the vital implications of the
Guideline Table for the sentencing process. 54 Parole release decisions
are largely determined by the Guidelines for Decisionmaking.35 The
Parole Board provides three different Guideline Tables: "Adult" (for
Regular Adult, (a)(1) or (a)(2) sentences); "Youth" (for offenders sen-
tenced under the Youth Corrections Act); and "NARA" (for offenders
sentenced pursuant to the Narcotic Addict Treatment Act).3 50 The
NARA and YCA guideline tables provide different-and often lower
-time ranges for the same combination of offense and offender char-
acteristics.3 5 ' Other sentencing alternatives, however, such as the (a)(1)
or (a)(2) provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 4208, neither affect which guide-
line table is used 355 nor play a significant role in the exercise of the
Board's discretion. 359
Before imposing sentence a judge may wish to determine how the
Guidelines would apply to the particular defendant.3 60 Indeed, it
would seem that in order to make an intelligent sentencing decision
that includes the factor of parole, the judge would have to determine
the defendant's Guideline range by calculating the Salient Factor Score
and Offense Severity Rating.3 1 The judge could then determine what
353. See Note, The Collective Sentencing Decision, supra note 229, at 715-19 (problems
of plea bargaining and nonjudicial sentencing).
354. See note 346 supra.
355. Memorandum from Federal Judicial Center to all district judges, Concerning the
Parole Policies of the U.S. Bd. of Parole, Aug. 1974, at 5 (on file with the Yale Law
Journal) [hereinafter cited as Memcrandum]; see p. 825 supra.
356. Memorandum, supra note 355, at 5; see 28 C.F.R. § 2.20 (1974). For a discussion
of the federal sentencing statutes, see pp. 818-19 supra.
357. See note 64 supra.
358. Memorandum, supra note 355, at 5.
359. The Memorandum states that the main effect of the (a)(1) and (a)(2) provisions
will be to expand the range of discretion available to the Board. id.
360. Id. at 4. Fifty percent of the judges responding to the Project Survey of Sen-
tencing Judges, see note 159 supra, stated that the Guideline Table would affect the
length or type of sentence imposed. Forty-eight percent responded that they would
calculate a defendant's Guideline time before sentencing, 42 percent said they would not,
2 percent had other responses, and 8 percent did not answer. Project Survey of Sen-
tencing Judges, question 17.
361. Eighty-eight percent of the judges responding to the Project Survey stated that
they considered parole in sentencing. Project Survey of Sentencing Judges, question 5.
Forty-seven percent of judges, when they impose a Regular Adult sentence, generally
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effect various possible sentences would have upon the indicated Guide-
line time. Generally, however, the length of sentence does not affect
the determination of release dates on the Guideline Table; two in-
mates whose Salient Factor and Offense Severity scores call for 36 to
42 months will be released within that range of time even though
one has a sentence of five years and the other a sentence of ten years.
36 2
Despite the fact that the Guidelines themselves do not take account
of sentence length, the judge can still have the effect of "overriding"
the Guidelines by using the various sentencing alternatives available
to him.3 3 One way this result can be accomplished is to impose a
sentence of such a length that the Guideline period ends before
the minimum parole eligibility date or after the mandatory release
date. Using an example of a defendant whose Guideline time is
between 20 and 26 months, a seven-year Regular Adult sentence
would insure that the defendant would not be released on parole dur-
ing the 20 to 26 month range, since the minimum parole eligibility
date would not occur until 28 months (one-third of the sentence).3 64
Likewise, a two-year sentence would insure that the defendant did not
serve 20 to 26 months, because the mandatory release date would oc-
cur shortly after 19 months30
expect that an inmate will be released on parole after serving one-third of the sentence.
Two percent responded that they expected release to come at one-half of the sentence,
17 percent at some time prior to mandatory release, 16 percent had other responses and
17 percent did not answer. (Percentages sum to 99 percent due to rounding error.) Project
Survey of Sentencing Judges, question 6(b). In addition, many judges impose (a)(2) sen-
tences under the belief-which they sometimes communicate to the inmate-that prison
performance will be the key factor determining when the inmate is released. Project
Survey of Sentencing Judges, question 9. Since the Guidelines indicate how long a com-
mitted defendant can expect to serve before being released on parole, and since prison
performance and sentence length or type only rarely have an effect on that decision, the
use of the Guidelines negates many of these judicial beliefs. Unless the judge consults the
Table, he may be imposing sentence on the basis of materially false information and as-
sumptions, in which case the sentence does not meet minimum constitutional standards.
See United States v. Malcolm, 432 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1970); United States ex rel. Brown v.
Rundle, 417 F.2d 282 (3d Cir. 1969); cf. EUROPEAN COMM. ON CRIME PROBLEMS, COUNCIL
OF EUROPE, REPORT BY THE Su-CoMM. ON SENTNCINC 61-78 (1974).
362. However, varying sentence length beyond the Guideline range will affect the
relative amounts of incarceration and community supervision an inmate will receive.
Under a three-year sentence an inmate with a Guideline range of 20 to 26 months would
serve between one-half and two-thirds of the sentence in prison, while spending between
one-third and one-half of the sentence on parole; under a five year sentence, the same
inmate could be expected to serve between one-third and less than one-half of the sen-
tence before being released on parole.
363. Fifty percent of the judges stated that the Guidelines will have an effect on the
length and type of sentence they might impose, while 37 percent said the Guidelines
would not. Five percent had other responses and 8 percent did not answer. Project Survey
of Sentencing Judges, question 19. See pp. 818-19 supra.
364. 18 U.S.C. § 4202 (1970).
365. A person sentenced to a term of more than one year and less than three years
earns statutory good time at the rate of six days a month, id. § 4161, thereby moving the
mandatory release date to shortly after 19 months. This does not include any industrial
or meritorious good time an inmate might earn, id. § 4162.
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Alternatively, when judges want a particular defendant to serve less
than the Guideline time in prison, followed by a period of supervisory
custody, they can utilize 18 U.S.C. § 3651. Applicable to any offense
with a maximum of more than six months, this section authorizes the
judge to impose a sentence in excess of six months and provide that
the defendant be incarcerated in a prison or treatment institution for
a period not exceeding six months, with the execution of the remain-
der of the sentence suspended and the defendant placed on probation
for that period and under those terms that the judge determines at
sentencing. 30 6
Such "split sentencing" can be a particularly flexible technique when
a defendant is convicted of, or pleads guilty to, more than one count.
The judge could then impose Regular Adult sentence of imprisonment
on the first count and impose a term of probation under § 3651 con-
secutive to the sentence on the first count. For example, if a defendant
were convicted on two counts, the judge could impose a Regular Adult
sentence of one year on the first count and a consecutive term of two
years' probation on the second count. This would insure that the de-
fendant would be released after no more than one year of incarceration,
even if his Guideline time were greater, and that he would receive
two years of supervision after his release.367
Similar results can be achieved by utilizing the (a)(1) and (a)(2) pro-
visions of 18 U.S.C. § 4208. For example, suppose a judge wanted to
impose a seven-year sentence but felt it was unnecessary for the de-
fendant to serve the normally required one-third of the sentence (28
months) before being released on parole. In this case, he could utilize
§ 4208(a)(2) to allow the defendant to be released within the estab-
lished Guideline period even though this time may be less than 28
months. The flexibility given the judge under § 4208(a)(1), enabling
him to establish parole eligibility at any set time less than one-third
of the sentence, can be used to insure that there will be neither a pre-
mature parole release nor a requirement that the defendant serve
one-third of his term before being eligible for parole. For example,
if a judge wanted to impose a six-year term but did not think it neces-
sary that the defendant serve 24 months (one-third of the sentence)
366. Id. § 3651.
367. The supervision given probationers is essentially tile same as that given parole
releasees since both are supervised by a federal probation officer; see id. § 3655; 28 C.F.R.§§ 2.42, 0.126(b) (1974). By imposing a term of probation the judge has the opportunity to
establish the conditions and length of that release (18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1970)), and for any
alleged violation, the judge rather than parole hearing examiners then determines if a
violation did occur and, if so, what additional punishment, if any, is warranted. Sce
Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973); cf. Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967).
884
Vol. 84: 810, 1975
Parole Release Decisionmaking and the Sentencing Process
before being eligible for parole, but also thought he should serve
more than the predicted Guideline period of 12 to 16 months, the
judge under § 4208(a)(1) could set a minimum parole eligibility date
of 20 months. Since the offender by that date would have already served
more than the time required by the Guidelines, it could be expected
that he would be paroled at his first hearing.
A final method by which a judge can attempt to effectuate the pur-
poses behind a particular sentence is to provide the Parole Board with
the reasons underlying its imposition.3 18 A memorandum distributed
to federal district judges by the Judicial Center states that although
the Parole Board welcomes such communications, either at the time
of sentencing or later, such communications will be considered by the
Board only in the exercise of discretion and will not be treated as
a judicial limitation upon its administrative prerogative.3 69 In prac-
tice, examiners appear to be little influenced by a judge's reasons for
imposing a particular sentence.370
To ensure that their sentencing purposes are effectuated, therefore,
judges will have to use the various statutory sentencing alternatives
available to them. And to do so intelligently they will have to cal-
culate a defendant's Salient Factor Score and Offense Severity Rating
at sentencing even if those determinations officially remain within the
power of the Parole Board.371
Such manipulation of sentences detracts from the laudable purposes
that motivated the recent reforms of the parole release process. First,
it undermines the Guideline Table's capacity to achieve equality in
treatment of offenders. More importantly, it indicates an underlying
conflict between the judiciary and the Parole Board, and raises the
368. The form recently introduced for this purpose is A.O. 235, which enables the
sentencing judge to communicate with the Parole Board without having to use the same
form as the U.S. Attorney, U.S.A. form 792. The A.O. 235 specifically asks the judge to
state the reasons underlying the sentence. In addition, of course, a judge may use a
number of other means to communicate with the Board such as a personal letter or
telephone call. See note 401 infra.
369. Memorandum, supra note 355; see 28 C.F.R. § 2.21 (1974). In the Project Survey of
sentencing judges 20 percent of judges said that their communications with the Board
would increase as a result of the Board's new procedures, 67 percent safd their frequency
of communication would remain about the same, 3 percent said it would decrease, and
10 percent did not answer. Project Survey of Sentencing Judges, question 20.
370. In one instance a first offender with a five-year (a)(2) sentence was represented
by her trial counsel who quoted the sentencing judge as stating that he was imposing an
(a)(2) sentence because he would have no objection if the Parole Board released her be-
fore one-third of her sentence. Despite this consideration, and notwithstanding her work-
ing and training as a dental assistant since arriving at the institution, the hearing
examiners gave her a set-off of 24 months, which, together with the three months she
had already served, would bring her within her Guideline range at her first review
hearing. Observation of parole hearing (III1) at Alderson FRW, Sept. 1974.
371. See note 360 supra.
885
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 84: 810, 1975
fundamental issue of which body ought to be responsible for post-
conviction decisions about length of imprisonment.
2. Relative Governmental Roles and the
Allocation of Decisionmaking
The use of the Guideline Table as the substantive basis for release
decisions has significant implications for defendants, courts, the Pa-
role Board and the Congress. It raises the fundamental question of
which decisionmaker is most appropriate to determine the goals of
punishment and to assure equality of treatment with respect to those
goals in the post-conviction process.
With the adoption of the Guideline Table the Board has thrust it-
self into a central role in determining the goals of punishment and
"justice" in the post-conviction process. 372 The Guidelines have aban-
doned the goal of rehabilitation in favor of the goal of incapacita-
tion.37 3 Further, the Board's reliance on offense severity is intended
372. See 18 U.S.C. § 4203 (1970) (Board to determine that release "not incompatible
with the welfare of society").
373. The legitimacy of incapacitation as a goal of punishment depends on the premise
that past offenders are likely to commit future crimes. Indeed, the parole statute directs
the Board to make an incapacitative prediction in each case. Unless "there is a reasonable
probability that [a] prisoner will live and remain at liberty without violating the laws,"
the Board may not order release. Id. § 4203. Essentially, the Board is enjoined to in-
capacitate each prisoner until he or she is no loiger a threat to society (or else until
mandatory release), apparently in the belief that many offenders' risk of recidivism will
decrease over the time spent in prison. The Parole Board states that the Salient Factor
Scale relates to this statutory criterion. Battle v. Norton, 365 F. Supp. 925, 933 (D. Conn.
1973) (affidavit of M. Sigler, Chairman, U.S. Bd. of Parole).
The Salient Factor Score, however, is not designed to release those inmates with
"reasonable probabilities" of not violating the law, but rather to hold those inmates with
a greater probability of violating the law for longer periods of time than those inmates
with lower probabilities of violating the law. This conflict with the statute is inevitable
given the empirical finding that a prisoner's risk of recidivism depends largely on static
factors unaffected by length of imprisonment. See pp. 826-28 supra.
It thus appears that either all offenders have, ab initio, a "reasonable probability" of
not violating the law, in which case the statutory criterion is meaningless and should
not serve as the basis for longer incarceration of some offenders, or the criterion is not
capable of achievement unless the entire criminal justice system is willing to accept a
marked decrease in the percentage of persons paroled.
This conflict presents a serious ideological dilemma for parole boards. The logic of
incapacitation and the statistical coincidence that persons committing less serious crimes
are, generally, more likely to engage in future criminal activity than persons committing
more serious crimes would lead to very lengthy incarceration of petty criminals and
minimal incarceration of violent criminals. GLASER, supra note 72, at 41-48 (especially 44);
N. WALKER, SENTENCING IN A RATIONAL SOCIETY 92-94 (1969); see F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS,
DETERRENCE: THE LEGAL THREAT IN CRIME CONTROL 131-32 (1973). But it cannot fairly be
said that the Board's policy serves to incapacitate those whose predicted offense behavior
upon release would be more "serious." The Salient Factor Score does not purport to
discriminate according to what offense a predicted "failure" may commit, but only to
predict the risk of "failure," as defined by the Board. See note 311 supra. In fact, there
is no evidence to suggest that severity of commitment offense correlates highly with
severity of recidivist offense, among those who do in fact "fail." See Note, Preventive
Detention, 6 HARv. Civ. RIGHTS-CIv. Lm. L. REv.-289, 384 (1971). Some offenses, however,
do seem to be frequently repeated by the same offenders, e.g., check forgery, auto theft. N.
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to correct the perceived injustice that would arise from decisionmaking
based solely on the risk factor. Murderers and bank robbers, no matter
how unlikely it is that they will commit crimes in the future, should
be punished more or longer than forgers or auto thieves, even though
the latter are frequently worse risks than the former.37 4 According to
the Board the offense severity factor is necessary for purposes of both
general deterrence and retribution or condemnation.
In implementing these goals through adoption of the Guideline
Table, the Board did not attempt a major research effort designed to
explore how future criminals are deterred. Nor did they seek guidance
from legislative or judicial sources. Rather, the Board developed an
independent classification system for judging and comparing the seri-
ousness of offenses. For example, if it is assumed that the statutory
maxima permitted for various offenses reflect a congressional assess-
ment of the seriousness of the criminal behavior, the federal penal code
provides for 18 categories of offense severity.3 7 5 However, the Board's
basic classification scheme has only six categories. Further, in placing
specific types of "offense behavior" within each of the six groups, no
apparent attempt was made to implement the legislative judgment of
comparability of crime severity.3 76
WALKER, supra, at 93-94; GLASER, supra; F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, supra. The Parole
Board can thus hardly be faulted for its half-hearted implementation of the goal of in-
capacitation, even in apparent contravention of the statutory directive. However, when
incremental incapacitation becomes the bedrock purpose of a parole denial, this policy
decision, like every decision, has costs as well as benefits to society and to various persons'
liberty and property. Note, The Costs of Preventive Detention, 79 YALE L.J. 926 (1970);
Von Hirsch, supra note 309, at 718; Note, supra. Society, for example, bears the social and
budgetary costs of maintaining the "bad risks" in prison longer at state expense, either
as compared to complete freedom or as compared to the cost of supervisory probation or
parole. In state adult correctional institutions an average of S1,912.60 per year per in-
mate was spent in 1966. TASK FORCE REtoRr: CORRECTmONS, supra note 1, at 180. The
average cost of parole supervision during the same period was $323 per year, or only one-
sixth as expensive. Id. at 189. The decision as to the balance of financial costs and benefits
of maintaining a prison system of a certain size is for the Congress to make, and for the
Parole Board, within its delegated purview, to carry out.
374. Battle v. Norton, 365 F. Supp. 925, 932 (D. Conn. 1973) (affidavit of M. Sigler,
Chairman, U.S. Bd. of Parole).
375. 2 U.S. N.AT'i. COMM'N oN Ri:FORM OF FED. CRIM. LAWS, WORKING PAPERS 1250 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as BROWN CO.INI'N WoRKING PAI' RS] indicates that there are 18 different
maximum terms authorized in Title 18 of the U.S. Code, 14 of them over 6 months and
thus potentially bringing persons within the jurisdiction of the Parole Board. But the
federal penal code only establishes maximum sentences imposable, and offers no ad-
ditional guide to sentencing an offender convicted of the "average" offense behavior. See
United States v. Hartford, 489 F.2d 652, 655 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Daniels, 446
F.2d 967, 972 (6th Cir. 1971); MeLeary v. State, 49 Wis. 2d 263, 275, 182 N.W.2d 512, 518-
19 (1971). There is no guarantee that, because statutory maxima differ, the legislature
expected "average" behaviors to differ in the same degree. Nonetheless, this discussion
proceeds on the assumption that maxima bear some relationship to the legislative evalua-
tion of the relative severity of various, typical offense behaviors.
376. For example, the general federal conspiracy statute, 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1970), im-
poses a maximum penalty of 5 years, the same as the maximum penalty for mail fraud,
id. § 1341. However, under the Guidelines, mail fraud is classified as a "moderate" severity
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The Board's approach to the goals represented by the offense severity
factor may well be "better" than the congressional approach.377 But
both the choice of goals and their relevance to particular forms of
criminal behavior are decisions more appropriately made by legislative
rather than administrative bodies.378 Congress has access to the mech-
anisms for considering the relative importance of such goals as reha-
bilitation, incapacitation, and general deterrence.37 9 It is the forum
best suited to balance the complex costs and benefits inherent in par-
ticular goals of punishment: It pays for the prisons, for the super-
visory personnel, for the rehabilitative program, and it is in closest
touch with the constituencies that "pay for" criminal acts, that is, the
general public. Congress also "pays for" the services of other institu-
tions in the criminal justice process, from police to courts, and it could
thus best determine which institutional actor should implement par-
ticular goals. In addition, the legislature is the only political body with
offense, while "conspiracy" is not listed at all and is classified on the basis of the under-
lying intended behavior. See Billiteri v. United States Bd. of Parole, 385 F. Supp. 1217
(W.D.N.Y. 1974).
377. The federal penal code has been called a "major failure," characterized by the
"utter inconsistency and irrationality of its penalty structure," resulting in "the incon-
sistent evaluation of similar conduct and the irony of more severe penalties in one part
of the present code than the penalties provided for a comparable offense in another." 2
BROWN COMM'N WORKING PAPERS, supra note 375, at 1246. See generally Wechsler, Sen-
tencing, Correction and the Model Penal Code, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 456 (1961); Comment,
Sentencing: Disparity, Inconsistency and a New Federal Criminal Code, 20 CATI. U.L. REv.
748 (1971). Combining authorized fines, maximum terms and other sanctions permitted in
Title 18, there are between 65 and 75 categories for sentencing "without an apparent
rational basis." U.S. NAT'L COMM'N ON REFORM OF FED. CRlst. LAWS, STUDY DRAFr OF A
NEW FED. CRIM. CODE § 3002, at 268 (1970) [hereinafter cited as BROWN COMM'N STUDY
DRAFT]. Even where and if the penal code provisions are not inconsistent, they "neverthe-
less often reflect subtleties of moral judgment which are far more precise than would seem
to be warranted by available information." BROWN COMM'N WORKING PAPERS, supra note
375, at 1246.
The parole board has, in establishing six categories of offense severity, followed several
proposed recommendations for legislative reform of the penal code. BROWN COMN'N STUDY
DRAFT, supra, § 3002, adopted in S.1, SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 93D CONG., IST
Sass., REPORT ON S.1, CRIMINAL JUSTICE CODIFICATION, REVISION, AND REFORM ACT OF 1974
§ 2301 (Comm. Print 1974); ABA, STANDARDS RELATING TO SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND
'ROCEDURES § 2.1(a) (App. Draft 1971).
378. In fact, courts have steadfastly refused to review sentences imposed within the
legal maximum set by the legislature because "each offender is subject to the penalty
prescribed; and if that be too harsh, the remedy must be afforded by legislative act."
Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 305 (1932); Accord, Dorszynski v. United
States, 418 U.S. 424, 431-32 (1974); Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386, 393 (1958); see M.
FRANKEL, supra note 226, at 105-11; Wechsler, supra note 377, at 488; Note, Due Process
and Legislative Standards in Sentencing, 101 U. PA. L. REV. 257, 271-76 (1952). In United
States ex rel. Johnson v. Chairman, N.Y. State Bd. of Parole, 500 F.2d 925, 930 (2d Cir.),
vacated as moot, 95 S. Ct. 488 (1974), the court, in holding that reasons must be given for
parole denial, noted that such explanations were essential to enable courts to decide if
the parole board is "arrogat[ing] to itself decisions properly made only by the legisla-
ture...." See United States v. Norcome, 375 F. Supp. 270, 275 n.3 (D.D.C. 1974).
379. For example, the fact that the Board's implementation of incapacitative goals
meets the minimal standards of constitutionality, see pp. 866-77 supra, should not
preclude congressional review of these efforts in the light of the presently limited predic-
tive capacity of modern social science. See pp. 826-27, 872-75 supra.
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a colorable claim to represent societal moral values relevant to the
amount of punishment appropriate for certain classes of crime.380
The Parole Board's effort may well represent an understandable re-
sponse to congressional indifference toward the complex decisions in-
herent in the post-conviction process. It is illustrative of what occurs
in many areas of the law when the legislature simultaneously abdicates
responsibility and delegates authority.381 However, the Board's action
involves fundamental choices concerning societal values and policies
that are more properly within the province of Congress.
In addition to its delegation to the Parole Board, Congress has also
conferred responsibility in this area on federal district cogrt judges.
Judges make prior decisions about all of the persons over whom the
Parole Board has jurisdiction. These sentencing decisions should serve
as a guide, as well as a limit, upon the Parole Board's discretion.
However, hearing examiners generally draw no inferences about the
inmate from the length or type of sentence imposed.38 2 The sentence
imposed by the judge, whether the result of agonized deliberation or
of casually skimming a presentence report, is usually ignored. This
practice reflects the Board's effort to achieve true comparability among
persons committing similar antisocial acts. They argue that judges may
be bound by a plea agreement as to the "conviction offense" or sen-
tence, so that neither of these considerations necessarily reflects the
"true" gravity of the defendant's acts.38 3
Yet for many inmates, the Board's exclusion of type and length of
sentence from parole release decisionmaking appears to be a significant
loss. Moreover, for purposes of allocation of decisional authority among
different institutions in the post-conviction process, some of the results
of the Board's new emphasis on equality of treatment appear to give
insufficient weight to judicial determinations and to be inconsistent
380. Many "goals" of the post-conviction criminal justice system are based not upon
their relative efficacy in preventing other crime, but rather on theories that it is wrong
to disobey the law, and that therefore retribution and. community condemnation are
appropriate functions of the law. M. FRANKEL, supra note 226, at 106.
381. See generally K.C. DAvis, supra note 14; Victor, Furman v. Georgia: The Burger
Court Looks at Judicial Review, 1972 LAW AND SOC. ORDER 393.
None of the recent bills introduced to reform the federal parole system adequately
addresses these problems. See, e.g., S. 1, §§ 3831-37, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. ("Criminal Justice
Reform Act of 1975"); H.R. 2322, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. ("Parole Reorganization Act of
19715]," by Rep. Kastenmeier); H.R. 382, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (by Rep. Chappell); S.
1463, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (by Sen. Burdick); cf. Hearings on Parole, supra note 6.
382. In one case hearing examiners relied on court ordered sentence reductions in
making a decision below the Guidelines. Observation of parole hearings (1id) at Lewis-
burg FP, Aug. 1974. In two other cases hearing examiners made decisions beyond the
Guideline range because they felt the judges had been too lenient in sentencing. Observa-
tion of parole hearings (If, Ij) at Lewisburg FP, Aug. 1974.
383. See NCCD Supp. Rep. 13, supra note 67, at 4.
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with the total post-conviction scheme envisioned by Congress.3 4
One example is the Parole Board's treatment of persons sentenced
under 18 U.S.C. § 4208(a)(2). The (a)(2) sentence option enables
judges to afford the Parole Board discretion not available under the
Regular Adult one-third-of-sentence minimum to release an inmate
at any time.38 5 Although (a)(2) sentences are imposed by judges for
diverse reasons, 38 6 most judges used the (a)(2) sentence primarily for
the purpose envisioned by Congress:3 8 7 to enable the Board to release
the inmate at the moment best designed to further his rehabilitative
progress and promote his reintegration into society.3 88
Under the Guideline Table, however, inmates with (a)(2) sentences
are not distinguished from other inmates. Only if the Guideline time
falls below one-third of the maximum sentence imposed will an in-
mate with an (a)(2) sentence normally be released prior to an other-
wise similarly situated inmate with a Regular Adult sentence. 38 9 All
(a)(2) sentencees are rated on the Guideline Table at an initial hear-
ing held very shortly after commitment, and are commonly denied
384. In Snyder v. United States Bd. of Parole, 383 F. Supp. 1153, 1156 (D. Colo. 1974),
the court held that use of the Guidelines as a basis for denying parole to persons sen-
tenced under the YCA who had the highest possible Salient Factor Scores, gives rise to
an
inference ... that the board is acting on the basis of the nature of the offense and
prescribing minimum terms for narcotics violations. Such an approach would indeed
contradict the decision of the sentencing judge. It was for the court to decide whether
to impose a definite term or to use the flexibility of 18 U.S.C. § 5010(b). That judg-
ment having been made, the [Board's] emphasis must be placed upon treatment and
rehabilitation ....
This argument also would apply to persons sentenced under NARA or under 18 U.S.C. §
4208(a)(2) (1970). Accord, United States v. Norcome, 375 F. Supp. 270, 274 n.3 (D.D.C.
1974).
385. 18 U.S.C. § 4208(a)(2) (1970).
386. United States v. Zacharias, 365 F. Supp. 256 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) ((a)(2) sentence im-
posed on motion for reduction of sentence, F.R. CRIM. P. RULE 35, to permit flexible
Board response to institutional programs); Battle v. Norton, 365 F. Supp. 925, 932 (D.
Conn. 1974) (bank robbers should have long, (a)(2) sentences because "no one should be
imprisoned for a long time without the availability of administrative leniency (short of
the pardoning power) in the event of totally unforeseen circumstances, such as terminal
illness"); Project Survey of Sentencing Judges, question 9.
387. See note 81 supra.
388. Project Survey of Sentencing Judges, question 9. Out of a choice of six specified
reasons, 41 percent responded that this was their primary reason for sentencing under
(a)(2). Many judges believe that when they impose an (a)(2) sentence they are signalling
to the Parole Board that the primary factor to be considered in deciding on parole release
should be the inmate's conduct and progress during his incarceration. Project Survey of
Sentencing Judges, question 9. See United States v. Velazquez, 482 F.2d 139 (2d Cir. 1973);
United States v. Surgeon, 421 F.2d 119 (8th Cir. 1970); Rice v. United States, 420 F.2d
863, 867 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 910 (1970); United States v. Zacharias, 365
F. Supp. 256, 257 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (Weinfeld, J.). Confronted with Parole Board disregard
of the (a)(2) choice, some courts may be moved to reduce these sentences under FEn. R.
CRIM. P. 35 to compel early release; cf. United States v. Annechiarico, Criminal No. 71-
1062 (E.D.N.Y., Jan. 25, 1974) (Weinstein, J.). See United States v. Slutsky, No. 74-2041
(2d Cir., argued Oct. 21, 1974) (whether such policy constitutes new information war-
ranting sentence modification).
389. See p. 883 supra.
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parole and are given a date for another parole hearing within their
Guideline time or are continued to expiration with no further parole
consideration contemplated. As a result, (a)(2) sentencees often have
no opportunity to demonstrate the exceptionally good institutional
program achievement which may justify a decision outside the Guide-
lines.390 Indeed, they ironically have a lesser opportunity to dem-
onstrate exceptional performance than do Regular Adult sentencees,
who have served one-third of their sentence before they are classified
on the Guideline Table by the Board.3 91 Although the Board's ra-
tionale is understandable-since the rehabilitation envisioned by the
(a)(2) provision is no longer measured-its efforts to achieve equality
here result in unequal treatment for (a)(2) sentencees.3 92 Such treat-
ment seems inconsistent with the clear congressional policy expressed
in the (a)(2) statute, and the Board's failure to provide special con-
sideration for these prisoners may therefore be unlawful.393
The Parole Board's independent handling of the court-imposed sen-
tence also occurs in cases where inmates have received relatively short
terms. Inmates with sentences of under three years often receive no
serious parole consideration, because the hearing examiners know that
the mandatory release date will arrive prior to that indicated by the
Guidelines. 394 Many inmates reasonably believe that the judge must
390. 28 C.F.R. § 2.20(c) (1974).
391. Grasso v. Norton, 371 F. Supp. 171, 174 (D. Conn. 1974), appeal docketed, No.
74-1222, 2d Cir., July 2, 1974.
392. To minimize this inequality a number of courts have ordered that the Parole
Board reconsider (a)(2) sentenced inmates at the completion of approximately one-third
of their sentence. Garafola v. Benson, 505 F.2d 1212 (7th Cir. 1974); Grasso v. Norton, 371
F. Stpp. 171, 376 F. Supp. 116 (D. Conn. 1974), appeal docketed, No. 74-1222, 2d Cir.,
July 2, 1974; Diaz v. Norton, 376 F. Supp. 112 (D. Conn. 1974); cf. Stroud v. Weger, 380 F.
Supp. 897 (M.D. Pa. 1974) (review on record sufficient). Contra, Moody v. United States
Bd. of Parole, Civil No. 74-601(a) (N.D. Ga., Apr. 1, 1974), affd ner., 502 F.2d 1165 (5th
Cir. 1974). However, mere equality of treatment of (a)(2) and regular adult sentenced in-
mates does not fulfill the legislative purpose that the (a)(2) sentence encourage rehabilita-
tion. See note 81 supra.
The hearing examiners appeared to resent having to conduct "court-ordered" hearings.
At one such hearing, they decided to deny parole; when the inmate asked the reason for
the parole denial, he was told, "Your release at this time would depreciate the seriousness
of the offense committed and therefore be incompatible with the welfare of society." This
was one of four standard reasons which the Board was then relying on. The inmate then
asked: "Well, what does than mean? what do I have to do?" The hearing examiners
responded by telling him that this was a court-ordered hearing, and he was "not entitled
to any more reason that that." Observation of parole hearing (IId) at Danbury FCI, June
1974.
393. However, it must be stressed that the substantive basis for the Parole Board's
action was scientifically correct; it properly abandoned the assessment of rehabilitative
progress as the governing factor in a release decision. See pp. 826-27 supra. But given the
existence of the (a)(2) statutory provision the Board ought either to have sought congres-
sional authorization for its action or to have made special provision in its reforms to take
account of the (a)(2) sentencing alternative.
394. In several hearings observed, inmates with "short," i.e., two or three year sen-
tences were, compared to other hearings observed, dealt with relatively summarily, as the
hearing examiners went through the motions of an interview. For example in one initial
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have meant something when he imposed a short sentence, and they
resent the Board's failure to give them the same serious parole con-
sideration as is given those sentenced to longer terms.
Another point at which the Board's actions appear to conflict with
the sentencing authority of judges is in the weighing and balancing
of various factors relevant to determining length of incarceration. Be-
cause parole release decisions are now virtually determined by the
combined factors of risk prediction and offense severity, the Board
in setting release dates is often making a second evaluation of those
very factors which judges weighed in imposing the sentence. At sen-
tencing, courts are encouraged to evaluate the severity of an offense
beyond the mere facts surrounding conviction. 395 Underlying the
statutory scheme providing a range of punishments imposable for the
same conviction offense is the assumption that in order to sentence
a defendant justly, more information than is provided by the bare
fact of conviction is required.390 Were this not so, mandatory, standard-
ized penalties would be set for every penal offense. But do parole
boards need more information than is provided by the mere fact
of sentencing in order to take account adequately of offense severity?
Given the present state of sentencing law, the answer is probably
yes, since judges are not required to explain the reasons underlying a
sentence. 397 Although many judges do state their reasons, they do
hearing where the prisoner's Guideline range was substantially longer than his actual
sentence the examiners spent a total of 10 minutes making their decision to continue the
inmate to expiration. Observation of parole hearing (Ila) at Lewisburg FP, Aug. 1974.
As U.S. District Judge Joseph Tauro has commented, "There is something inherently
suspect about a policy decision which in effect tells a man sentenced for two years that
he must serve three years before becoming eligible for parole." Boston Evening Globe,
Nov. 20, 1974, at 1, col. 4.
395. Kadish, supra note 1, at 915; Kadish, supra note 148, at 813; Note, Procedural Due
Process, suln'a note 283, at 823.
396. Note, Procedural Due Process, supra note 283, at 823.
397. Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 440-44 (1974). Because of the absence of
a body of appellate law on sentencing, there is little agreement on what should be the
proper goals or criteria in sentencing. The courts have only just begun to consider the
questions of what are impermissible criteria for sentencing. See United States v. Hendrix,
505 F.2d 1233 (2d Cir. 1974); United States v. Haywood, 502 F.2d 166 (7th Cir. 1974);
United States v. Maples, 501 F.2d 985 (4th Cir. 1974); United States v. Clutchette, 465 F.2d
749, 754 (9th Cir. 1972); United States v. Wallace, 418 F.2d 876, 878 (6th Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 955 (1970); United States v. Levine, 372 F.2d 70, 74 (7th Cir. 1967);
Humes v. United States, 186 F.2d 875, 878 (10th Cir. 1951). Very few cases address them-
selves to what factors a court should consider at sentencing, or how much weight should
be accorded each factor, e.g., United States v. Daniels, 446 F.2d 967 (6th Cir. 1971) (abuse
of discretion to impose maximum sentence on Jehovah's Witness draft resister, without
giving adequate weight or consideration to substantial mitigating evidence). See United
States v. McKinney, 427 F.2d 449, 455 (6th Cir. 1970); United States v. Wiley, 278 F.2d
500, 503 (7th Cir. 1960); 41 U. GIN. L. REv. 195 (1972). Arguments against appellate review
of sentences have suggested that sentencing is not an objective decision, that no criteria,
i.e., no law, exist to provide standards of review for essentially discretionary decisions.
This argument is tautological, however, for in the absence of statutory guidelines, stand-
ards can only be developed through the process of appellate review itself. See M. FRANKEr.L,
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so only in open court.398 Indeed, although a number of judges399 and
commissions400 have recommended efforts to introduce explicit cri-
teria into the sentencing process, the general response of the judiciary
has been very unsympathetic. Therefore, rarely does the Board have
articulated reasons from the bench to guide its parole release deci-
sionmaking. Until communication between judges and parole boards
increases and becomes more particularized, 40 1 to say that the Board
should not take into account offense severity may mean that for some
defendants no official body has ever "counted" how much penalty
should be imposed for the seriousness of the offense. Presently,
however, that factor-and often no other-is counted twice. Not know-
ing whether differences in sentences reflect justifiable distinctions per-
ceived by the sentencing judge, the Board continually second guesses
the judge's evaluation of many factors. Although perhaps inevitable
under the present system of unexplained and "unreviewed" sentencing,
the Parole Board's second guess makes a mockery and often a nullity
of the sentencing process, as unknown judicial purposes may be
thwarted and further inequities introduced into the system.
40 2
supra note 226, at 75-85; Hearings on Appellate Review, supra note 227, at 87, 94-100;
Mueller, Penology on Appeal: Appellate Review of Legal But Excessive Sentences, 15
VA%-D. L. REV. 671, 684-87 (1962); Weigel, Appellate Review of Sentences: To Make the
Punishment Fit the Crime, 20 STAN. L. REV. 405 (1968); Note, What is the Proper Scope
of Appellate Review of Sentencing?, 75 HArv. L. REV. 416 (1961); Note, Procedural Due
Process, supra note 283.
398. Hearings on Appellate Review, supra note 227, at 78 (testimony of judge Weigel)
(most judges give reasons at sentencing but should not be required to); M. FRANKEL, supra
note 226, at 39-45 (criticizes judicial failure to supply reasons). SENATE Cora~irrraE ON THE
JUDICIARY, supra note 377, § 2005, would not require judges to state reasons, but does
provide for limited appellate review of sentences.
399. E.g., M. FRANKEL, supra note 226, at 108; Wyzanski, A Trial Judge's Freedom and
Responsibility, 65 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1291-93 (1952); Hearings on Appellate Review,
supra note 227, at 27 (remarks of Judge S. Sobeloff).
400. E.g., ABA STANDARDS, SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND PROCEDURES § 5.6(ii) (App.
Draft 1971); ABA STANDARDS, AP'PELLATE REVIEW OF SENTENCES § 2.3(c) (App. Draft 1968);
EUROPEAN COMM. ON CRIME PROBLEMS, supra note 361, at 28-30.
401. Communication between the federal Parole Board and sentencing judges is, at
best, erratic. M. FRANKEL, supra note 226, at 47. See p. 885 supra.
The Project Survey of Sentencing Judges explored the nature and extent of the con-
munication between courts and the Parole Board. Judges were asked, first, if they ever
communicated with the Parole Board: 75 percent answered yes, 25 percent answered no.
Of those who answered yes, 8 percent answered that they "almost never" made such
communication, 20 percent that they "seldom" did, 27 percent that they "sometimes"
did, 8 percent that they "often" did, 6 percent that they "almost always" did, and 3
percent that they "always" did. When questioned as to their means of communicating
with the Board, 59 percent said they made use of the U.S.A. 792 Form; 31 percent made
use of personal letters; 2 percent communicated by telephone; 16 percent made use of
the Judgment and Commitment Orders, and 13 percent indicated that they used "other
means." Project Survey of Sentencing Judges, question 11. It should be noted that an-
nouncing reasons for a sentence at the sentencing proceeding does not mean that thbse
reasons will appear on the Order of Judgment and Commitment.
402. Judge Tauro has complained that the Board's Guideline Table "demonstrat[es]
on its face an unauthorized usurpation of the court's sentencing responsibility and
powers .... What you have done there is effectively reverse my decision." Boston Evening
Globe, supra note 394. Other judges agree that the Board has usurped the sentencing
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The Project Survey of Sentencing Judges403 strongly supports the
conclusion that the Board's Guidelines impede judicial sentencing
purposes and ignore judges' expectations about the relation between
sentencing and parole. In the Survey questionnaire judges were asked
to rank three criteria-offense severity, past record, and rehabilitative
potential or institutional adjustment-in the order in which they
should be considered at both the sentencing and the parole release
decision of persons committed to Regular Adult and (a)(2) sentences.
Offense severity appeared to be the foremost factor for most judges
in sentencing: Fifty-seven percent of judges responding answered that
the most important factor in sentencing persons under the Regular
Adult statute was the offense severity,40 4 while 41 percent answered
that offense severity was the most significant factor in determining
sentence under the (a)(2) statute.40° However, only 22 percent re-
sponded that offense severity should be of principal importance in
the parole release decision for Regular Adult sentencees, 40 6 and only
14 percent said it should be of foremost consideration in deciding
whether to release (a)(2) sentencees. 407 In fact, most judges answered
that offense severity should be the least important of the three fac-
tors in determining parole release decisions, 408 and the overwhelming
majority indicated that the primary consideration should be the in-
mate's rehabilitative progress and institutional adjustment. 409 But the
Board's actual decisions minimize those rehabilitative and institutional
factors that judges think it ought to evaluate, 410 and redetermine as-
sessments already made by many judges about offense severity and
likelihood of risk.
function, and that their decision process may now make a "nullity" out of the judicial
sentencing decision. Interview with a federal district judge, Sept. 13, 1974; Interview
with another district judge, Aug. 29, 1974. See United States v. Norcome, 375 F. Supp.
270, 275 n.3 (D.D.C. 1974); Lupo v. Norton, 371 F. Supp. 156, 163 (D. Conn. 1974) ("judges
may... wonder why parole Guidelines specify various time periods of confinement cor-
related with various offense categories, rather than various fractions of the sentence im-
posed correlated with various offender characteristics. Under the latter approach, the
Board could still ameliorate unjustified sentence disparities by prudent departure from
the Guidelines...."); Frankel, supra note 84, at 37.
403. See note 159 supra.
404. Project Survey of Sentencing Judges, question 12.
405. Id.
406. Project Survey of Sentencing Judges, question 13.
407. Id.
408. Of the judges responding to this question, the majority (56 percent) thought
offense severity should be the least important factor in parole release decisionmaking for
(a)(2) sentenced prisoners and a plurality (45 percent) thought it should be the least
important factor for prisoners with regular adult sentences. Approximately 15 percent of
the judges did not answer this question. Project Survey of Sentencing Judges, question 13.
409. Sixty-three percent of the judges stated that rehabilitation should be paramount
for Regular Adult sentenced inmates, and 73 percent ranked it first for (a)(2) inmates. No
judge ranked rehabilitation last in the release of (a)(2) prisoners and only 7 percent felt
it should be of least importance for Regular Adult inmates.
410. See pp. 842-46 supra.
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With respect to offense severity, the Board's attempt to fill the void
left by judicial abdication of responsibility is a poor method for achiev-
ing the goals of society or preserving the individual rights of inmates.
Society's goals, be they instrumental goals of general deterrence or
moral goals of denunciation or condemnation, can better be served
in the more visible judicial forum. No matter how well publicized
Board procedures become, no matter how much light and air come
into the parole process, the courtroom is the focal point for the reso-
lution of conflicts in the criminal law.4 11 The efficacy of "deterrent"
measures depends primarily upon their being known to the relevant
audience,41 2 and sentencing policy and practices are always more easily
accessible to the general public than are parole practices. So little is
known about general deterrence, much less about the "justice" of im-
posing particular penalties in the name of retribution or condemna-
tion, that parole boards have no legitimate claim to expertise.41 3 Fi-
nally, if there is one decision on which judges feel they do not need
the Board's assistance, it is the determination and assessment of the
severity of the offense; 414 this evaluation is a peculiarly legal and ju-
dicial one, calling upon skills of comparison and differentiation in
the light of statutory definitions.415
A similar conclusion also applies to the Parole Board's use of the
Salient Factor Scale. Since research has not shown the likelihood of
recidivism to be affected in measurable ways by institutional events,
the judge could make that determination as well, possibly through use
of criteria similar to those in the Guideline Table. Judges may not
make the evaluations any better than the Board, but their visibility
is a greater aid to the accomplishment of any goals embodied in the
411. D. NEWMAN, supra note 343, at 5.
412. F. ZIMRING 9. G. HAWKINS, supra note 373, at 141-57.
413. Id. at 249-53; Andenaes, The General Preventive Effects of Punishment, 114 U.
PA. L. REv. 949, 973-81 (1966). The only factor having a measurable impact on decreasing
general crime rates is the certainty of punishment; severity of punishment is only effec-
tive as a marginal deterrent beyond a minimal level of certainty. Antunes 8- Hunt, The
Impact of Certainty and Severity of Punishment on Levels of Crime in American States:
An Extended Analysis, 64 J. CRINt. L. & CRIMIN. 486 (197,3). Although the Board's Guide-
lines may create greater certainty with respect to Parole Board actions, they have no effect
on the certainty of conviction or incarceration. See R. HooD & R. SPARKs, KEY IssuEs IN
CRIMINOLOGY 171-75 (1970); T. HONDERICH, PUNISHMENT: THE SUPPOSED JUSTIFICATIONS 40-
75 (1969).
414. M. FRANKEL, supra note 226, at 45. Judges are not unanimous in the belief that
the Parole Board should not consider offense severity at all. For example, one judge
commented that although there was a superficial incompatibility between the Board's
determination of the seriousness of the crime and the judicial responsibility and discretion
to evaluate offense severity in setting sentence, judges "expect" the Board to consider
the gravity of the offense in making a prediction of risk; moreover, he noted, because
the Board must make parole decisions for offenders with unjustifiably disparate sentences,
there was a "necessity" for the Board to consider offense severity. Interview with a federal
district judge, Aug. 29, 1974.
415. See Frankel, supra note 84.
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decision and provides an accountability factor checking arbitrary de-
cisionmaking. 416
The Board has further injected itself into the judicial arena by at-
tempting to minimize sentence disparities. 417 The Board seeks to re-
duce disparities by emphasizing "equality of treatment" in time served
by offenders with similar characteristics and similar offense behaviors.
In so doing the Parole Board has decided that sentence type and length
will not be determinative of parole outcomes. 418 Instead, the Board
seeks to make the two scales of the Guideline Table the major criteria
for decisionmaking. In effect the Board has determined that pursuing
"equality of treatment" with respect to sentence type and length would
be "unfair" 41 9 because it would result in unequal treatment of inmates
who are similarly situated with respect to other characteristics that the
Board considers more important. 420
However, there are major obstacles to the Parole Board's effort to
minimize sentence disparities. The most serious inequity in federal
sentencing practice concerns defendants who are similar in all relevant
regards, some of whom are incarcerated and others placed on probation
416. Considerations of efficiency, accuracy and fairness also support the suggestion that
the judge at sentencing should be responsible for determining the offender's Salient
Factor Score and rating the offense severity. Defense and government counsel, two
advocates presumably familiar with the characteristics of the defendant and the cir-
cumstances of the offense, are present at sentencing. See Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.S. 155
(1957); Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 741 (1948); United States v. Weston, 448 F.2d
626 (9th Cir. 1971). Defense counsel is entitled to make a statement to the court, and the
defendant has an opportunity to speak in allocution, FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(a)(1). The pre-
sentence report has been prepared for the judge, FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(1); see note 335
supra, and its contents may have been disclosed to the defendant or his counsel in ad-
vance of sentencing, FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(2); see note 259 supra. Moreover, the judge
could rate offense severity on the basis of the evidence presented at trial or, in the case
of a guilty plea, on supportable statements submitted by the defense and prosecution. See
United States v. Rosner, 485 F.2d 1213, 1229-30 (2d Cir. 1973); United States v. Weston,
supra, at 633-34. Finally, there would be little difficulty in having the judge compute the
Salient Factor Score, since all but one or two of the questions can be answered at the
time of sentencing, see note 72 supra.
417. On the problem of disparate sentences for similar offenders-and on the highly
variable nature of sentencing as manifested by "judge-shopping," see 119 CONG. REc.
S1776-82 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1973) (statement of Sen. Hruska introducing S. 716, to provide
for appellate review); Burr, Appellate Review as a Afeans of Controlling Criminal Sen-
tencing Discretion-A Workable Alternative?, 33 U. Prir. L. REV. 1 (1971); D'Esposito, Jr.,
Sentencing Disparity: Causes and Cures, 60 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 182 (1969); Comment,
supra note 227; Note, United States v. Daniels-Appellate Review of Criminal Sentencing
-Limiting the Scope of the Non-Review Doctrine, 33 U. Pir. L. REV. 917 (1972). But see
Brewster, Appellate Review of Sentences, 40 F.R.D. 79 (1965); Dix, Judicial Review of
Sentences: Implications for Individual Disposition, 1969 LAw & Soc. ORDER 369.
418. It should be noted that the Board's non-Guideline list of criteria which it may
consider in parole release decisionmaking includes several factors on sentence data, in-
cluding length and type of sentence, judge's recommendations, and district attorney's
recommendations. 28 C.F.R. § 2.19 (1974).
419. See pp. 867-68 supra.
420. The Board seems to have concluded not only that decisionmaking based on sen-
tence length would result in the unequal treatment of offenders similarly situated with
respect to offense severity and likelihood of success, but also that such decisionmaking
would serve no useful, individualizing purpose. See note 402 supra.
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due to differences among sentencing judges.421 But the Board has no
jurisdiction over those persons who are convicted but not sentenced
to prison, and therefore it cannot remedy this inequality. Further,
judges can easily circumvent the equalizing effects of the Guidelines
even with respect to those persons sentenced to prison a.4 2 2 Thus, the
Guideline Table cannot effectively minimize sentencing disparities,
and the task therefore falls upon the judiciary.4 23
In sum, the Parole Board can make no greater contribution than can
the judiciary in fairly effectuating the goals of punishment or reduc-
ing the most serious sentencing disparity. At one time it was believed
that if the release decision were made by correctional and parole ex-
perts, within a broad range of discretion provided by the court, in-
mates would be both rehabilitated and treated fairly, and parole re-
lease would come only at the point when the rehabilitative progress
of each had reached its zenith. 424 The Board itself, having abandoned
this effort, also abandoned any claim to expertise beyond that of the
sentencing judge. Further, the balancing required in every case to de-
termine what legislatively specified or inferrable goals should be im-
plemented with respect to individual offenders is a peculiarly judicial
task. Finally, the judiciary is the most appropriate body to minimize
sentence disparity. The courts have the duty and responsibility of
imposing sentences, but they have abdicated their concomitant obliga-
tion to ensure equality of treatment in the post-conviction process.
Conclusions and Recommendations
The Parole Board's articulation of standards and criteria may be
the first step toward the ultimate removal of release decisionmaking
from its hands. While the Board's efforts to insure equality of treat-
ment and rationality in decisionmaking are admirable, these efforts
421. Harries 9- Lura, The Geography of Justice: Sentencing Variations in U.S. Judicial
Districts, 57 JuDIcATuRE 392, 393-94, 397-99 (1974). BROWN COMM'N STUDY DaAFr, supra
note 377, at xl. See Seminar and Institute on Disparity of Sentences for the Sixth, Seventh
and Eighth Judicial Circuits, 30 F.R.D. 401, 442-47 (1962).
422. See pp. 883-85 supra.
423. Various alternatives have been proposed for the accomplishment of this goal:
sentencing councils, sentencing institutes, appellate review, or legislative intervention. The
Eastern District of Michigan (among others) has been employing sentencing councils for
years, in which three judges evaluate material relevant to each sentence. Upon the
basis of their evaluation and discussion, the sentencing judge may, or may not, revise his
original appraisal. See Note, The Collective Sentencing Decision, supra note 229. Such
councils have been found effective in reducing overall disparities. M. FRANKEL, supra
note 226, at 70-71; Hosner, Group Procedures in Sentencing: A Decade of Practice, FED.
PROBATION, Dec. 1970, at 18; Zavatt, Sentencing Procedure in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of New York, 41 F.R.D. 469 (1966).
424. Hearings on Appellate Review, supra note 227, at 7 (introductory remarks of Sen.
Hruska).
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have encroached upon congressional and judicial functions in the sen-
tencing scheme.
It is the leoislature's role to specify which legal institution will be
charged with implementing each of the goals of punishment. Congress
might rationally conclude that an administrative agency should have
prime responsibility for evaluating offense severity and likelihood of
risk; if this were the choice it would then be reasonable to remove
all discretion-including whether to impose probation or a term of
incarceration-from the courts. But it is difficult to see any purpose
in having two independent decisions with respect to the same indi-
vidual, based on the same data, aimed at achieving the same purpose,
unless one is explicitly and intelligently assigned as a review or check
on the other. Congress should at least clearly indicate which body has
responsibility for making particular determinations.
Were Congress to conclude, as has been suggested here, that the
balancing of offense severity and risk prediction is more properly
performed by the sentencing judge, it follows that a presumptive date
of conditional release should be set at sentencing.42 5 This process could
take several forms. For example, one model would specify that release
at that date was required unless the inmate had failed to observe the
rules of the institution, allowing only the minimal necessities of in-
stitutional administration to interfere with the inmate's achieving
conditional liberty at the presumptive release date. Under this model,
any functions now performed by the Parole Board could be served
by the Bureau of Prisons' administration of the "good time" laws.4 20
Alternatively, Congress might find that certain circumstances warrant
limited postponement of the presumptive release date. It might au-
thorize a parole board to postpone the presumptive release date upon
a finding that the inmate needed a certain amount of time to com-
plete specific institutional programs, or that there was substantial
probability, based on specific evidence particular to the individual,
that the inmate would engage in further criminal activity. Either of
these models would be preferable to the present one of largely over-
lapping decisions based on different criteria.
425. Such a system should be accompanied by much shorter maximum sentences. See,
e.g., McGee, A New Look at Sentencing, FED. PROBATION, Sept. 1974, at 3, 7; Motley, supra
note 229, at 267 (favors shorter mandatory sentences with mandatory probation for first
offenders); Pierce, Rehabilitation in Corrections: A Reassessment, FED. PROBATION, June
1974, at 14, 15.
426. If this system is adopted, with fixed, determinate sentences and the elimination
of the Parole Board, then the provision for modification of sentence should be amended
to allow the sentencing judge to respond to unexpected changes in the prisoner's personal
situation at any time before the expiration of sentence; cf. FED. R. CRINI. P. 35, 45(b) (120-
day jurisdictional limitation. But see Irizzary v. United States, 58 F.R.D. 65, 67 (D. Mass.
1973)).
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Assuming, however, that parole decisionmaking will continue basi-
cally in its present form, the results of this Project's research prompt
the following recommendations:
1) The courts should assume primary responsibility for eliminating
disparities in sentencing. The Board's attempt to do so cannot fully
remedy systemwide disparities, and results in a seemingly senseless dis-
regard of the favorable sentencing decisions some inmates receive. The
Guidelines might serve as a model for such judicial action. The Guide-
line system reasonably addresses the dual needs of minimizing dis-
parities and preserving opportunities for individualized consideration.
However, any "sentencing guideline" system would have to provide
substantive criteria to structure the decision whether to impose pro-
bation, as well as a mechanism to clarify the purposes served by par-
ticular types of sentences in order to guide later post-conviction de-
cisions.
2) The courts should articulate the reasons for imposing a given
sentence so that the Board can better take the sentence into account
in applying the Guidelines to a particular inmate. While some judges
may offer standard reasons that envision or are compatible with parole
decisionmaking under the Guidelines, a contrary judicial intention
should be made known to the Board.
3) Defendants should be made aware of the Guideline Table by the
court and by counsel, especially where a plea agreement contemplates
either an (a)(2) or (a)(1) sentence recommendation, or a recommen-
dation for a sentence so short that the inmate is likely not to be
granted parole under the Guidelines.
4) Probation officers who compile presentence reports should be
instructed how the Guideline Table works, and should then research
and write these reports with an eye toward providing the most ac-
curate information necessary for classification under the Guidelines.
5) Prior to every parole hearing, the Parole Board or caseworker
should advise the inmate of his or her tentative rating on the Guide-
line Table. This should be done with sufficient specificity to enable
the inmate to rebut any factual mistakes, to argue in mitigation of
the Offense Severity Rating, or to contend that a decision outside the
Guidelines is appropriate. When reviewing the inmate's file to pre-
pare the progress report, the caseworker should disclose to the inmate
all information in the file reasonably bearing upon Salient Factor and
Offense Severity classification, and provide an opportunity for the in-
mate to correct the file prior to the hearing. Such notification should
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occur sufficiently in advance of the hearing to allow the inmate ade-
quate time to prepare his case.
6) Where the hearing panel thinks that a decision beyond the Guide-
line range may be justified by extraordinary information in the in-
mate's files, it should disclose during the hearing all relevant infor-
mation which is in fact being considered as a basis for going outside
the Guidelines. The Board might, in its discretion, prevent disclosure
of psychiatric reports to the inmate; however, where this discretion
is exercised, the substance of the decision together with all the evi-
dence relied on should be reviewable in court.
7) Counsel or counsel-substitute should be permitted at parole re-
lease hearings, and should be permitted to perform certain adversarial
functions such as specifically rebutting the Board's evaluations or fac-
tual determinations, questioning the inmate, and presenting arguments
in favor of decisions outside the Guidelines. Counsel's presentation
might be reasonably limited in time.
8) At the hearing, information necessary for classification on the
Guidelines should be specifically discussed.
9) Reasons given by the Board for parole denial should be mean-
ingful and specific. The reasons given should reveal the factual grounds
for the loss of any Salient Factor points, the basis of the Offense Sever-
ity Rating and the basis for decision outside the Guidelines. Examiners
may wish to give inmates personal advice to participate in rehabilita-
tive or other institutional programs. However, such advice should not
be characterized as a "reason" for denial.
10) Changes in the Guideline Table's classification of offenses or
of ranges of time served for specific offenses, and other changes in the
rules and regulations of the Board affecting procedures for parole re-
lease decisionmaking, should be announced and formalized in com-
pliance with the requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act
for public notice and opportunity to comment.
These recommendations are designed to promote greater fairness and
accuracy in post-conviction decisionmaking. Given the deleterious con-
sequences of incarceration, such measures are necessary to assure the
maximum protection for individual liberty consistent with protection
of society. Furthermore, fair and accurate decisionmaking is a crucial
part of the effort to achieve equitable results in the imposition of
sanctions. Despite serious flaws, the United States Parole Board's efforts
to make explicit the criteria and priorities in its decisionmaking are
a significant step that should spur legislatures and courts into more
rational attempts to achieve the aims of the criminal justice system.
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Average Total Time Served Before Release (Including Jail Time)
OFFENSE CHARACTERISTICS:
Severity of Offense Behavior
(Examples)
LOW
Immigration Law Violations; Minor
Theft (Includes larceny and simple
possession of stolen property less than
$1,000); Walkaway.
LOW MODERATE
Alcohol Law Violations; Counterfeit
Currency (Passing/Possession less than
SI,000); Drugs: Marijuana Possession
(less than $500); Firearms Act, Posses-
sion/Purchase/Sale, single weapon-not
altered or machine gun; Forgery/Fraud
(less than $1,000); Income Tax Evasion
(less than S3,000); Selective Service Act
Violations; Theft From Mail (less than
$1,000).
MODERATE
Bribery of Public Officials; Counterfeit
Currency (Passing/Possession $1,000-
$19,999); Drugs: "Hard Drugs", Posses-
sion by drug user (less than $500), Mari-
juana, Sale (less than $5,000), "Soft
Drugs", Possession (less than $5,000),
"Soft Drugs", Sale (less than $500); Em-
bezzlement (less than $20,000); Explo-
sives, Possession/Transportation; Fire-
arms Act, Possession/Purchase/Sale,
altered weapon(s), machine gun(s), or
multiple weapons; Income Tax Evasion
$3,000-$50,000); Interstate Transporta-
tion of Stolen/Forged Securities (less
than $20,000); Mailing Threatening
Communications; Misprision of Felony;
Receiving Stolen Property With Intent
to Resell (less than $20,000); Smuggler
of Aliens; Theft, Forgery/Fraud ($1,000-
$19,999); Theft of Motor Vehicle (Not
Multiple Theft or for Resale).
OFFENDER CHARACTERISTICS:
Parole Prognosis (Salient Factor Score)
Very Good Good Fair Poor
(11-9) (8-6) (5-4) (3-0)
6-10 8-12 10-14 12-16
months months months months
8-12 12-16 16-20 20-25
months months months months
12-16 16-20 20-24 24-30
months months months months
* During summer 1974, when the authors of this Project observed parole hearings, this
version of the Guideline Table was in use. More recent revisions of the Table (28 C.F.R.
§ 2.20(f) (1974)), appear at 39 Fed. Reg. 45227 (Dec. 31, 1974) and 40 Fed. Reg. 5358 (Feb.
5, 1975).
(See Notes on following page)
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OFFENSE CHARACTERISTICS:
Severity of Offense Behavior
(Examples)
HIGH
Burglary or Larceny (Other than Em-
bezzlement) From Bank or Post Office;
Counterfeit Currency (Passing/Posses-
sion $20,000 or more); Counterfeiting
(Manufacturing); Drugs: "Hard Drugs",
Possession by drug dependent user
(.$500 or more), "Hard Drugs", Sale To
Support Own Habit, Marijuana, Sale
$5,000 or more) "Soft Drugs", Possession
($5,000 or more) "Soft Drugs", Sale
($500-.$5,000); Embezzlement (.S20,000-
.$100,000); Interstate Transportation of
Stolen/Forged Securities ($20,000-
$100,000); Mann Act (No Force-Com-
mercial Purposes); Organized Vehicle
Theft; Receiving Stolen Property
($20,000-$100,000); Robbery (No Weap-
on or Injury); Theft, Forgery/Fraud
($20,000-$I00,000).
VERY HIGH
Robbery (Weapon); Drugs: "Hard
Drugs", Possession by non drug de-
pendent user ($500 or more) or by non-
user (any quantity), "Hard Drugs", Sale
for Profit [No Prior conviction for Sale
of "Hard Drugs"], "Soft Drugs", Sale
(more than $5,000); Extortion; Mann
Act (Force); Sexual Act (Force).
GREATEST
Aggravated Felony (e.g., Robbery, Sex-
ual Act, Assault)-Weapon Fired or
Serious Injury; Aircraft Hijacking;
Drugs: "Hard Drugs", Sale for Profit
[Prior conviction(s) for Sale of "Hard
Drugs"]; Espionage; Explosives (Detona-
tion); Kidnapping; Willful Homicide.
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OFFENDER CHARACTERISTICS:
Parole Prognosis (Salient Factor Score)
Very Good Good Fair Poor
(11-9) (8-6) (5-4) (3-0)
16-20 20-26 26-32 32-38
months months months months
26-36 36-45 45-55 55-65
months months months months
(Greater than above-however, specific
ranges are not given due to the limited
number of cases and the extreme varia-
tions in severity possible within the
category)
NOTES:
1. If an offense is not listed above, the proper category may be obtained by com-
paring the severity of the offense behavior with those of similar offenses listed.
2. If an offense behavior can be classified under more than one category, the most
serious applicable category is to be used.
3. If an offense behavior involved multiple separate offenses, the severity level may
be increased.
4. If a continuance is to be given, allow 30 days (1 month) for release program
provision.
5. These guidelines are predicated upon good institutional conduct and program
performance.
6. "Hard Drugs" include heroin, cocaine, morphine or opiate derivatives, and syn-
thetic opiate substitutes.
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